NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

FOR USE IN STUDY OF AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION

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CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The Problem

It is now upward of fifty years since most areas of the African continent south of the Sahara were brought under some form of colonial administration. An important part of this process consisted in the establishment of local supervision of African tribal groups through the organization of "administrative districts" or similar subdivisions of the various colonial territories. The district is the working level of colonial administration, where two or more different cultural streams have come together over a relatively brief period of time to form what is called here "African political systems". This term is used to distinguish the peculiar phenomena of this period of transition from "tribal political systems" and from "local government", with all of the overtones which the last designation carries. The tribal system assuredly no longer furnishes the sole basis for political organization; but local government has not yet, at least in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term, come into existence. What does exist is "local administration" of African populations, a critical factor being the active participation of a significant handful of Europeans, mostly colonial officials. These circumstances create the African political system.

The essence of the problem upon which this study is focused may well be found in the failure of students of political processes in

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Africa to take full cognizance of precisely the fact which has created

the African political system. The fact is conceded, with expressions

of due concern for the results, but the full implications for political

analysis are apparently not often grasped, or certainly not exploited.

The situation was recently described very clearly by one student, as

follows:

> Generally, such published material as is available is
> of two sorts. First there is the large and growing body of
> official and semi-official literature dealing mainly with what
> might be called the ideal structure of African politics as
> conceived by colonial governments. . . . This is the litera-
> ture of what is called in British territories "Native Admin-
> istration," and it is concerned with those institutions which
> are the result of explicit planning on the part of the admin-
> istering power . . . by its very nature (this literature)
> seldom reaches deep levels of subtlety in the analysis of
> political process. It is concerned with formal arrangements,
> with the ways in which power _ought_ to flow, and it treats such
> arrangements in quite general terms. . . . It seldom concerns
> itself with the ways in which . . . indigenous diversities
> combine with the formal, official institutions to form the
> real pattern of politics within a tribal or ethnic area.
>   The second type of material generally available is that
> gathered by anthropologists in the course of investigations
> into the traditional structure of African societies. . . . If
> the official literature looks at the chief as he _ought_ to be,
> or as the District Officer hopes he will be tomorrow, the bulk
> of the anthropological literature looks at him as he was yes-
> terday. . . . Modern developments are usually mentioned in
> monographs but most often only as representing the destruction
> of the integrated social systems which existed before.

It would appear that, under the traditional academic division

of labor, and in accordance with relatively fixed habits, the disci-

pline of anthropology has tended to concentrate attention on tribal

societies and tribal political systems. Political scientists or

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[1]Lloyd Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief",
American Anthropologist, LVII (April, 1955), pp. 290-305 at p. 291.

specialists in public administration have concerned themselves with something they call "local administration", which is, however, essentially descriptive of the legal forms and the policies utilized by colonial powers. The anthropologists largely ignore or treat only superficially political developments in the colonial era, while students of "local administration" fail to use the rich anthropological literature with any degree of perception.

The quotation above demonstrates admirably the need for bringing together separate lines of inquiry in the analysis of the African political system. The student of the African political system as defined here requires, of course, a knowledge of the legal forms and of what the colonial administrator wants to accomplish, but he needs likewise emancipation from "ought" questions, and clear ideas about what the anthropological literature offers of value to his analysis.

The problem may be stated more broadly. In the processes of change involving the African political system, there will be found two patterns of political activity, the European colonial and the African tribal, modified by each other and, as time passes, by alterations in the social and economic environment of the African political system. Neither what the colonial administrator nor what the indigenous participants contribute, either jointly or severally, to the African political system may fully explain why something which takes place in the system happens so. The explanation may well lie in the environment or social matrix; the analysis cannot stop with the anthropologist's examination of the indigenous society as it was, or with the forms and achievements of "local administration" as the colonial

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administrator wishes them to be. The whole aggregate of politically relevant activity, European and African, must be taken into account. Unless this is done the what and the why of the political processes taking place may not be dealt with fully, because of ignorance or neglect of salient aspects of the situation. The governing principle is that the student should strive to omit nothing of significance. It might be added that there is a corollary, hinted at above; the student is engaged in analysis, and should strive to eliminate value-judgments, or at least to place them under rigid control.

This paper is in a sense an attack on this problem of what gets omitted and what should be omitted. It is an exercise in methodology, an attempt to assemble tools for bringing to light those whats and whys of the African political system, to search out a route of approach to the analysis of those political systems as they function and are affected by the activity of participants and by their environments. But the way in which the problem has been stated to this point leaves us with nothing less than the whole African social spectrum in its politically relevant aspects, as well as several different sets of European colonial enterprises, to provide for in a scheme of analysis. Some reduction in complexity can be achieved by considering only British colonial areas in this study, since this will considerably lessen the range of one component, colonial administrative policy and behavior, which will have to be taken into account.

There remain two originally distinct aggregates of activity, frequently characterized in dichotomies such as East-West or modern-traditional, and the problem of providing for analysis of them as a

single aggregate of activity of individuals and groups - the African political system - rather than as two or more. The aim is to be able to treat as an entity, a single political system of action. British and African patterns of political behavior as they impinge upon one another, are jointly or separately modified by circumstance and melt together into new characteristic patterns.

But the British (European) component of activity in the African political system is the more significant for present purposes, for it is European participation in affairs on the African continent which after all sets the problem of analysis; if there were no colonial policy and official activity on the ground to carry forward the policy, the problem would simply not exist because there would be no such thing as the African political system or the "modern-traditional" dichotomy with which it is involved. When viewed from this angle, the problem of analysis can be restated in the following way: during the process of establishing the African political system and after it is completed, the African participants are forced, told or asked to do or cease to do various things, the character of such activities depending largely upon time and place. In the beginning they may have to do with taxation or refraining from warlike activities or certain customs obnoxious to the colonial power, and at a later time be concerned with execution of complicated procedures in the realm of administration of "modern" public services, or even with the exercise of primary control over such services. Whatever the nature of the specific tasks, it is inevitable that the pattern of activity which the colonial official is thus engaged in encouraging must often be at odds with the normal

pattern of African activity, or at least be remote from it. To observ-
ers of the political process, the crux of the matter is this "lack of
fit", tension or discrepancy between what policy calls for and the col-
onial administrator is active in promoting, and what the African is
disposed to do. In other words, the problem of the observer is to dis-
cover the factors working for and against the achievement of the goals
of policy.

The ultimate goal of colonial policy is the _integration_ of Afri-
can behavior into whatever new pattern of activity is promoted by the
colonial power. Over the long run, to do effectively the things which
he is called upon to do in the new situation, the African must "institu-
tionalize", as standardized modes of behavior, the required patterns of
activity, so that they become part of what the individual expects him-
self to do, and part of what he expects from his fellow participants in
the African political system, including European members. To say that
behavior is integrated is thus to say that the lack of fit has been
largely eliminated. In this ideal situation, what the colonial admin-
istrator wants done is done in a reasonably satisfactory manner, with-
out undue effort on his part to achieve the end, although it may mean
some compromise with his own standards, for integration does not neces-
sarily imply true or precise fit with an ideal. It is thus because he
is concerned with political processes through which integration is reached
that the preoccupation of the observer is the factors working for or
against the achievement of given goals of policy. But although the
focus on policy furnishes a point of reference for measurement of re-
sults of the process, it does not help to uncover many of the factors

which are relevant in explaining the degree of integration achieved.

It is necessary for the observer to have what both anthropologists and the students of local administration have seemed to lack, a framework for thought and observation reasonably adequate to help them to perceive and hold in mind and in relation to one another at least the most significant factors in the situation here defined for study. The purpose of the paper is to open an attack upon this problem by fashioning such a framework or conceptual scheme to serve as a guide in the observation and analysis of the processes of the African political system.

Because the conceptual scheme is the central theme of this paper, and thus far only the barest hint has been given of its character, function and value, most of the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the conceptual scheme as a tool of analysis. Consideration will be given in successive sections to its general nature and utility, to the requirements of a satisfactory scheme and, lastly, to the device of typology as a technique for elaborating upon the conceptual scheme to facilitate analysis.

The Nature and Utility of a Conceptual Scheme

The human being lives for the most part on a conceptual plane; most of our distinctly human activity is somewhat removed from immediate sensory experience. What is experienced, except on that level, is known only as expressed in analytic concepts,[1] in relation to other analytic concepts. What is called common sense knowledge is relatively

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[1]Concepts formed by inductive reasoning from experience bound up in concepts at a "lower" level; characteristics of experience are abstracted, hence the term analytic.

casual organization of such concepts to explain, or perhaps better, to express experience. It is a system of "constructs" (read analytic concepts) against a background of unquestioned pre-knowledge.[1] Since it is casual, a certain body of common sense knowledge is likely to harbor inconsistencies and a strong increment of value judgments, and to be less complete than it might be as an expression of experience, simply because no hard, thorough analysis has been applied.

It is the ultimate end of science to explain the common sense concepts of nature in a theory of harmonized thought[2] - a body of knowledge on the level of the analytic concept, purified of inconsistencies and sufficiently inclusive that it explains and hence will facilitate prediction in some realm of experience. This is obviously not an aim to be achieved in one great leap. A first step is a reexamination of concepts and a casting up of a series of appropriately revised, interrelated concepts as the basis for a scheme of analysis of the area of experience with which one is concerned. The concepts are definitions of what is to be observed in the particular area of experience.[3] They constitute a scheme because of their hypothesized interrelationships. This conceptual scheme is really a model of the world of experience, telling us in highly simplified form (definition of concepts) what is in it and how the defined phenomena appear to interact or may be related

[1]Alfred Schuetz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (September, 1953), pp. 1-37, at pp. 3-4.

[2]Ibid. p. 2.

[3]Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), Chap. II, p. 87.

to one another. However, it is only a model, a highly provisional way of making more coherent and orderly ideas about what is experienced. It requires several more steps to reach such a degree of confirmation, through experiment and observation, of patterns of relationships that the scheme can be said to constitute a theory. In a later section it will be stated how far it is intended to go here with the series of steps which starts with tentative definition of concepts and which, in principle, culminates with a full-blown, confirmed theory facilitating explanation and prediction.

The utility of a conceptual scheme for resolution of the problems stated in the preceding section is apparent. A conceptual scheme can be valuable because it reorganizes experience in a new and broader framework, and it is precisely the partial and even casual nature of the conceptual organization of inquiry into African political systems which is one of the problems stimulating this project.

A conceptual scheme for the study of the African political system should have more than the utility of bridging the gap between the administrative specialist's and the anthropologist's terms of reference. Because such a scheme may be designed for a whole class of phenomena - such as the African administrative district and its political system - it can provide common terms of reference for analysis of data gathered from many individual specimens of the class. And since generalizations about political processes can only be made, validly, as evidence from numerous cases is amassed, uniformity in the way the various examples of the African political system are analyzed should promote eventual sound generalization. Categories or "boxes" used in common by various

students would, in theory at least, facilitate comparison of the data classified into the categories.

These two points with respect to which a conceptual scheme for the analysis of African political systems would have utility cover what might be called the "function of thoroughness." A suitable scheme might both facilitate thorough analysis of the single African political system and furnish a basis for useful generalization about the processes which occur within the class of African political systems as a whole. The other main point of utility of the consciously articulated scheme would be its capacity, noted earlier, to facilitate elimination of the inconsistencies which lurk in the common sense interpretations of a given area of experience. As M. R. Cohen puts it:

> Our safeguard against fantastic speculations and hardened prejudice is not to try to clear the mind of all pre-judgements or anticipations. That is neither possible nor desirable. We cannot by mere resolution get rid of all preconceptions, since most of them seem to us obvious or unquestionable truths, and it does not in fact occur to us to question one of them except when it conflicts with some other preconception. The hampering effect of narrow prejudice or prejudgement is reduced rather by logical analysis and reflection, which, by making our premises explicit, shows them to be a part of a larger number of possible assumptions. Reason thus enriches us with a greater number of possible hypotheses or anticipations of nature, and this makes possible a richer variety of observation.[1]

Inconsistencies thus may spring simply from too narrow a view, or from a preoccupation with "ought" questions. Whatever the case might be, the attempt at logical analysis and reflection in the form of conceptual analysis should tend to broaden and "purify" the attitude of the student toward the subject matter.

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[1]Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931), pp. 81-82.

The ethical problem faced probably almost universally by American students of colonial areas may be examined here. Underlying a study project will be an abiding concern that the immense political changes taking place in colonial areas should result in new political units in which governmental practices will be both morally comfortable from the democratic viewpoint and reasonably effective from the standpoint of the material and spiritual wants of the population. There may be allied with this feeling a wish that freedom from colonial rule should come quickly. These attitudes may skew analysis if not kept under close surveillance. Furthermore, although virtually the same set of values lies behind these attitudes, the results of efforts to implement the action called for may be contradictory; the consequences of the termination of control by a colonial power may well not be democracy and well-being. The difficulty comes down to the fact that while we have values to guide us, all are relative and conditional, none imperative and absolute, so the charting of courses of action with assurance of desirable results is a difficult thing.

The scientific ethic becomes significant at this point. If one cannot rely upon values as a guide to action, then the logical course is to attempt to establish an area of certainty by ascertaining as matters of fact the relationships obtaining in the situation with which one is concerned. Conflicting value standards are not eliminated, but the frontiers beyond which evaluation is necessary are pushed back. This scientific commitment is ethical because it rests on the imperative that for the sake of the good life the "booming, buzzing confusion" of reality ought to be studied in as methodical, dispassionate fashion as

possible in order to enlarge the area of certainty. And the conceptual scheme, as a conscious effort to articulate reality, is in line with that commitment, because it is methodical and can be dispassionate, the more so the more penetrating the logical analysis and reflection. Thus, a conceptual scheme may offer a method of eliminating diverse and partial, and value-oriented approaches to the study of African political systems. The scientific ethic may be served at the same time that the use of fairly rigorous logical techniques keeps within bounds the interest in democratic government which might otherwise seep into the analysis to its detriment as a piece of scientific work. But this does not, at least in principle and in an ultimate sense, eliminate that interest as a guiding beacon. Whatever findings or "new anticipations of nature" may come out of study within the framework of a satisfactory scheme may be employed in the interests of democratic government, for they may offer themselves as guides to appropriate manipulation of institutions.

The Requirements of a Conceptual Scheme

A conceptual scheme, if it is an attempt to improve the path which leads to scientific achievement, is more than a sorting out and labeling of things. This is done at all times and places - the old parlor game involving animal, mineral and vegetable classifications or concepts is a good illustration - and is a very useful device for straightforward descriptive statement.

The mere sorting out of parts of the whole according to some given criteria - weight, appearance, color, etc. - cannot in itself tell anything about the interrelations of these parts in the working of the whole. It can be, of course, that the criteria guiding the

sorting process are the ones most useful for comprehending the way the parts fit together, but this would be a matter of accident if the criteria were in fact generally chosen on a random, impressionistic basis.

The scientifically valuable conceptual scheme is more likely to be the one which, while aiding comprehension to the extent that any sorting activity does, is also informed by some notion of the way in which the parts fit together. The better the notion, the better the scheme. The jewels in a watch should be sorted, not with the glass lens because they seem to be of the same type of substance, but with the pivots and gears into which they fit and with which they move in the assembled watch. Some notion of this relationship would be essential to any amateur essaying the formidable task of putting together a watch, and the whole job would be done better by a professional watchmaker who had a very precisely formulated set of concepts leading to a "theory" about how watches operate.

The student who is interested in attaining the predictive results which are the ultimate end of science will therefore do well to go into a project with a set of concepts which offers at least some hope that it can be used to uncover or to clarify effectively some interrelationships among the particular set of phenomena he is interested in. Such concepts would be chosen because they seem logically to imply or point to possible relationships in the defined area of inquiry, on the basis of reasoning from the knowledge about the area already available. The study project would be successful, from the strictly scientific viewpoint,[1] to the degree that the apparent logical implications

[1]C.G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formations in Empirical Science", International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), II, No. 7, p. 46.

could be shown to coincide with what was actually found to occur, for the scheme would then be demonstrated to possess a modicum of both _systematic_ and _empirical_ import, the hallmark of a highly developed theory.

A conceptual scheme may meet certain requirements with regard to systematic application, without attaining maximum usefulness. It is also necessary that it be broad enough that the whole body of phenomena defined as the problem area can be dealt with in terms of the scheme. _Generality_ of statement in the conceptual scheme is therefore also required. If one wants a theory to cover all types of electronic devices, he will need a scheme which can take into account transistors as well as vacuum tubes.

It may be concluded, then, that the initial conceptual scheme governing an inquiry should be both systematic, in that the categories in it seem in experience to have consequential relationships with each other, and general, in that no highly significant aspects of the defined field of inquiry, insofar as these can be judged, are left unspecified.

There are, however, further considerations. Since a conceptual scheme is a device for fixing some points of reference and thus helping to bring order into what might otherwise be a confusing wilderness of facts, the fewer the concepts required the better. Rather it might be said, the fewer on the initial level of generalization the better, for many other concepts inevitably will appear as subsidiaries of the primary or major concepts in a discussion of complex matters.

The requirements of sufficient generality and of economy work in the same direction - toward a limited number of concepts in a system.

But it is also necessary that the concepts should be "operational", that is, capable of application without undue confusion or ambiguity as definitions of what is to be observed in the field of inquiry. It would of course be relatively useless to have a conceptual scheme which could not be applied with reasonable certainty of what phenomena the concepts referred to. There is thus a methodological dilemma: on one hand, generality and parsimony are required to override the multiform data; on the other, the concepts adopted must have clear reference to empirical phenomena of significance to the political system. The dilemma can only be resolved by a decision to deal through the primary concepts only with what one considers the most significant or strategic clusters of data. The selection of concepts is therefore, within limits, a matter of choice. The choice depends upon the particular interests which have drawn one to the problem, since these will provide criteria of significance to guide the sacrifice.

This use of certain criteria of significance in selection of concepts is related to what is always listed as another requirement of concepts in a scheme - that they should be "fruitful". This means that the system of concepts used should have some explanatory power regarding relationships found in the data which was not possessed prior to formulation of the conceptual scheme and its application. This is that "empirical import" mentioned above. But the explanatory power obviously depends on the level of generality, which in turn is related in part to what one is interested in. "Fruitfulness" is relative, therefore, an injunction to keep looking for something better in the way of concepts for use in explaining what one is interested in explaining.

Typology and Comparative Analysis

The object of inquiry in this paper is the African political system, which has been defined as something shaped out of the activities of European officials and others, and of Africans, in the administrative district or other such territorial unit. This implies that the concern is with the impact of European upon African societies, essentially - of the modern world upon the peasant and herding economies of Africa - with reference to the forms and processes of political control. As a beginning, one can enunciate the common sense assumption that the consequences of the impact will be similar in some respects, different in others, over the whole range of African societies. The basic problem for any student interested in comparisons of the differential effects of contact with the West will be to search out the similarities and differences and to try to find reasons for them.[1]

In undertaking the design of a scheme of analysis of African political systems, the aim is to find a certain limited number of concepts which, when taken together, will include within their definitions the most significant phenomena in the African political system and display them in terms of their causal relationships with one another. The scheme resulting from this research and contemplation is supposed to be applicable in analysis of all African political systems. The implication, therefore, is that the scheme will focus on demonstrations of the similarities of all these political systems, as they are affected by

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[1]Cf. H. Becker, Through Values to Social Interpretation, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1950), pp. 93-94. "If sociology, in particular, means anything at all, it means at least the ability to say wherein the society in question is like other societies and wherein it differs from them."

their contact with European influences. All superficial indications to the contrary, it is supposed, it is possible through a process of analysis and abstraction to show how all these systems are alike in the most significant elements entering into the political process.

It is important to establish these basic similarities in African political systems. But once it has been shown that elements conceptualized in the scheme are always present and significantly interrelated with one another, a dead end is reached. As Becker has remarked, "If everything is absolutely different, there can be no analysis; if everything is absolutely identical, there can be no analysis."[1] One is in the position, if the emphasis is solely upon the similarities of political systems as highlighted by the conceptual scheme, of closing off the possibility of explaining obvious variations in the situations because there is no allowance in the scheme for differences. One can logically discuss only the general interrelationships of the elements falling under the various concepts, not variations in their interrelationships under different conditions.

"Without properly sifting out different dimensions of situations, it is impossible to determine whether two situations are either significantly different or similar."[2] So speaks another writer, and his dictum points the way to a solution to the problem: different "dimensions" must be established so that there will be a basis within the logical structure of the scheme for possible prediction of varying results in the interaction of the elements or concepts which the scheme

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[1] Ibid., p. 114.

[2] Alvin Gouldner (ed.), Studies in Leadership, (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 39.

will assert are common to all African political systems.

The problem relates to typology - literally, the science of types, but here defined less grandiosely as having to do with the establishment and employment or interpretation of types or categories of phenomena in analytical work. Type and dimension are in effect identical in meaning, for they both refer to variations among phenomena according to which they are differentiated and sorted out into distinct categories. The establishment of types is concerned with determining dimensions according to which categories can be set up, and employment of types with interpreting the significance of differences or similarities established in this fashion. In other words, the "sifting out" of dimensions is a step preparatory to the searching out of the causal significance of the various types or dimensions[1] for the processes or forms in which they are elements.

When this point is reached, one arrives at the core of the problem of typology. In the first place, it is possible to establish innumerable types; some anthropologists have gone so far as to describe for a single society up to 7633 "culture traits",[2] i.e., types. But the value of types lies in what they are significant for. The type called the African political system as of now is useful for descriptive purposes - it is distinguished, for example, from South

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[1] In this definition of typology the meaning which is apparently traditional in theology is followed: namely, typology is the interpretation of types. (See Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.) The Eucharist, for example, as a type of ritual, is claimed to be foreshadowed in the Old Testament by the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. The interpretation is that they are comparable, having the same significance. And of course, for there to be interpretation of types, types first must be established.

[2] M. J. Herskovits, Man and His Works, (New York: Knopf. 1948), p. 173.

American marketing practices - but it is not significant for explanation or prediction. The idea that a type should be thus useful is what lies behind the injunction that the concepts in a scheme should be "fruitful", and it is the very lack of such an idea which makes much classification relatively pointless.

In the second place, the establishment of a type not only needs to be accompanied by some idea of use for interpretive purposes, but the notion of its significance needs to be confirmed and confirmable by examination of empirical data. Presuming that certain types have been established with some prior notion of their significance for one another, the next step is to employ them as elements in a hypothesis embodying the notion and then to test the hypothesis. As Becker puts it: "We can say, 'Given such and such circumstances, these consequences are likely to ensue', and then we inspect the 'historical record' and/or the record of 'contemporary events' to find out whether our generalizations . . . are pragmatically verified or not."[1] The circumstances will be, of course, the types of phenomena associated in the analytic scheme, the consequences, the types of phenomena which result.

If the presumption is removed that the conceptual scheme to be developed in this paper will be confirmed by the data, a third point may be taken up. The analysis of a phenomenon such as the African political system will resemble the probable conduct of an inexperienced hand asked to put together a series of watches of various makes and degrees of complexity. What presents itself is a formidable array of possible ways of classifying the parts, combined with only a very sketchy notion of the significance of the parts for one another and hence for the

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[1]Becker, op. cit., p. 119.

watch as a whole. In other words, each type of part for each watch exists more or less in isolation from its significance, the abstracted concept apart from the analytic scheme in which it may have a place - if that place can be determined by interpretation of the type.

The first step must be, through a process of abstraction, to make out something about the parts there are, to establish sub-types of parts. Then somewhere in this process a beginning is made at determining their interrelationships and working out a simple analytic scheme involving the main parts. Presuming that all the watches have this same basic mechanism, the type of the watch will have been tentatively established and a basis for comparative work created by showing that the various devices are not absolutely different.

This is the point which, for purposes of discussion, the conceptual scheme is assumed to have reached. Until at least this much is done, the identity of African political systems as a type, on any basis other than that apparent in the terms "African", "political" and "system" cannot be taken as confirmed.

Returning to the watches, it will be found that much remains to be done before they will operate: i.e., before a complete theory of watches is worked out. Many lesser parts of apparently heterogeneous character will need to be sorted out and a place in the workings found for them. This again means abstraction of types and interpretation of their significance for other parts of the watch, and might mean separate attention to each watch, or to groups of watches, depending on the variations found. Differences in detail between individual

watches or among groups of them would furnish a basis for establishment of sub-types, and invite comparison.

Again, the problem in analyzing African political systems is similar. The "main parts" must be the primary concepts of the scheme of analysis. But to get on with the analysis, once the relevance of these concepts is established for the data on the political process in an administrative district or districts, the "lesser parts" must also be taken into account. In effect, what must be done is to elaborate upon the conceptual scheme after it has been established as a basis for distinguishing the type of the African political system, seeking to establish differences and their significance within the framework of a basic identity. A complete job would, of course, constitute achievement of the utopian condition of absolute knowledge and hence ability to predict unfailingly; and it cannot here be hoped to make more than a beginning, following the reasonable course of starting with relatively simple problems of analysis and then proceeding to the more complicated ones.

The Program of Analysis

These considerations lead to the question of exactly what it is proposed to do in the subsequent chapters. The basic purpose of the project is to work out a conceptual scheme which will include within its scope the more significant phenomena to be observed in the African political system and, through the interrelationships which may be hypothesized among the concepts, will provide a framework for analysis of what does and may occur in the system. The steps by which it is proposed to proceed can be outlined as follows:

1. In the next chapter a general orientation for the project

will be established. The main item will be an explanation or defini-
tion of what is meant by the term political system, with a statement of
the general character of the relationship of the political system to
other human systems of action. Then an initial typology[1] of British
colonial policy with respect to local administration will be worked out
as a starting point for analysis.

2. The conceptual scheme itself will be derived in the succeed-
ing chapter, in conjunction with the examination of the data concerning
a particular tribe and the development of colonial administration.

3. Continuing with the same tribe, and utilizing the typology
of policy, the applicability of the scheme as a tool for analysis of
events will be demonstrated.

4. Thereafter, the analysis will shift from a particular tribe
to the general level of African political systems. In the seventh chap-
ter, the objectives of British policy will be characterized in a dif-
ferent way, this typology being in terms of the behavior required of
the African. In this and the eighth chapters, an attempt will be
made to relate these types of policy objectives to the kinds of behav-
ior reported to be typical of Africans in pre-contact tribal systems,
and to modifications in behavior induced by the impact of the modern
world upon African society, economy and beliefs. These chapters con-
stitute elaborations of the conceptual scheme, therefore, the assump-
tion being that the conceptual scheme valid for one African political
system will be valid for all.

5. The final chapter will sum up the general line of argument
and offer suggestions concerning the utility of the scheme and the
development of its potentialities.

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[1]The word "typology" is used here to refer, not to the process
of establishing and interpreting types, but to the classifications or
categories of phenomena which result from the first phase of the process.

CHAPTER II

THE AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM:

A GENERAL ORIENTATION

Introduction

The initial difficulty in attacking the problem just outlined
is that of achieving a general orientation or frame of reference which
will encompass the extreme diversities in the phenomena under examin-
ation. A conceptual scheme is a scaffolding which one utilizes in
putting the various factual items into place, and a scaffolding re-
quires not only materials and a plan for putting them together, but
also some prior idea as to siting and orientation.

The formulation of this frame of reference involves (1) some
indication of the relations of the "political system" to the surround-
ing terrain, (2) a definition of the important characteristics of a
political system, making it clear how one can be identified, and (3) an
indication of how the idea of political system can be put to use in e-
recting the conceptual scaffolding. Consideration of these points be-
gins with the idea of society as the matrix in which the political
system is embedded.

The Political System: Functional Basis and Controlling Conditions

To explain the phenomenon of human society, it is necessary to

search out non-genetic factors[1] as well as genetic ones, which operate to integrate the individuals in an aggregate or crowd into a cooperating whole. Nothing is more evident than that man may be found pursuing a multitude of ends through a multiplicity of means, that he is a creature of purpose or free will, within wide limits. It is therefore essential to show how a theoretically possible chaos of behaviors is reduced to patterns of generally compatible activities, so that millions and hundreds of millions of individuals can now live together in societies displaying high degrees of integration. Much of social, political and psychological theory constitutes an implicit recognition of this question, for one dominant concern through the ages has been advocacy of particular "fundamental factors" (God's Will, the social contract, etc.)[2] as both explanations of the existence of society and foundations for policy in obtaining a concordance of human purposes.

The vastly expanded knowledge of cultures accumulated during the past one hundred years or more has served to sharpen the difficulties of explanation in terms of any single factor or any narrow group of factors by making it clear that the possible permutations of social forms are apparently almost infinite. The realization of the vast range

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[1] In contrast to non-human societies, where the evidence indicates that in general such societies are "a function of organic evolution", and change form only through biological mutation. See Kingsley Davis, Human Society (New York: MacMillan and Co., 1950), pp. 31 ff., for a discussion of the differences between "bio-social" (non-human) and "socio-cultural" (human) social systems.

[2] R. T. LaPiere, A Theory of Social Control (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), Chap. I, offers a good, brief discussion of suggestions from various philosophers and other theorists regarding the factors underlying social control, or integration.

of variation possible has driven generalization about integration to a much more basic level. A typical "scientific" explanation of society at the present time will therefore propose categories of integrative mechanisms which can be applied to any human society, being founded on the notion of functions which must be performed as prerequisites to social existence as we know it, and which, taken together, are logically capable of covering the entire range of human behavior in society.

A scheme of integrative mechanisms which meets these requirements in good measure might offer the following "elements of integration": biological, socializing, economic, religio-moral and political. Since the problem here is to map the relation of the political system to the rest of society, there is no need to assert the validity of this particular classification over any other. The elements listed merely occupy a place where something of the sort must be put, if the existence of human society is to be accounted for, and this list seems as plausible as any developed out of a notion of function.

The functional bases of all but the element of political integration need be sketched only briefly.[1] The race must be reproduced and the young be cared for and protected for the relatively long period until they can care for themselves. The element of biological integration expresses the social consequences of this requirement. Furthermore,

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[1] The background and some of the material for this discussion may be found in H. J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), where an extended treatment of "functional requisites" and of the "structural requisites" through which they are met is offered. Davis, op. cit., pp. 135-144, supplements this with an enlightening discussion of modes of integrating ends in society. See also J. W. Bennett and M. M. Tumin, Social Life - Structure and Function (New York: Knopf, 1952), especially pp. 41-59.

it is necessary that into the young or inexperienced there be inculcated the complex techniques of coping with the human and material environment. "Socialization" as an element of integration expresses the social consequences of this requirement. The material bases for life and other desired ends are haphazardly distributed and generally scarce, and furthermore can often better be attained by joint effort. The element of economic integration expresses the social consequences of the requirements of manipulation and redistribution implied here. Man must deal with much of his environment, and certainly with the ultimate problem of his own existence, in terms not of knowledge but of faith and belief which have no certain foundation in nature. This includes dealings with fellow humans, who are highly uncertain factors. The element of religio-moral integration expresses the social consequences of the requirement that the environment be interpreted so that an individual can grasp it as a basis for action.

For what functional requirement does the element of political integration express the social consequences? All of the above elements draw human beings together, if one can trust the evidence. But even when the forces so designated are operating, a need for further integration arises. There is no process of "natural evolution" through which is achieved a perfect fit between what is expected in a social unit and what is actually done, or even feasible. There is no automatic agreement on the value of things or how events are to be interpreted and dealt with. Conflicts with regard to scarce desired ends and the activity calculated to obtain them will inevitably occur within the group. There will also be a problem of group relations with outsiders

and perhaps with the physical environment as well. Such questions demand solutions, and herein lies the functional basis for the element of political integration.

Of course, in the absence of purpose, or if individuals or groups holding certain ends or purposes in view are not in contact, there would be no basis for asserting that the element of political integration will manifest itself. Apathy and non-contact thus constitute situational limits for the political system. Some students would also hold that a condition of anarchy - "the absence of government"[1] - is another such limit, but this conflicts with the concept of relations with outsiders as a functional basis for a mechanism for or element of political integration. War is anarchy, as a state of relations between two groups, but it is activity directed toward at least a minimum of integration of incompatible purposes, and is thus political in nature. Chaos - "the utter negation of order", a confusion of blindly caroming atoms after the Lucretian vision - as random, apparently purposeless activity is a better limit than anarchy for the political system. Yet a fourth limit may be distinguished: namely, the unit under examination. This is more or less arbitrarily established by the assertion of two things, that in the unit to be isolated for examination there is a political process directed toward integration which is sufficiently distinct from other such processes as to render examination feasible, and the definition of the boundaries and hence components of the unit to be examined. Such a limit is already established here by definition of the African

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[1]This definition of anarchy and that of chaos given below are from the Concise Oxford Dictionary (4th ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951).

administrative district or other similar unit for local administration
as the subject of analysis, and the notation that the African political
system operating within such a unit comprises two main components, the
European and the African participants.

What Is a Political System?

Thus far, the term "political system" has been used without def-
inition, although it will be clear enough from the usage above that the
political system comprises human activity, within the various limits
indicated, identifiable with the element of political integration. It
is now time to set about deriving some ideas of what is meant here when
the term is used, by defining "system" and then passing to considera -
tion of what is "political".

A system may be defined as the "interaction of a plurality of
individual actors oriented to a situation".[1] There is implied in the
fact of interaction an interdependence among the participants or "act-
ors". As one author states, "The basic criterion for distinguishing
a system is interdependence. Interdependence may be identified as a
situation in which change in one part of a system results in changes
through other parts of the same system".[2] Furthermore, since there is
also _orientation_ to a situation, and hence presumably at least a mod-
icum of ends and purposes present as activity of the participants, a
system will comprise determinate, not chaotic behavior. For a system

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[1]Talcott Parsons, _The Social System_ (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free
Press, 1951), p. 5.

[2]Scott A. Greer, _Social Organization_ ("Short Studies in Soci-
ology"; Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 49.

to exist, in other words, it must lie this side of the limits represented by apathy or non-contact, so that individuals affect one another by their activity, since if it did not there would not be interaction, and it must also lie this side of the limit represented by chaos. This would be true of the political system, because there would be no basis outside those limits for the mechanisms of political integration to manifest themselves, and it would equally be true of other systems of human action, such as the economic, identified with the other elements of integration.

The fact of orientation to a situation is the final aspect of the definition to be considered. It is this which permits one to say that there is a system of human action, be it of a political, economic or other character, identified with each of the elements of integration. Presumably, certain functional requirements for the existence of human society lie behind each of the elements distinguished as integrative mechanisms. Human activity in the forms of these mechanisms is necessary if the society is to survive, and therefore it can be said that the meeting of the functional requirements is the situation to which a particular form of activity is oriented. The elements of integration are, then, made operative through and identified with certain systems of action.

The discussion may now proceed to the definition of that type of activity called political, which, as aspects of observed behavior, constitutes the political system. From the discussion of the element of political integration and the limits of political and other systems of action, it would appear that conflicting or incompatible ends or purposes

held by individuals or groups in contact and interplay is the situation which gives rise to political activity. The function of the element of political integration and hence the system of action identified with it is to affect the situation of conflict or incompatibility in such a way as to reduce the strain on human association to or below a point where the social relationship in question can exist. Political activity, then, and politics as the processes of the political system of action, consists in consideration of, decisions regarding and behavior effectuating decisions concerning conflicting ends and purposes. When there is interaction in a social unit of whatever size, centering about problems of "what should be done" or be made to happen within or on behalf of the social unit, it may be called political activity. The unit may range from two individuals to a number of nations; the essential thing is that purposes or ends should be at issue despite the operation of the other elements of integration, so that there is a felt need for reducing tensions which result from the condition. This does not necessarily imply a highly self-conscious, rational process of politics, but may mean simply a rather vague awareness of the existence of strain or cross-purposes which call for working out.

It will be noted that in presenting this definition of the activity called "political", nothing was said about the character of the ends and purposes toward whose integration the activity is directed or the character of those in terms of which it is defined. This omission is related to the way in which the systems of activity identified with the various elements of integration are formulated. They are constituted analytically, by abstraction of certain aspects of behavior from

the mass of observed activity, through a process of classifying behavior according to notions of basic function. Thus, it might be said that a man is "playing politics" when he might ostensibly be giving instruction at a school of economics, and hence carrying on activity which also has both socializing and economic functions involved as aspects of behavior. The various aspects of behavior to which the elements of integration as outlined above refer are rarely if ever found in isolation from one another. Aspects of several or all may be perceived in a single act, as in the illustration of the economics teacher, or within a social unit or concrete system of action, such as a business firm, club or office.[1] The combinations may vary, so that units may be classified as "predominantly" political, economic and so forth. In such cases, no one aspect or one analytic system of action can stand alone as an explanation of events. The point is, of course, that political needs or purposes are but one of many kinds mingled together in concrete acts or systems of action.

The consideration of what is "political" will be incomplete to the degree to which the character of ends and purposes is ignored, for in analysis which utilizes a notion of function, the ends and purposes involved in activity must necessarily be assumed to be related to the function of that activity. It is therefore necessary to consider the nature of "political" ends and purposes as well as identify the kind of activity which we call political.

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[1]Such units are systems of action, for they meet all of the criteria laid down in the definition of system. They are called concrete systems of action to distinguish them from the analytic systems of action such as those under discussion here, and so-called because they are derived by a process of abstraction on a relatively higher level of analysis.

While in reality, it would seem, no social unit or concrete system of action can be explained in terms of one element of integration alone, it is nevertheless logically conceivable that a unit could be of a "pure" political type, displaying no activity which could be classified analytically under any of the other elements of integration. But what would this mean in terms of the ends and purposes involved? As Bertrand de Jouvenel defines "pure" political activity, it comes about when

> The association (social unit) is no longer a means subordinated to some particular end, but . . . it is itself considered to be an end . . . the activity in forming and maintaining groups is political in form. Its objective can be heterogeneous to it. When there exist homogeneity of the goal of the action and its form, when the associational activity has for a final end the existence of the group, that is politics in its pure state.[1]

In other words, if a social unit were to exist and have as its sole end or purpose that existence, if there were integration of individuals or groups for the sake of that integration alone, that unit would be purely political. In that case, it would not exist for the sake of getting agreed choices and priorities of activity respecting a wide range of conflicting values, but would have either to be the expression of absolute altruism or to rest on the pinpoint of a "will to power", the sole end or purpose thus being a molding of the human clay because the clay is there to mold.

Such a state of affairs is difficult to imagine, for it presupposes a total divorcement of the individuals carrying on the political

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[1]See William H. Harbold, "Bertrand de Jouvenel on the Essence of Politics", Western Political Quarterly, (December, 1953), pp. 742-749, on p. 746.

activity from society in its other aspects, and that is difficult to achieve because such individuals will also have functional requirements which can be fulfilled only in society. One could only assume non-existence, for such participants in the "pure" political activity, of other ends and purposes, or accomplishment of them through other systems of action. The ascetic, the prison-keeper or the conqueror might come closest to the mark. The end or purpose par excellence of political activity is control. In the social unit comprising nothing but political activity the purpose of control would be the final end, there being no underlying ends or purposes to be accomplished through that control as a means, an intermediate end. In the "predominantly" political unit, however, the main end or purpose will certainly be control, directed at least to some extent toward accomplishment of ends and purposes of other kinds.

Such a political unit, although constituted for the purpose of control, must also have reference, in the distinctly political activity within it, to the whole social experience of the individuals or groups involved in the unit. Purposes other than altruism or the will to power must always be present, and for the most part it will be these that make explicable the effort to control which constitutes political activity. Activity classifiable under the other elements of integration will also refer to the same types of purposes, at different stages of their progress toward fulfillment in the concrete system of action. It is for this reason that the various elements of integration, when sought to be abstracted as distinctive types of activity, are found to be so complexly interwoven with one another in concrete systems of action.

The locus of study, the African administrative district, is a concrete system of action or social unit, as these terms have been used here, and more particularly it is a predominantly political unit, because it was established expressly for the purpose of control. But it is not at all close to the "pure political" end of the spectrum, for the administrative unit is superimposed upon a number of concrete systems of action. The grist for the political mill of the administrative district is provided by individuals and groups involved in these units also, so that the social purposes and various modes of integrating them have a bearing on the political system of the district.

Phases of Policy and the African Political System

If the idea of a system as the "interaction of a plurality of individual actors oriented to a situation" is accepted, then the starting point for determining the shape of the system is to ascertain the situation toward which the behavior of individuals may be oriented. For the political system, that situation will always be a policy or an issue of policy, the courses of action suggested or resolved upon, answering the question of what should be done about problems facing some at least of the members of a social unit. Policy concerns the directions in which control should be permitted, stimulated or carried forward, and since it involves purposefulness, implies choice among alternatives with respect to the ends and purposes which should be promoted, suppressed or accorded changed priority through appropriate adjustments in the behavior of members of the unit. As the earlier discussion of limits suggested, it is to the extent to which individuals are concerned and to a significant degree somehow involved with the

questions of the directions which activity might take, or with performance once direction has been decided upon, that a political system exists.

The political system is thus a complex of activity which forms itself and turns on a policy or policy proposal. This is the fundamental notion, from which it follows that the political system changes shape as the focus of interest shifts from problems of policy concerning certain matters to questions regarding other matters. At an extreme, each policy measure might be regarded, therefore, as producing its own political system, its own unique complex of activity revolving on the problems at hand.

Turning to British Africa to apply this theory, one can readily ascertain that at a minimum there are two sets of purposes, British and African, at work. The interaction of these two sets of purposes sketches the main outlines of the African political system, for contact emphasizes discrepancies in ends and purposes and thus creates problems of policy and a situation toward which activity must above all be oriented. Obviously, British intentions and purposes will be dominant and compelling for the political unit, which in this case is the administrative district. This is of course the essential significance of the word "colonial" as applied to African territories; for the British resolve to exercise control is of over-riding importance.

Since this is the case, the standpoint that must be adopted to achieve the general orientation which is the objective here is that of British policy. When this is said, however, there immediately arises the question - which policy? The extremes logically would be either to define a political system by reference to the situation created by having

a colonial policy at all, or a distinct political system for each distinct policy measure. As the present purpose is preparation for comparative analysis, neither extreme has great value, the former being so excessively broad in scope, as the genesis of the political system, as to include everything, the latter having very limited usefulness for comparative work, since unique policies can only be assumed to produce unique political systems. It is necessary to strike a mean. This can be done if certain types of policy are drawn out of the historical material.

The concept of types of policies and political systems is particularly well-suited to the African scene, for the observer can block out a series of types of policy by reference to the history of colonial administration. Owing to the very short history and the continuous nature of such administration, certain types of policy are a matter of recent historical record, each developing as an elaboration upon the previous type. A list of the types of policy which appear to offer the best possibilities for separating out political systems for study is offered below:

I.   Establishment of public order – suppression of warlike activities, slave and cattle raiding; the opening of the country to trade; and enforcement of African recognition of the authority of the European overlord and its colonial agents.

II.   "Supervision" of the African tribal society – simple forms of taxation, and regulation of some African activities by edict of the administrative organization carrying out the supervisory activity; minor public works largely carried out by African labor corvees called out

at the behest of the administration; a certain degree of application of European legal concepts and practices.

III.   Reform of the African economic, social and political systems - development of devices for financial and administrative control within the African sphere of activity, of social services, and encouragement of local initiative in such measures of change.

IV.   Establishment of representative local institutions for political control.[1]

It will be noted that these various types of policy arrange themselves in order from an approximation to the system of "pure" political activity in Type I, wherein the colonial authorities need not pay much attention to the purposes embodied in the values held by African tribesmen, to Type IV, in which the fullest possible account is supposed to be taken of the purposes motivating the population under administration. Correspondingly, the range of activity involved in the African political system increases as new policies supersede and incorporate the old; for under Type I the main purpose is control, very nearly for the sake of control as a final end, and under the later types such control becomes more an intermediate end, a means to achieve other purposes. For this reason, the latter two or three types are of primary interest here, for they represent more contemporary phases, full of change in many directions. Type I, as a separate policy rather than an aspect of a broader one which has superseded and incorporated

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[1]In order to distinguish the political systems formed about these types of policy from the general concept of the African political system formed by European-African contact, the former will henceforth be called "policy systems", e.g., the policy system of reform.

it, is in any event a matter of history, for everywhere in Africa colonial policy has moved beyond this stage. The type will be used here, in the next chapter, solely to help derive a scheme of concepts.

Equilibrium and Policy

The notion of policy systems is of great value for two reasons. First, it opens the way to comparative treatment of political systems in British Africa, for the typology of policy has been developed in such a way that it is very widely applicable in those territories, and quite possibly elsewhere. It is of course possible to derive from the data many other typologies of policy, but this one seems the most useful for present purposes, both because of this generality of application, and because it springs to the eye from the historical narrative. Second, it gives a criterion of what to look for. It is now only necessary to decide whether and how a particular activity bears on the issue or type of policy - the political situation - which has been singled out for examination. However, the ability in principle thus to separate the wheat from the chaff is only the beginning in developing methods for the study of African political systems. The total pertinent activity, when found, must be reduced to order, so that the task of establishing the nature of the political process will be manageable.

The first task faced after having identified the aspects of activity which constitute the political system will be to show how the items of behavior thus identified affect one another. It is assumed, of course, that they will be causally related, for the assertion that a system exists implies interdependence or interaction.[1] In actuality,

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[1]See page 28.

the existence of such interdependence is easily demonstrable; much of
the subsequent discussion will be devoted to showing how the data on
certain African political systems reveal interdependence among elements
in the system. There would of course be no need to go further than
such data if interest lay solely with showing interdependence. However,
the problem of showing the effect of items of behavior on one another
is also the problem of drawing out the consequences of the interdepen-
dence one perceives. In the case of the political system, it is in
terms of the ways in which the forces brought to bear in a political
situation are combined or interact upon one another that the ultimate
direction taken, the success or mutation of policy, can be explained,
and this explanation requires the drawing of consequences.

The concept of equilibrium is of great assistance in devising
a mode of attack on this problem. If there is interdependence and
hence system, the concept descriptive of the persistence of the sys-
tem over time is equilibrium, which may be defined as a condition in
which "the state of the elements . . . is such that any small change
in one of the elements will be followed by changes in the other ele-
ments tending to reduce the amount of such change".[1] Conversely, of
course, the non-persistence of the system, implying changes in the
various parts or elements of the system such that interdependence
arising out of a common orientation to a situation ceases to be, could
be described as "loss of equilibrium", and the tendency toward this
condition as "disequilibrium". The same basic concept is thus descrip-
tive of the condition of the system in either case.

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[1]George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Co., 1950), pp. 303-304.

System, interdependence and equilibrium thus imply one another.[1]
There are two ways of using this cluster of concepts. One might start
from the established facts of interdependence and try to show how the
interaction contributes to the continued existence of the system which
they comprise. Or one can start from the fact of continued existence
over time and try to discover the relations of the elements which, it
is reasoned, must be present in order for the system of action to per-
sist. In either case, equilibrium is postulated as an optimum condi-
tion of the system of action, in which a tendency toward change is
checked by a counter-tendency and with reference to which it is asked
what tips the balance for or against the survival of the system. When
this is done, there is a standard against which to draw out the conse-
quences of the relationships among the elements of the system; these
relationships are either such that a condition of equilibrium exists or
such that it does not, and from whichever situation is found can be de-
rived an explanation of the fate of the system or a prediction of its
future.

From this exposition of the nature and use of the concept of
equilibrium can be derived some lessons concerning the problem of draw-
ing the consequences for the African political system of the relations
among its interdependent elements. Policy is the nucleus about which
the political system forms and revolves, and in the present case, an
indication as well of the idea of the optimum state of the system which
is held by the colonial authorities. It is in this latter aspect a
statement of the ideal condition to which it is desired that the results

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[1]David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953),
pp. 270, 291.

of the interaction of the elements in the system should approximate.
As such, a policy (at least a realistic, workable one) is the resultant
of the impact of various forces and as well a forecast of the future
weight of impact of these and any other forces which it might appear
necessary to take into account as elements in the political system which
will form about the policy. Implied in a policy calling for control in
certain directions are predictions concerning at least the major helps
and hindrances to be encountered in the relationships established with-
in the system, including the activity the policy-making officials them-
selves propose to engage in.

Viewing policy in this light, one can regard it, as formulated
by the colonial authorities, as a definition of a state of equilibrium
which will come about if the prediction of the forces brought to bear
by the elements of the system in their multiform relationships is cor-
rect. It thus provides a standard in reference to which the consequen-
ces of the relationships in the system can be drawn. Knowing the course
of action which the responsible officials plan for a political unit,
the observer's task is to find out how the different elements - includ-
ing the colonial servants - interact to produce a greater or lesser
conformity with the ideal result envisaged in the policy. When this
attitude is adopted, the observer is taking as his standard what Homans
calls a moving equilibrium; that is, "the state of the elements that
enter the system and of the relations between them, including the be-
havior of the leader, is such that disobedience to the orders of the
leader will be followed by changes in the other elements tending to
bring the system back to the state the leader would have wished it to
reach if the disobedience had not taken place."[1]

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[1]Homans, op. cit., p. 422.

Utilizing this standard, one will find that either the relationships among the elements are such that a condition of equilibrium (a "successful policy") exists and the policy system is surviving, or that the reverse is true and the policy has broken or is breaking down. That is, the control exercised by colonial officers will either suffice or not suffice, in the existing state of the other elements, to accomplish the goals of policy. As a matter of fact, in the present instance there is no question of a loss of equilibrium and disappearance of the African system, for colonial administration has continued without pause in most parts of British Africa since the original establishment of control. However, it is in variations in the elements of the system and hence in its processes that interest lies. As these occur, the condition of the system will wax and wane with reference to the optimum condition, the changes evidencing themselves as alterations in the strain on policy. The merely relative loss and recovery of equilibrium are just as indicative of these variations as might be the complete overturn of the African political system. The use of the concept of a moving equilibrium as a standard to which to refer the results of the operations of the elements of the political system is in no way impaired, since in effect what is being done is to explain, through analysis of the interrelationships in the political system, whatever degree of success is achieved in carrying through a policy.

This discussion of equilibrium will be of value only if it is related to the typology of policy discussed earlier. A policy is a formulation of a state of moving equilibrium, or a series of such states, if it anticipates changes in elements of the political system which will then require certain plans for adjustments in other elements to

maintain the balance. Obviously, then, a _change_ in policy will be the formulation of a new state of equilibrium, recording in its very existence a relative loss of equilibrium of the former policy (for the state of the relations among the elements of that system must have been irretrievably upset, at very least, by the behavior of the "leader" or colonial servant in endorsing and supporting the new policy with his activity). The history of African political systems will be an endless chain and web of alterations of policy and of loss and recovery of equilibrium which correspond to them. The typology of policy outlined above utilizes some of those changes as a framework, as the discussion in succeeding chapters will make clear.

Thus far the concept of equilibrium has been employed solely with reference to the balance among the various interdependent elements in the political system. The question asked up to this point is: "What are the effects of each element upon the others, and what are the contributions these various relationships make to the persistence of the whole system?" The answer to the question would, if the political activity comprising the system existed in a stable context, explain either persistence of policy or tendency to change. But the context is a complicating influence, for it may consist in any of the ends and purposes involved in human activity with the exception of the end or purpose of control itself. The only political system not involving a context of such ends and purposes would be one answering de Jouvenel's definition of "pure" political activity, where the political activity and the final end of the activity as well might be summed up in the word "control". There would be no context there because the purpose, control, is the sole objective of the activity of control, not an intermediate end to

the control or integration of ends and purposes of other kinds.

The context of political activity in the normal case thus offers a vast scope for change in the political system. By way of illustration, there may be offered the contrasting examples of a political system devoted to elementary policing tasks and relations with other social units, and of the modern state with its vast welfare, economic control and public works enterprises, which are additional to the tasks of the former political system. In all probability, then, there will be constant change in the context of the political system, as the ends and purposes brought to it as the subject matter of policy vary. To take this into account in the analysis another question must be asked: "What is brought to the political system from time to time, in the form of new or modified ends and purposes, which may affect the balance of the elements constituting the system?" In the formulation of this question, equilibrium again serves as an orienting idea, not in its aspect as the state resulting from the interaction of the various elements in the system, but because of its concomitant status as the description of the fact that the system is persisting (or not) in its environment. These two aspects are opposite sides of the same coin. The political system must not only function, which is a matter of "healthy" relationships among its elements, but it must function in relation to its changing context or environment, with which some sort of balance must be maintained.

Thus, every system, political or otherwise, has an inwardness and an outwardness, both of which can be considered aspects of its equilibrium and alternative modes of defining that equilibrium. The internal aspect is covered by the first of the questions put above, the

external, by the second. It may be said, then, that two main kinds of factors must be taken into account in formulating a policy: the internal balance and the external balance of the political system of action which will form about policy when it becomes effective. The terms indicate possible points of origin of change; the alteration of the equilibrium may have its source within the system, or outside of it and due to a change in the context. In the latter case, the change will of course have to be mediated through the political system, because by definition political activity alone can accomplish political change.

It is obvious that the predictions involved in policy-making will be good or bad according to how well they take into account the relationships of the elements entering into the internal balance as part of the moving equilibrium, and through this calculation, how well they take into account the context of the political system which defines the external balance. The policy will be successful if the political activity revolving about the policy conforms to the context of ends and purposes to such an extent that discrepancies or conflicts, which are of course the occasion for the policy, are in the main controlled so that order is achieved or maintained. There will thus be internal balance, because the relationships among the elements of the system will be such as to contribute to the persistence of the system, and there will be external balance, because the political activity in the system takes account of the context. The converse of all this is equally possible, of course; one can imagine a policy-maker who does not take full account of the context of ends and purposes, and his attempt to enforce his policy arouses such opposition that the official political activity which he had counted on to maintain a moving equi-

librium does not suffice. In such a case, an adjustment in prediction and hence in policy would be called for, in order that a true state of moving equilibrium could be formulated and established.

However, the policy-maker must be concerned not only with the accuracy of prediction and its relation to equilibrium, but also with the interplay between the prediction and subsequent events, including both the activities of the authorities themselves as they perceive changes in other elements, and changes in the context which may lie behind such changes. A generalization such as the following seems valid: if the context changes, and the character of the ends and purposes involved in the human activity within the social unit is altered, then policy must also tend to change, for political activity in the old pattern will not accomplish what members of the unit feel should be accomplished, and the lack of conformity between the character of the discrepancies controlled by the existing political system and the new context of ends and purposes will lead to a condition of disequilibrium as defined above. In such a situation, the authorities might cling to the form of their prediction, while countering the changes resulting in the elements of the political system with changes in their own activities not anticipated in the policy as formulated and perhaps not even recognized. Or they might change their policy to bring it again into conformity with the context.

Such measures as the latter are already familiar as the recalculations of states of equilibrium represented by the typology of policy. These recalculations can be recognitions and predictions of factors in both the internal and external balance of the system. Thus, a stage may constitute a recognition of major changes in the internal, or more

likely, the external balance, not predicted and therefore taken into account in previous formulations of the state of moving equilibrium. Or they may just as well constitute predictions of changes in either of these balances which are expected either just to happen or to be promoted by the authorities. Whatever the case, the new stage of policy is an attempt to make a blueprint for the behavior of the various elements in the system, including that of the policy-makers themselves, so that what the policy-makers hold to be the objectives of control will be attained or at least approximated.

Conclusion

The point has now been reached where the erection of the conceptual scaffolding is possible. The components of the structure will be those "elements of the political system" concerning which there has been so much discussion, but upon which so little light has thus far been shed. The phrase stands for all that goes on in the political system, and is in a sense an anticipation of the conceptual scheme, utilizing as it does the notion of (presumably) clearly definable parts interacting with one another. The problem is now actually to seize hold on the highly complex processes of combination and interaction in the political system, and to strive to reduce the activities involved to few enough basic elements, clearly delineated, so that the human mind can grasp the system "whole". Utilizing the site established by development of the theory of "elements of integration", and the methodological devices for treating the materials of the scheme which have been outlined in this chapter, it is the task of the next chapter to erect the scaffolding.

CHAPTER III

A SCHEME OF CONCEPTS

The purpose of this chapter is to derive a conceptual scheme which will serve as a guide through the remainder of the paper. The technique used will be to examine the history of the establishment of British administration over the Mende tribe in Sierra Leone, and to attempt to treat the process in terms of a limited number of concepts. The materials required for this examination are assembled in Part I of the chapter, which begins with an account of the social organization of the Mende in its politically relevant aspects. The section is drawn from ethnographic accounts. The next section is a narrative account of the process through which British control of Mendeland was established. In Part II of the chapter, these materials are utilized to derive a set of concepts.

Part I: The Materials

An Ethnographic Portrait

The Mende are the largest tribe in the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, numbering over 600,000. The tribal area forms a flattened wedge, broadening out toward Liberia from a point lying close to Freetown, on an axis more or less parallel to the coastline. At no point does it touch the coast, the distance inland of the Mende frontier ranging from

twenty-five to fifty miles. To this circumstance can be attributed the relative isolation of the Mende from European influence in the pre-"scramble for Africa" period. Contact before that time was rather episodic and without permanent political consequences. British penetration of Mendeland and other parts of the interior after 1875 led to the establishment in 1896 of a Protectorate including all of the Mende except a small section in Liberia.

Mendeland was divided into a number of chiefdoms, enjoying varying degrees of autonomy or independence with relation to one another. However, linguistic and cultural identity existed despite political disunity; this is the basis for description of the Mende as a "tribe".

The Mende were an agricultural people practising shifting cultivation in the rain forest area. Their normal pattern of settlement featured relatively permanent towns or large villages, stockaded for defense if important enough, each having a number of hamlets or farming communities attached to it. The basic features of organization of the town-farming community complex may best be grasped if discussion begins with consideration of the farming household, the smallest social unit, and traces its relationships to the central town. The farming household comprised a man, his wives, their children and whatever slaves or retainers the man might have, living on land which the head of the family claimed as "owner". Inheritance of this right was within the descent group of a common ancestor, the land passing from the deceased to a brother and then to a son, when all suitably competent brothers were dead.

It was customary for a male to found his own farming household. The necessary land he could obtain either by settlement on any acces-

sible unclaimed land, or by use of land already claimed by his family.
If the latter was the case, he stayed close by his relatives. Thus,
the farming community was commonly an extended version of the farming
household itself. It would consist of a core of households whose heads
claimed common descent from the founder and original "owner" of the vil-
lage lands, households of kin, retainers and slaves, and of some "stran-
gers" - individuals who had been permitted to immigrate and take up
village lands. The farming community was therefore basically a kinship
unit, in charge of the senior suitable member of the kin group descend-
ed from the original "owner".

This "headman", advised and assisted by the more important male
members of his kin group, mediated disputes, managed financial and
other relationships with higher authority and exercised a general su-
pervision of the land, its allocation and use. However, especially
in activities relating to land allocation, he was subject to the super-
vision of the local group of elders formed by a recognition of descent
group ties beyond the village. The descent group on this level may be
called the kindred; it traced back to a more remote, and perhaps unre-
membered, ancestor than that of the descent group of the farming com-
munity, which might be regarded as a junior line of the house.

The kindred relationship found concrete expression in the socio-
political unit called the "compound". The central town or village of
the settlement pattern was divided into a number of geographical sec-
tions or wards in each of which a particular kindred was recognized
as dominant. Each compound had its group of dependent farming communi-
ties, and ideally at least, the headmen of these were supposed to be re-
sponsive to the elders of the compound. This town compound-farming

community relationship was frequently in practice strengthened by the taking up of residence in the compound of his kindred by the headman of the farming community, who would leave a deputy in charge of the hamlet. The tenuous web of kinship relationships was thus reinforced by the use of the compound as a political and social center. Evidence of the social and hence political importance of the compound is found in the fact that a Mende usually identifies himself to strangers by reference to his kindred and to the town in which it has a compound.

The most important activities of the elders of the compound were the allocation of land and the hearing of disputes. They also had something to say about marriage, since this involved employment of the land and capital of the kindred as bridewealth.

A compound was primarily a kinship structure governing the descent group, but at the same time it occupied a distinct section of the town, and perhaps a large majority of the residents were not members of the dominant descent group. The compound played a part in the town government; its leader was on the town council, occasionally advised the town chief in legal matters, and collected the tribute due the chief from the compound and its subsidiary settlements. This leader was truly the compound representative, however, not an appointee of the higher authorities. In at least one authenticated case,[1] the chief established a new town and appointed his wives as compound heads, but in due course these were succeeded by men chosen by residents of the compounds themselves.

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[1] K. L. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone (London: Routledge and Paul, 1951), p. 103. This book is the main source for this account of Mende social structure and ideology.

The emphasis on kinship ties so obvious in farming community and compound organization was found repeated with perhaps less regularity at higher levels. The town, sub- and paramount chiefs were drawn from "ruling families" of the political units they governed. The theory of original settlement and "ownership" of land as a sanction for claims to power by kinship groups thus operated throughout the tribal structure. However, when the higher levels of the social structure in its political aspects are reached, more distinctly political influences appear more prominently.

In Mendeland, war was a "cultural pattern"; it seems to have stimulated the development of some large chiefdoms, which have been described as "hegemonies or confederacies". A chiefdom could be "founded" by force of arms as well as by true settlement. A successful chief and his "war-boys" might place an enslaved population on the land they had seized, establish towns and thus establish a chiefdom. Or a town or chiefdom which surrendered might be left intact under a military lieutenant of a successful chief, thus being added to what the victor's ancestors had "founded" and now "owned".

This adaptability of structure apparently served to drop the cloak of legitimacy very quickly about a conquest or usurpation. The conquerors of course shared the culture of the conquered, and within a fairly short time a chiefdom so carved out became fairly well integrated, through such processes as intermarriage and establishment of rights to use of land. For example, even slaves after several generations became barely distinguishable from their ostensible masters.[1] In the

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[1]Slavery in Mendeland was not the strictly commercial variety familiar in American experience. It resembled serfdom in many respects, and furthermore, a slave might himself have rights over slaves of his own.

political sphere, there was a strong tendency for office to be inherited:

> . . . Most holders of political office . . . are descended from former settlers who, in many cases, were allocated land in return for services rendered the local warrior chief. Thus, out of forty-eight persons holding minor political positions . . . in the present-day Kakua chiefdom, thirty-three are the direct descendants of men who had the favor of . . . the great warrior chief. . .[1]

Therefore, although war undoubtedly stimulated the development of large chiefdoms, it was not an exclusive, or even predominant source of authority for office-holders. It did, however, make for more "open" recruitment of leaders, since military prowess and the command of preponderant power was so important for survival. The effect of the combination of such recruitment and of inheritance of the chieftainship as the cultural pattern is seen in the fact that in many Mende chiefdoms there are several descent groups which have a recognized claim on the position of chief, an ancestor having occupied it.

By virtue of his position, the chief had certain rights, perquisites and duties. He did not actually act as "owner" of all of the land in the chiefdom, but had the duty only to guard the rights to land of the various descent groups against aggressive acts originating either within or without the chiefdom.[2] He had the right to receive gifts in fealty from his subordinates, annual tribute from every family household, and to demand the services of his subjects on his farms and buildings or for work as porters and on other public works. In addition, he received gifts and fees for hearing

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[1] Little, op. cit., p. 176.

[2] T. N. Goddard, The Handbook of Sierra Leone (London: Grant Richards, 1925), p. 88.

court cases.

On the other hand, the chief had to have a large establishment of "war boys", maintain the dignity of his office through lavish entertainment, assist the needy, support his advisers and the hangers-on of his court and act as patron of ancestral cult and secret society rites. Part of his income for such things came from his subjects, as mentioned above, but part came from his own resources - helped along, for example, by the fact that the chief had the right to half the slaves taken in war. He was assisted in his various duties by a deputy (known as his "speaker"), who was often a relative, and by a council of close personal advisers - the speaker, sub-chiefs, "big men" of various descent groups, relations and particular friends. For matters of great moment, a council of all of the title holders of the chiefdom might be called.

These were the facts of the Paramount Chief's position. They seem to have been repeated in large degree at lower levels. Even compound heads had "speakers". Sub-chiefs and towns maintained "war boys" as well as the Paramount Chief, to the extent that they could afford them. Courts and councils were found at every level, the elders of the community involved supplying advisers and assistants to the chief or headman.

Chiefs seem to have had few religious sanctions working to strengthen their positions. They were only patrons of ancestral rites, which were actually conducted by descent groups on their own land, to placate the spirits of the ancestors who were thought to retain an interest in the land they had used. This situation of course accorded with the chief's situation as legal guardian of the chiefdom, not as "owner" of the land, a situation which revealed itself particularly

in the practice of descent groups with high prestige of letting land to strangers without consulting the chief. The idea of "medicine" - supernatural forces made to work through various earthly media - was utilized to some extent in support of the chief's position. "Chiefdom medicine" was employed to swear participants in court cases and to assist in reaching and enforcing decisions, both within and outside the courtroom.

A summary reference to Mende cosmology will assist comprehension of how such control is attained. The Mende believe in a supreme god, who made the world, then withdrew into the sky and now maintains only tenuous contact. But he left behind certain spirits, and infused physical objects of all sorts with a power from himself. (The spirits of the dead are assumed to take on such power also.) The use of "medicine" is simply invocation of the power in an object (fetish) for some purpose stated or implied in the oath or declaration of the user. It would appear that "medicine" can also be used to mediate with the spirits regarding some action which is desired of them.

The main category of magical or quasi-religious activity other than "medicine" was found in the secret societies. Here the Poro will be taken as both representative of such societies and the most important of them politically. It had a number of "spirits" which it invoked by sacrifices, rituals and oaths, and prominent deceased members of the society were also invoked, in a manner analogous to that of the ancestral cults. Complex rules of behavior were associated with the Poro, the violation of which was believed to bring down divine retribution, unless the sin was duly expiated under society rules.

The political power of the Poro arose from the fact that it en-

forced supernaturally sanctioned mores on a membership which comprised all of the adult males in the community, who had to pass through a course of Poro training. In fact enforcement often went beyond the membership itself to women of the community. The local Poro society was divided into grades, the leaders being hereditary office-holders in the society and men who had passed through ordeals and advanced training. The rank and file were the vast majority, whose duty was simply to implement whatever decision was arrived at by the elders. Local Poro customs and organization throughout Mendeland were basically similar, and an initiated male could pass from one "lodge" to another, enter the restricted area of the "Poro bush" and participate in ritual. But there was no "national" organization or council for the Poro.

It does not appear that the chief or other political officers were necessarily prominent participants in the Poro. The chiefs sponsored rather than conducted rituals. They did not attempt to assert any personal ability to call upon supernatural forces, either through "medicine" or the Poro, but left this to practitioners of the art, just as any other Mende might do. With the Poro they maintained a working alliance. Thus, the chief could carry out regulation of the timing and emphasis of farming activities by having Poro medicine placed on the crops, produce or fields which were to be passed by for the moment. Sometimes a chief might convene a meeting of the Poro leaders within his jurisdiction for consultation on some business of the chiefdom. The same technique of "making a Poro" was sometimes used to facilitate coordination of action among several chiefdoms. For example, the chiefs concerned might make a peace treaty by cal-

ling on the Poro spirits to witness their intention.

For their part, the Poro societies of the various towns played a prominent role in the ceremonies connected with the coronation or funeral of a chief, thus giving the imprimatur of the Poro spirits and medicine to crucial political changes. It was also possible, obviously, for the Poro organization to be used to manipulate the choice of chiefs and other officials, or for the Poro sanctions to be used to dominate the chief. Accusations of this sort are frequently brought, but there seems to be little firm evidence either way; although the occurrence of some such events may be implied in the characterization of local Poro societies as "strong" or "weak".

The Coming of Colonial Rule

The history of truly effective European penetration and domination in Sierra Leone begins with the establishment in 1788 of a colony on the Sierra Leone peninsula. This settlement of ex-slaves from Great Britain and the Americas, augmented later by those freed from slave ships on the high seas, was the focal point of the movement which culminated in the creation of the present Sierra Leone Colony and Protectorate.

Although contact with the Mende was minimal until about 1875, it is convenient to begin this account at about 1850, since the Colony had dealings with various tribes long before the Mende were brought onto the stage, and the purposes expressed in these earlier relationships are pertinent to an understanding of the British-Mende relations of a later period.

Sierra Leone grew rapidly in population as British policy on

slavery hardened and her cruisers became more active in the course of the first half of the nineteenth century. As the naval blockade of the slave coasts tightened and the Colony received an ever-growing stream of Africans liberated from the slave ships taken, there developed in official circles at least two impelling motives in native policy - the wish to put down the slave trade at the source, and the desire to promote trade so that the Colony, small in area and poor in resources, might approach financial self-sufficiency. The means predominantly used in working toward these ends in relation to the surrounding tribes was diplomatic negotiation, for the Colony was wary of heavy financial commitments such as would be involved in the conquest or purchase and the subsequent administration of "worthless" dependencies.

A treaty of 1851[1] foreshadowed a whole series of similar pacts which came to cover the whole coastal area in the neighborhood of the Colony, and illustrates very well the trade and anti-slavery motifs of the native policy of the day. It contains a series of articles relating to trade: no customs to be levied either way on goods passing between the respective territories, British subjects to have "most-favored-nation" treatment in the chiefdom, the chiefdom roads to be kept open to trade and no Poro prohibitions to be set on British subjects or property.[2] Regarding slavery, the trade was declared abolished in the chiefdom (but not the keeping of domestic slaves). In addition, the treaty provided that the Governor or his agent might

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[1] Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, 1859-1860 (London: Ridgway and Sons, 1867), L, 806.

[2] See page 56 for a discussion of the use of Poro prohibitions.

arbitrate disputes between the chief and British subjects and take other action to assure compliance with treaty terms. A small annual stipend was usually provided in such treaties.

The very "correct" attitude of "non-intervention and Olympian neutrality" which such a treaty suggests had only one major drawback: it did not prevent native disputes and wars which hurt trade, harmed the interests of British subjects and sometimes spilled over into Colony territory. The supply of captives taken in such wars also went far toward keeping the internal slave trade going. Policy therefore took cognizance of native conflicts in various ways, but it was quite cautious; a letter of admonition would be accompanied by an offer of good offices, put guardedly, since the authorities did not wish to appear to be taking sides in a situation where a hint of support might simply encourage aggression. There might also be a mission to attempt to settle the dispute, but a punitive expedition was mounted only very rarely, as a last resort, when Colony interests were deeply touched by the war. Gradually, however, there seems to have developed a set of tactics which essentially preserved neutrality while allowing more insistent intervention.

The case of the chiefdom considered to be within the jurisdiction of the Colony is a good place to begin tracing this process. In 1875 Mende mercenaries were brought down into chiefdoms of the Sherbro tribe near the coast, to help one protagonist in an intra-tribal quarrel. In the course of the war they raided an adjoining region of Sherbro settlement, called British Sherbro because it was nominally under British jurisdiction under a treaty of cession made in 1861. The offense against British sovereignty required punishment; an expedition

penetrated deep into Kpa Mendeland, the Mende area closest to Freetown. Thereupon, the most important Kpa Mende chiefs accepted responsibility, permitted the arrest for murder and later the execution of the main Mende offender and signed an "agreement" with the Sherbro chiefs. They consented to accept arbitration by the Governor of disputes with the Sherbro, not to hire out "war boys" and to avoid hostilities in areas where they were likely to impinge upon the Colony. The Governor was thus conceded a right to intervene in Kpa Mende affairs as an interested neutral.

An even better instance is the case of the Krim country, located on the coast near the Liberian border. The area was ceded by the chiefs in 1883, and in 1885 the Governor travelled there to negotiate an end to a war which was ravaging much of the ceded area. The coastal chiefs asked for help with their relations with certain inland chiefdoms, expressing inability to end the war by their own action alone. The Governor thereupon proceeded inland to the town of Bandajuma, an important communications center, where he again encountered peacemaking problems, for not only were the up-country chiefs of the area involved in the war, but so were Mende chiefs from further inland who had been invited in by one side or the other. It was necessary to put pressure on some more important Upper Mende[1] chiefs, particularly one Mendigrah, before a treaty could be negotiated. The Governor then returned to the coast with the up-country leaders and negotiated a general treaty of peace with the whole body of chiefs. This, however, was not the end of his

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[1]Upper Mendeland was the area closest to Liberia. The third great geographical subdivision of the tribal area was Middle Mendeland, which lay between Kpa and Upper Mendeland.

labors, for Darwah, a Mende war chief connected with the important Middle Mende chiefdom of Tikonko, was operating in the Bandajuma area, thus threatening to reopen the war. The Governor had to intercede with the chief of Tikonko, telling him sharply that the area "must have peace", and the Colony government intended to keep it, before Darwah reluctantly submitted, remarking with a note of complaint that he had always tried to keep his operations outside the area of Colony jurisdiction.

The same process of attempting to blanket in all of the contending parties appears in the rather extended negotiations in the Sherbro Island, Jong and Boom rivers area, which were directed more toward promotion of trade than protection of the territory of the Colony. In a treaty of 1875 with certain chiefs in the Big Boom river area, for example, not only was arbitration of disputes provided for, but also submission for "mediation" of the difficulties of the signatories with non-treaty chiefs – to tap whose territories the signatory chiefs agreed to cut roads. In the subsequent course of events there were encountered again those difficulties, noted in the case of the Krim country, of dealing with a multitude of independent and semi-independent chiefdoms.

Disturbances recurred in the area; intervention brought a peace treaty among the three main Mende chiefdoms (including Tikonko) on the upper part of the river. Later, the Governor managed to obtain ratification of this treaty by all of the Mende and Sherbro chiefs in the area of the rivers and coast, but within eighteen months he had to intervene once more to obtain a renewal of promises regarding peace. Arbitration came down to a process of intermittent negotiation. But war very soon broke out again between two of the treaty chiefs on the Mende borders, and despite government sponsored efforts at arbitration

by other chiefs, the situation on the Big Boom became so bad in 1882 that traders had to be warned away. A final blow came with the invasion of the treaty area by marauders from elsewhere, who began to fortify villages and extend their operations to the various trade routes. The result was a punitive expedition, whose marked success was assisted by warriors levied from some of the treaty chiefdoms.

It is apparent from these accounts that the influence exercised by officials of the Colony ceased to be effective if removed for long. The small area of agreement and cooperation created among a group of chiefs by diplomatic activity quickly withered away in the face of a lack of confidence of the treaty chiefs in one another, or of the activities of war chiefs from other areas. It was possible for the British negotiators to obtain an agreement to break down the stockades, but they quickly went up again at the rumor of war. In the fluid political situation prevalent among the chiefdoms there was every temptation to resume the calling in of warrior bands or mercenaries, despite the prohibitions adopted in treaties. Roads which were to be kept open would, if war were rumored, be allowed quickly to become overgrown, thus returning the country to a ripe state for war.

The decisive break with the diplomatic approach to native relations came in the late 1880's. A much stronger policy, stimulated by an agreement with the French as to spheres of influence, by the provisions of the Berlin Conference protocol relating to "effective occupation" of African territory as a criterion of legal possession for those engaged in the "scramble for Africa", possibly by the emphasis placed on suppression of slave trading by the Brussels agreement and certainly owing something to the frustrations experienced by the Colony

government in earlier years, eventuated in the rapid establishment of British administration up to the French and Liberian frontiers. Its essential features will be made apparent by an examination of what happened when the modus vivendi in the Krim-Bandajuma area, referred to earlier, broke down.

Darwah, the Tikonko Mende war chief already mentioned, and another Tikonko freebooter named Macviah made the error of attacking certain places considered to be British territory. A punitive expedition was mounted, and Macviah was signally defeated and took refuge with one of the most powerful of the Upper Mende chiefs, Nyagua of Panduma. By past standards, the operation was over, but not under the new regime, for the authorities were fired by the ease of the victory (the decisive battle was fought by only seventeen native police under European leadership and a horde of levies from the chiefdoms of the Krim area), and a determination truly to settle the country once and for all. There was a marked change in tone in relations with native leaders; several arrests were made of treaty and other chiefs, sometimes on very slim evidence, for support of Macviah. The Governor told one group of treaty chiefs that he would arrest any of them breaking the peace, and that they were expected promptly to obey orders. It was his boast that the Macviah action had made the chiefs subservient and afraid of him.[1] The fame of the action spread far into Mendeland, for Mendigrah, who had been allied with Macviah despite the firm representations made to him about interference in affairs toward the coast at the time of the

[1]Great Britain, Colonial Office, Correspondence Relating to Native Disturbances in Sierra Leone Colony, Cmd. 5740, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LVI (1889) (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1889), p. 932.

Bandajuma agreement, made haste to assure the Governor of his willingness to follow the will of the Government.

Operations were planned against Nyagua as part of the effort to force the procrastinating chief to give up the fugitive. However, Macviah was finally surrendered when a deadline was set and police were moved forward in strength. Mackavoreh, the Tikonko chief, who was called upon to furnish levies for the expedition, surprised and pleased the authorities by asking for a temporary loan of police to garrison his capital while his men were away on the expedition. This attitude was significant, as the Colony officials realized, for it constituted an estimate of both government influence and policy. Where the police were, the government was, and when police units were attacked, they not only were likely to give a good account of themselves against native war bands, but there would be retaliation. Officials had long ago noted that the presence of police tended to discourage raiders; in one instance a lone native policeman was sufficient to turn back a war band.

This was not always true, for there was a recent instance of the Yonni tribe, located upriver from Freetown on the northern border of Kpa Mendeland, putting a police post to rout and burning the town. Under the stronger policy directed so effectively against Macviah, however, there had been an expedition which resulted in the establishment of a police garrison among the previously independent Yonni, the arrest of several chiefs and a directed election of a new Paramount Chief.

The garrisoning of the Yonni area was the first step in the execution of new measures for pacifying the country and keeping it so. It was decided to station police at various points near the navigable headwaters of the rivers - such points being not more than thirty or

forty miles inland, in most cases - and to connect these posts and various other important points by well-prepared paths. The posts would be beyond the Colony frontiers in many if not most cases. The measures to place this policy in effect were in full swing at the time of the Macviah expedition in 1889.

This new frontier of Colony control did not hold for long. "Travelling Commissioners", appointed in part for this purpose, set about concluding treaties with all chiefdoms within the boundaries agreed upon with the French and Liberians, and within a few years all Mende chiefdoms were under treaty. The emphasis in these treaties was on British rights - of British subjects alone to settle and trade in the chiefdoms, and of the Colony to insist that the chief conclude agreements with no other countries. This emphasis was of course part and parcel of the partition of Africa, and in this particular instance reflected concern over French and German competition in the "scramble for Africa". The chiefs also agreed to abstain from acts of aggression in the direction of Sierra Leone Colony; and in some of the last treaties assumption of full control by Colony authorities was provided for in the event of violation of the treaty.

The last mentioned clause seems to have been added as a legal afterthought, for the Colony was prepared to see to it that in any event the treaties were adhered to. A Frontier Police Force of 300 men (quite distinct from the civil police of the Colony), later doubled as the area of effective administration increased, was created in 1890. This force and the travelling commissioners served as the main agents for a swift establishment of administration in Mendeland in the early 1890's.

The commissioners, by their own accounts,[1] were basically not administrators, but diplomats, moving about the territory adjusting relations with and among the chiefdoms. Alldridge tells of sponsoring negotiations between chiefs who were at odds, overseeing the negotiations among chiefdom notables regarding the selection of a new chief and, generally, trying to smooth over the rough spots he found. The chiefs thus still dealt directly and more or less as equals with emissaries of the Governor in the field, or at Freetown, as they had been accustomed to doing.

Events overtook this leisurely method of doing business, however, leading to the administrative organization of the entire area of the present Protectorate by the end of 1894. Certainly one of the main stimulants was the invasion of the area by "Sofas", or Mohammedan slavers. A large expedition was sent in 1893 to the Konno country, north of Mendeland, to deal with these invaders. The threat apparently brought the Frontier Police Force into Mendeland itself in large numbers, sometimes at the invitation of the chiefs.[2] In connection with this Konno war, the powerful Nyagua and other chiefs were arrested.[3] Another factor was the Governor's determination to check the slave traffic, an interest which figured largely in two tours he made of Mendeland and other areas in 1894 and 1895. In 1894, the present Protectorate was divided into five police districts, "to check the slave traffic,

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[1] See T. J. Alldridge, The Sherbro and Its Hinterland (London: MacMillan, 1901), pp. 156-264, for a rambling account of his adventures as a travelling commissioner.

[2] Ibid., p. 190

[3] Alldridge, Sierra Leone, A Transformed Colony (Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1910), p. 285.

prevent slave raiding and maintain general peace and order. The passing of Ordinances and signing treaties was fruitless in these respects, and it was a wise step to introduce the controlling influence of a European Officer and a force of police . . . which . . . was strong enough to support the carrying out of these agreements."[1] So runs the account of the man who was chief secretary of the Colony at the time.

The police inspectors at the various posts acquired the character of administrators in a sense in which the word could not be applied to the travelling commissioners. Other than the usual police duties, they were expected to promote native exploitation of the resources of the area, induce chiefs to open and maintain roads and settle "little" disputes among chiefs. They were not responsible, however, to the Native Affairs Department in Freetown, which meant that the chiefs lost the channels of communication to which they were accustomed; and they relied not on negotiation so much as on the giving of orders to attain their ends.

The logical next step was the full legalization of the de facto administration of the chiefdoms outside the Colony. This was accomplished by proclamation of a Protectorate in 1896, placing the whole area of Sierra Leone outside the Colony and up to the boundaries agreed with Liberia and France under the jurisdiction of the Colony Government and Legislative Council. The five police districts were converted, with some changes of boundary, into administrative districts under commissioners. Although for the moment the change was only superficial, as

[1] J. J. Crooks, A History of the Colony of Sierra Leone, Western Africa (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1903), p. 318.

the District Commissioners were usually military personnel commanding Frontier Police units, this step can be taken as the point when the policy system of public order came to full flower.

Part II: Conceptual Analysis: Derivation of a Scheme

The Method

The above accounts are reasonably well-rounded descriptions of the Mende social structure in its political aspects, and of the establishment of British administration over the tribe's various chiefdoms. The next step is to reinterpret this material in terms of a conceptual scheme. To do so admittedly contributes little to knowledge; the justification is that it gives the opportunity to unfold the conceptual scheme. Reinterpretation of the data on the Mende will provide a basis for work on the process of growth and mutation of the political system by demonstrating at least initially the feasibility of the scheme, which can then serve as a foundation for interpretation of data in the later stages of policy as these have been defined.

The conceptual scheme developed must be so designed as to include the most significant factors in the formation and maintenance of the system of law and order, and to draw these factors into patterned relationships. The other requirements of a good conceptual scheme must also be kept in mind.[1] Analysis of the account of establishment of administration over the Mende should proceed with a view to extracting what seem to be the most significant factors and attaching concepts to them as tags. The advantage of the procedure is that

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[1]See Chapter I, pp. 12-15.

the interrelationships of these conceptualized elements lie in the historical materials themselves, so that a systematic scheme comes ready to hand once concepts and the data they define are matched. Furthermore, the concepts will be operational. However, this procedure for deriving concepts constitutes only a beginning, since it is not certain from this one example whether the scheme will be generally applicable or, in the end, fruitful. It must eventually be tested by application to other material and elaborated on in the process.

Structure: Organizational and Social

Without doubt one of the factors of highest significance in the establishment of British administration over the Mende was **structure**. The human beings involved on both sides, for example, were in some fashion organized hierarchically, so that some few maintained a capacity, in some respect or other, to command the obedience of sections of the whole human aggregate involved. Structure in this sense was above all the element which imparted form to the process by which the policy system developed. In fact, discussion of political processes anywhere ordinarily revolves about the concept; the positions of the various participants and what these imply in the way of activity are usually important factors in the description. In this case, the Government of the Colony of Sierra Leone (a structure), established administration (which requires a structure of related positions) over the Mende tribe (which constituted, at least in its component chiefdoms, a structure). As between British and Mende, contact was not chaotic, for individual positions existed on both sides which were more strategic than others for regulating the processes of contact and penetration. It was primarily through relationships established at these points that the political questions raised by British penetration were

resolved, not through a general lumping together of all of the Mende
and all of the British or Sierra Leoneans.

Structure will be such an important concept in this paper that
it deserves extended discussion. It may be defined as "a pattern, i.e.,
an observable uniformity of action or operation",[1] which means that it
persists over time. Structured human activity is not an abstraction;
it leaps to the eye and ear as a commonplace of human experience. A
great deal is merely implied, however, in the phrase, "an observable
uniformity of action". When one detects structure, what is observed
is "co-activity" or co-adaptation of human beings in direct or medi-
ated contact with one another.[2] It is from behavior in these complex
interactions that the conception of structure comes. The structure is
not just the human beings, with tags such as "chief" attached, but
these persons taken together with the modes of behavior which seem to
be agreed upon as standards within the group. For those "in the know"
the tag implies the behavior expected from the person bearing it. Be-
cause there are these standardized modes of behavior ("institutions")
there is that "observable uniformity of action" which is the hallmark
of structure.

Another definition expresses the implications of this fuller
consideration of the meaning of structure: "the membership (of a struc-
ture) is rigorously defined; the distinction of members from non-members
is clear and meaningful, the occasions for and the procedures involved

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[1]M. Levy, The Structure of Society (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1952), p. 57.

[2]S. F. Nadel, The Foundations of Social Anthropology (Glen-
coe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 28.

in coming into association are established and acceptable to all members, and the roles of the various members are functionally coordinated . . . the ultimate in structuration is the institutionalized group".[1] The author might have gone on to add that the first sentence in the quotation constitutes a definition of the fully institutionalized group.

The various terms of the definition flow from one another, for if roles are to be coordinated, the rights and obligations expressed in these activities must be mutually acceptable, or expected, and the definition of membership is needed to maintain a distinction, so that individuals will know how to act toward others. A proviso should be added, however; the structured group always exists within a context set by the generally recognized purposes of group activity. Therefore, it is the roles of members in this area of activity only which need to be coordinated, and a group can be defined as fully institutionalized or structured if rules are provided which guide participants in all cases where alternatives present themselves with respect to the particular area of the group activity. Structure can be visualized as falling along a continuum from the emergent group to the fully institutionalized one, depending on how completely the possible kinds of action are limited by rules. The mob is a good example of the emergent group or structure, for its members share relatively few rules - even those defining membership - to guide activity. On the other hand, structuring of behavior was such a noticeable feature of many primitive societies that certain European scholars developed a theory of "primitive

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[1] R. T. LaPiere, A Theory of Social Control (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 105-106.

mentality" as a physiological explanation of what appeared to be an inability to reason out innovations in activity to meet novel situations.

Summing up this definition of structure, one can say that the concept refers to arrangement of positions held by human beings, each position in the arrangement being associated with certain activities having implications of some sort for the well-being and the effective activity of holders of other positions in the arrangement. These interrelationships are the basis for defining structure as an arrangement of positions, for the sets of activity and hence the holders of positions are confined to more or less fixed patterns of behavior with respect to one another by rules of procedure which are supposed or expected to be followed in some fashion by the individuals concerned.

As the rules of procedure in carrying out activities associated with positions are defined and in the final analysis have their being in the expectations of participants in the structure, so they are enforced by the ability of participants to punish deviance from the ordained patterns of behavior by themselves deviating in such a way as to change adversely the implications of their activity for the well-being or effective activity of the erring member. And just as there may be "sanctions" for deviance, so there may be rewards for hewing well to the line or exceeding expectations.

This is, in brief, the commonly accepted theory of structure[1]

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[1]A more usual terminology would utilize such terms as status, role and norm. Status is the identity in which an individual enters a situation (i.e., his position), role refers to the way he is expected to perform in that identity (it thus relates both to sets of ac-

formulated by sociologists to explain in very general terms that persistence of the "pattern (of) observable uniformity of action or operation" which reveals the presence of structure. Since the theory has been enunciated, this is a good point at which to differentiate structure from system, which was defined in the last chapter as "the interaction of a plurality of individual actors oriented to a situation". Just as activity in a system is oriented to a situation, so is the activity in a structure; the rules, sets of activities and the positions exist and have significance only by virtue of their bearing on some area of human activity. But the difference between system and structure lies in the degree to which the interaction oriented to the situation is allowed to exercise a reciprocal influence on behavior, so that the implications of activity of individuals for the well-

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tivity and to rules of procedure, in my terminology), and norm is the standard to which the individual is thus held in his performance (they are the rules of procedure, in a sense). Status changes as performance of roles fails to measure up to or exceeds norms, and structure is altered or may be destroyed if the individual affected ignores the punishment thus administered or takes the reward as encouragement for even more deviant behavior.

There are difficulties in using these concepts. The first is that status and role are highly abstract, and it is difficult to keep in mind what one is talking about. Objectionable also is norm, partially because of its association with the other two, partially because it implies "should" too strongly. "Rules of procedure" softens and broadens the meaning, for it does not carry the implication of moral intent which norm does, at least in the same measure. However, these terms are used later on at points where it is convenient to do so.

The second point is a related one. These concepts imply one another in their definitions. This is particularly true of role. Difficult problems arise from what seems an effort to combine the virtues of static with those of dynamic analysis. Levy, for example, finds it necessary to divide the concept of role into actual role, which is how a person really conducts himself, and ideal role, which is what he is supposed to do. The whole problem and the issues of definition which arise from it have been avoided by using terms which unequivocally separate the modes of analysis. The static analysis comes first, and can easily be followed up with analysis of process.

being and effective activity of others operates as a control on courses of action taken by individuals. In the structured situation, the reciprocal influence and its duration are such that a pattern of activity and hence persistence[1] and predictability of behavior result, whereas in the system there is no such reliability of prediction based on observation of previous responses. The test of the difference is whether predictions of behavior can be made, the observer knowing or caring nothing about the individual personalities. In the example just given, the mob might better be treated as a system of action rather than as an emergent structure, for whatever reciprocal influence there is among the participants, based on implications of their activity for one another, is in all probability evanescent and unpatterned over time, and therefore behavior will be quite unpredictable.

With reference to the Mende and structure as a factor in the establishment of British control, it will be noted that here there are two types of structure; the Mende social structure as it manifested itself on the political scene, and the organizational structure imported by the British as part of their effort to establish law and order. The first is an "organic" type, in that it grew out of and probably had little meaning apart from the activities of the Mende structurally located in relationship to one another and the outside world. The second, on the other hand, is in large measure the product of conscious planning, of abstraction from previous experience of the idea

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[1]The relation of this discussion to that of the theory of equilibrium becomes clear at this point. A structure comprises elements which are clearly in equilibrium, by the evidence of pattern and persistence, but a system may well comprise elements in a state of disequilibrium and thus constantly be in a process of changing the form of relationships and hence the shape of the whole system of action.

of a set of interlocking positions in which activity is so arranged and prescribed as to promote the accomplishment of a set of purposes. This conception of a rational arrangement of positions is what is called formal organization; it is a mere husk which takes on life when and to the extent that individuals are fitted into the various positions.

When the concept "social structure" is suggested as defining certain factors contributing very significantly to the development of the various types of policy systems, it is intended that tribal social structure as it existed in pre-contact times should be taken as a "base line". It is to be regarded as a constant factor in all of the stages, except insofar as changes in social structure bearing on the political situation can be accounted for by reference to other factors drawn into the conceptual scheme. Despite such changes, it is assumed, there will always be a very large residue of the original or pre-contact structure which will be of significance in the later stages. With regard to the organizational structure, the situation is different, for British administration is, so to speak, the main "independent variable". The conscious introduction by the colonial power of changes in organizational structure is probably the most important dynamic element in the whole situation. It may be possible to show in some cases that major changes in the structure of political activity in an area have been stimulated primarily by internal factors, and it is certain that in most cases such changes have been to some extent shaped by factors unique in the local situation. But the fact remains that the major stages of policy have usually been initiated by the colonial power, and the first thing affected by such changes in policy is the organ-

izational structure.

It is not necessary to recapitulate at any length the account of either social or organizational structure given in the last chapter. Such words as paramount, sub- or town chief, town, village, farming community, descent group, kindred, compound, headman, elders, council, "war-boys" slaves, ancestral cult, secret society, "owner"; all are indicators of tribal social structure. On the British side, Governor, Colony government, civil administrator, agent, mission, expedition, frontier police, inspector and travelling and district commissioner likewise call up the picture of an organizational structure in the tribal area.

However, the description of the social and organizational structure does not, under a strict interpretation of the concept of structure, constitute an explanation of the contact and impact of each upon the other. The question arises of how this came to pass. What did the participants bring to the situation which bridged the gap between the colonial power and the Mende chiefdoms? There can be no question that somehow there was involved the ability to communicate. A second concept is therefore <u>communication</u>, which may be defined as the "transfer of meaning, whether by written, spoken or pictorial symbols, or by various types of action".[1]

Communication

There seem to be three main elements to the idea of communication: the symbol or actions, to a large extent arbitrary with respect

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[1] W. Phillips Davidson and Alexander L. George, "An Outline for the Study of International Political Communications", <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, Special Issue on Communication, Winter, 1952-1953, pp. 501-511.

to the meanings they convey, the meanings themselves, and the physical means - visual or other perception, technical aids such as the telegraph or radio - by which the symbols or actions are conveyed from one human being to another. The fact of communication cannot be understood except by reference to all three elements. It is, of course, possible to discuss communication in terms of only one element, in which case the other two are simply taken for granted. For example, if interest lies in getting a symbol from one place to another, physical means of transmission only might be considered. Or one might focus on the particular nature of the symbols used to obtain maximum effectiveness, in which case means of transmittal may be taken for granted and the sharing of at least some meanings is assumed. But in both cases the analysis is of a static situation insofar as meaning is concerned, for interest lies largely in calling forth interpretations of symbols or actions of which it is assumed the recipient is already capable.

If one places the emphasis on the obvious fact that meaning is changed by influences communicated to the individual, one achieves a more dynamic analysis of communication which adds a dimension to the definition given above. A reference to learning theory[1] will help demonstrate how this fact bears on the concept of communication as used here. Learning theory concentrates on the formation of associations between stimulus and response; i.e., the process of assignment of meaning to stimuli, which then, because they are converted from mere physical forces to directives for purposeful action or responses,

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[1]Discussion based on paper by C. E. Osgood, entitled "Behavior Theory and the Social Sciences" (Delivered in the Conference on Analytic Systems at Northwestern University, June, 1955).

become cues.[1] There are a number of generally accepted principles in learning theory, the significant ones for present purposes being those of summation and contiguity. Repetitions of a cue - the process of practice - results in greater reliability of response through summation, while the bringing of an occurrence connected with the response closer to the event which provides the cue will increase the reliability of association of stimulus and response.

If these principles are accepted then it is evident that there is more to the concept of communication than meaningful symbols and actions and the physical facilities by which these are conveyed or processed. Questions of frequency and timing of stimuli also enter into the concept, since they bear so directly on the substance of what is transmitted in communicative processes. Meaning is not only conveyed but is created by communication, and the manipulations of cues which are a major determining factor in what is learned and how well must therefore be taken into account. This is so evident that one authority has been led to state that "communication is that phase of learning in which the conditions for learning are controlled by the communicator."[2] This definition of course is extreme, in that it emphasizes the meaning element in the concept to the virtual exclusion of the symbol-action and the physical means of transmission elements.

To sum up this discussion of meaning in relation to communication:

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[1] J. J. Gibson, "Social Perception and Perceptual Learning", in Group Relations at the Crossroads (Sherif and Wilson, eds.) (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 120-138, at p. 131.

[2] C. I. Hovland, "Social Communication", in Reader in Public Opinion and Communication (Berelson and Janowitz, eds.) (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 181-189, at p. 187.

communication has three elements. The relation of these to social processes raises two kinds of problems: how meaning is conveyed through symbolization or action and channels of communication, and how the process of communication gives rise to new meanings. Cues in the form of symbols or actions pass through units of space and time by some physical means to elicit a response, and if one is interested in this phase of "channels and devices", some assumptions are made about meaning for both initiator and recipient of the cue. The individuals involved and the meanings they assign to symbols or actions may in some cases justifiably be left completely out of account.[1] On the other hand, the meaning of cues for the recipients, including the influence of frequency and timing, may be of such interest as generally to exclude the consideration of the means of communicating these cues. However, both the problem of transferring meanings presently attached to symbols or actions and the problem of eliciting new meanings may for many purposes be taken together. The concept of communication used here includes both of these aspects.

In the instance of British-Mende relations in the first phase, both aspects will be taken up in conjunction with the concept of structure, in order to make a start at establishing relationships among our concepts. Thus, the dynamics of the processes of local colonial administration will be dealt with by showing how one conceptual element leads into and becomes interdependent with another. As other primary concepts are arrived at, the same steps of interrelating them with

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[1]See Karl Deutsch, "Communications Theory and the Social Sciences", American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XXII (1953), pp. 469-483, for a discussion of communication largely in terms of such a model.

ones already considered will help to complete the analysis.

In proposing the concept of communication, the discussion commenced with the obvious need to take into account the ways in which the two major structures - the colonial administration of Sierra Leone and the African chiefdoms - interacted with one another to develop the forms of interrelationship which exist today. Turning back to the last chapter, one finds many words and terms indicating communication: negotiation, treaty, good offices, arbitration, mediation, neutrality, fluid political situation, "blanket in", letters of admonition, intervention, nominal jurisdiction, trade routes and termini, cutting or opening roads and even the word "administration" itself. The process these terms stand for will now be interpreted in relation to the concept of communication, structural data being drawn in as a beginning to reconstruction of the account in the last chapter in terms of the conceptual scheme.

The transfer of meaning through symbol or action which is the communication process always has as its purpose a certain response, which for the source of the symbol or action is inherent in the latter, in its character as a cue. The problem of the British in this case, as initiators of action, was to insure through interaction with tribal representatives that the cues they supplied would in fact secure the wished-for responses - in other words, would be perceived as stimuli and interpreted as cues in accordance with the British intentions. This was no simple task, as the brief historical account indicates. It was, however, somewhat eased by the existence of tribal structure, which limited the number of points at which cues needed to be applied in order to obtain responses adequate to British requirements.

The process of penetration of the hinterland began with move-
ment along the lines of easiest physical communication - the coastal
sealanes and the rivers. Cues appropriate to the purposes of the Brit-
ish were supplied to various coastal and riverain chiefdoms through
negotiations. The treaties signed may be interpreted as "permanent
cues", both operating as stimuli by the very fact of their existence
and manifesting themselves as cues in the meaning of their terms. How-
ever, the treaty method of supplying cues was not always effective to
the desired degree, and renewal of the cues, in the form of fresh nego-
tiations, admonitions and so forth was frequently necessary to secure
the appropriate responses.

One of the primary reasons for this situation was the discon-
tinuity of structure in native society, or what was called the fluid
political situation among the various chiefdoms. These discontinui-
ties represented gaps in the web of communication, so that those on
one side of the gap could never be sure what the actions of those in
social structure on the other side of the gap meant, or even be sure
that they were perceiving across the gap enough of these actions to
predict behavior. The result was the recurrent return of lack of con-
fidence, which manifested itself in a shutting off of the routes of
communication down which danger might come. To secure the confidence
and hence the peaceful conditions essential to their purposes, the
British were led to intervene, both to provide more trustworthy chan-
nels of communication among chiefdoms (good offices, arbitration, med-
iation) and to make their purposes known, by the use of negotiation as
a method of supplying a cue, to the larger circle of chiefdoms among
which physical communication was established in the process of inter-

vention. This was one of two main alternatives regarding channels of communication which were open to the British, the other being to utilize chiefs with whom relations were already established to communicate with those further afield. Presumably for reasons concerned with control over the communications process and with the prevention of distortion of the meaning of their messages, they chose to "blanket in" chiefdoms by intervention in the guise of an interested but neutral party. It is reasonable to suppose that there was doubt over ability to regulate the responses and hence the sort of cues passed on to the destination by chiefs utilized as links in a chain of communication.

The effort to subject wider circles of native society to the same cues had to be accompanied by development of means of communicating the various messages or cues. There were more frequent missions and expeditions as time went on, and nominal jurisdiction was established over regions across the border of Mendeland. British officials were thus appointed to take up a special watching brief in Freetown and communicate at will with the chiefdoms whose response was desired. Tiny police detachments at strategic points in these areas of jurisdiction served to supply cues to certain responses in much the same manner as treaties did, but certainly more effectively. Various Governors devoted months on end to travel and negotiation extending into Mendeland, and the travelling commissioners took upon themselves the same duty of providing cues, as a steady employment. The decisive break in policy in the late 1880's was, from the communications viewpoint, just another step in supplying means and channels of communication so that cues could be applied steadily rather than intermittently. The cutting of roads and the stationing of police detachments under European inspec-

tors empowered to deal with the native leaders simply extended and raised the capabilities of communication channels already largely in existence. This is part of what is implied in the establishment of administration; the cues communicated are furnished through reliable channels and applied with constancy, so that the probabilities of a stable response are greatly increased by repetition and the more appropriate timing which can be provided by an agent on the spot.

Structure always implies communication, because except within very narrow limits mutual expectations of behavior cannot arise without some exchange of meanings. In turn, reliable communication and a stable cue-response relationship, to the extent that they exist, imply structure. In the Mende instance, a structure dedicated to the maintenance of law and order, the organizational structure of administration, developed over the course of time out of a requirement of reliable communication in order to obtain the ends which the British desired. This structure existed full-blown by 1896, comprising the District Commissioners, their staffs and police units and certain personnel of the chiefdoms - all of whom contributed to the maintenance of public order and were therefore part of the political system as defined in an earlier chapter. As a structure it was inseparable from its communicative function; it existed to insure the eliciting from the Mende and other tribes of the appropriate responses to cues which passed out through the channels of communication comprised within the organizational structure.

It would be a mistake, however, to conceive of this structure as the necessary and only possible consequence of a relationship with the communications situation. To illustrate the validity of this view-

point, it need only be asked what might have happened if the British had taken a different attitude regarding what they wanted in Mendeland. (Another of the concepts, interest or ideology, slips in at this point. It will be taken up in detail later.) They might have been satisfied with diplomatic methods of dealing with the problem of public order, in which case such a fully-developed organizational structure would not have been necessary, since reliable communication and stable responses would presumably not have been considered so important. Or they might have chosen to communicate, as pointed out earlier, with some chiefs through others, rather than intervene as arbitrator or "disinterested" third party. In this event, too, reliable communication would have been at a discount, and in both cases the effect would probably have been to focus primarily upon the chiefs dominant at the time over large areas of Mendeland - the great warrior chiefs like Nyagua. As it was, the creation of an organizational structure and the correlated reliable direct communication with even relatively minor chiefs made it possible to deal selectively with possible points of contact and communication with the native populations, ignoring by error or intention certain former relationships of submission and subordination.[1] As a result, approximately seventy chiefdoms were recognized as legally equal administrative units by 1945, in place of a certainly smaller number of hegemonies or confederacies existing at the time of contact.

These examples illustrate the fact that organizational and social structure, communications and interest are interrelated, and act upon and are influenced by one another. In order to maintain a proper picture

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[1] K. L. Little, op. cit., pp. 176-179.

of these interrelationships, it is necessary to fix it in mind that here the focus is on policy, which can be effected by various permutations of the factors defined by the concepts used in this scheme. The principle obtaining is that changes in one of these factors will result in corresponding changes in the other factors in the system.

Competence

In discussing communication as something which was required in order to explain the development of the forms of British-Mende relationships at the level of local administration, a good deal was taken for granted. For example, nothing was said in detail about the motives for establishing contact; concepts covering the motivational aspect will be offered later. Furthermore, a straightforward set of motivations leading the two sides into one another's arms cannot be assumed. They were able to influence one another so that one motivation rather than another might be made to operate in a given situation, affecting choices bearing on the formation of the system of public order.

This capacity needs to be taken into account, and to accomplish this the concept of competence is offered. Competence is defined as a condition of relative ability to perform a given task or to carry out a given purpose. It is ascertainable, by inference, from the imputation by an individual or group to other individuals or groups of the capacity to act so as to affect some interest in the situation under consideration and known to the imputing party. The evidence of such an imputation of competence might be an explicit cause and effect statement about a change in attitude and activity on the part of those to whom the imputation is attributed, or may merely be implicit in activity

itself on the part of the individuals or groups apparently affected.

The data on the development of the system of public order in Mendeland offer many openings for interpretations in terms of this concept. The success of the British in making their writ run throughout the hinterland is difficult to explain, for example, without reference to the prowess of the troops and police in relation to native military capacities. It was proved time and time again that punitive expeditions could accomplish their objectives against whatever force the natives could bring against them, and as the narrative account indicates, the Mende came to realize this[1] and accordingly stepped lightly with respect to known British interests. Turning to the "diplomatic" period of British-Mende relations, one can reasonably suppose that it was the very absence of conviction about the competence of the British to advance or at least to prevent damage to their interests which brought about the native lapses from grace. The "lack of confidence" mentioned earlier as the reason for the re-stockading of villages and closing of roads reflected this absence of conviction - which on the evidence was a generally sound estimate of British policy up to the middle of the 1880's. The signing of treaties during this period, however, may be taken as an indication of belief in British competence with regard to trade and the importation of European manufactures in which there was a growing native interest. It should be noted in this connection that the British sought in the Macviah case to use their competence with regard to trade to shut off supplies to Nyagua.

The interrelationship of competence and communication in these

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[1]Although they momentarily doubted it at the time of the Hut Tax War, probably due to the success of Bai Bureh, and had to be "convinced" again.

cases is obvious. Competence in trading or military matters affected the interests of the Mende, and could thus be used by the British to reinforce cues and impart a greater increment of meaning to them. In terms of the learning theory model mentioned earlier, response to cues was strengthened by manipulation of rewards, so that those competent to perform such manipulations were in better position to communicate their meanings. It is to the greater ease of communication when some inducement to understanding of meaning can be offered that the definition of communication by Hovland quoted earlier refers.[1] But inducement of, or competence to induce interest is not properly an element of communication, but merely a virtually indispensable adjunct to the process when it involves teaching meanings.

The discussion of competence brings out yet another aspect of the interrelations among organizational structure, social structure and communication, which were analyzed several pages back. It was noted that the organization of administration might have been different had the British been interested in establishing a set of communications patterns other than those actually created. Why was the particular pattern selected? The answer probably lies in the estimate of the competence of the Mende, in alternative patterns of communication, to affect the interests of the British. It would have been far cheaper, and hence to the British interest, to rest influence in the hinterland on a few of the most powerful chiefs. However, since the competence of these chiefs to promote British interests in trade and the suppression of slavery rested largely on their prowess in war, there inhered in any

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[1]See page 78.

policy utilizing their services a basic conflict of British interests. If these chiefs could not or would not maintain their competence with respect to native rivals such as the "Sofas" and their own subordinate chiefs without war, they were not useful, for war destroyed trade, promoted slavery and invited intervention by the other great powers interested in Africa.

The British might have had to accept the peculiar competence of the warrior chiefs, had their own military capacities in relation to those of the Mende been less. As it was, however, they were able to resolve their basic conflict of interest by choosing greater expense - the cost of direct administration and policing of the hinterland - as the lesser evil. This choice in turn seems to have affected their communications patterns with the Mende chiefs, for the niceties of Mende social structure were sometimes ignored and lesser chiefs were treated as independent, and the equals of their erstwhile overlords. This happened, it would appear, for one of several reasons; the lesser chiefs were elevated to new dignity because they had served the British loyally and well in some respect - had in other words proved competent in relation to British interests; or the British were enabled by possession of a full-blown organizational structure and the competence provided by the presence of police units in the hinterland, to create more reliable communication by by-passing some links in the chain of communication which led to the strictly local level; or enforcement of the peace had robbed the great chiefs of the means by which their own claims to competence were secured.

Before leaving the concept of competence, it should be noted that it, like communication, is always implied by the existence of structure.

It is distinguishable from the concept of structure only if we regard it as something emerging within a process of human interaction. When structure is spoken of here, competence is assumed as something institutionalized as rights and duties; in structure, competence is a given element. For example, the foreman has a right to the obedience of his men and the duty to give them sensible direction on the job. By virtue of the existence of a structured situation, he has a position and a prescribed sphere of work, and the imputation of others that therein lies a competence to affect interests is essentially an a priori one, based on known or assumed rules of procedure. This can be stated as a job description, although even then much would be merely understood and not stated, and the fact that it can be so stated demonstrates the nature of competence in structure. It concerns the job, not the individual in it. This area of activity, within which the system of rights and obligations authorizes certain conduct, may be called the foreman's legitimate competence, since it is "legalized" by the prescriptions or rules of procedure of structure.

But in cases such as that of European-African contact relationships are not institutionalized so that individuals can know and accept the competence of other individuals as rights to influence their activity in return for some obligations to have their activity influenced to some extent by others. Competence in this situation is therefore not a given factor, and one can look for the rights and obligations involved in the rules of procedure and hence the expectations in structured relations to emerge as legitimate competence only through the development and consolidation of a pattern of activity. It is obvious, then, that the concept of competence used here is not limited to the idea of the

capacity to act which the conferral of legitimacy on the holders of positions and their sets of activities establishes. The concept is also concerned with the process by which that legitimate competence may be developed or may, conversely, deteriorate.

A distinction is thus made between the process by which competence changes and competence as it is fixed in structure. The difference is really more in point of view than in substance, in degree than in kind, since human interaction is never completely structured and competence is thus never entirely fixed and absolutely unvarying. The distinction drawn has something in common with that between informal and formal organization. In the study of organization, it is found that the formally prescribed relationships, involving legitimate competence, are not the whole story. Personal friendships, cliques and individual personality, energy and ability quite frequently put a very different cast on the character and pattern of organizational activity than that prescribed formally.

To take the process of change in competence, or the existence of "informal organization" into account, other sub-categories of the concept of competence need to be placed alongside that of legitimate competence. One of these may be called competence in fact, which can be defined here as the actual ability, as opposed to the prescribed ability or capacity which is the feature of legitimate competence, to pursue a course of action. In other words, competence in fact is defined by the existence of a situation such that the response or lack of response of others with respect to the particular course of action under consideration is not so effective as to block that course of action. The other sub-category of the concept is technical competence, which

refers to individual or personal characteristics, such as awareness of and alertness to rules of procedure, skills in dealing with the limitations and opportunities which situations present and the willingness, training and physical condition necessary to undertake activity, which affect the capacity to perform tasks or to carry out purposes. This is competence in a meaning very close to the common usage of the phrase "a competent man".

Interest and Ideology

It remains now to deal with the question of motivation. Obviously, this is important in any study of human behavior. Man acts because he is motivated; it was suggested earlier that, in a general way, he can be said always to will or to have purposes. If this is accepted, then motivation needs to be taken into account in this study, because it cannot otherwise be explained why systems of administration came into being.

It is one thing to assert purpose as a general principle, and another to demonstrate over broad ranges of experience any precise or even close correspondence between presumed or known needs or desires of human beings conscious of activity and the course that events actually follow. Purposiveness of human behavior thus remains a general principle with an at least semi-metaphysical character. In other words, motivation itself is too broad a concept easily to be made operational, when merely defined as purposiveness.

When one moves to the other end of the scale, however, it becomes possible to infer from observation of individuals or restricted groups some fairly close connections between activity and events and

what may be presumed on the evidence to be the motivation of the unit
concerned. The evidence for such an inference of purposiveness may
merely be a statistical relationship between the results activity seems
to be directed toward and some condition of the individuals acting -
common residence or profession, similar status or wealth, for example -
or it may be a declared, conscious intent. In any case the need or
desire demonstrated by action is an _interest_.

   This definition does not go to the root of the matter, however,
and is therefore incomplete. It needs to be narrowed somewhat to point
out more specifically what is usually meant when interest is spoken of.
When certain individuals or groups consistently act in a certain way
with regard to a certain area of affairs, an interest is indicated by
the action. Behind the purpose manifested in the action, therefore,
there lies an explanatory element, the motivating item which to this
point has been summed up in the concept of interest. If this summation
were allowed to stand, however, all motivation would constitute inter-
est, a use of the term which does not conform with the usual practice
in Political Science. To clarify matters, it is necessary to realize
that the process of observation here proceeds on two levels. First
comes the level of action, where individuals or groups are seen to be
directing their activities in an apparently purposeful way in relation
to some situation. Second, there is the level of inference, on which
the observer derives from the action and what he knows or hears, the
motivation of the individuals or groups observed. Interest as defined
here is, of course, to be found at the second level. In common usage,
it seems to connote rather mundane objects toward which the individual
or group is motivated; it implies a relatively direct relationship be-

tween the interest, fulfillment of which is sought, and the material well-being of the seeker. The rush for the mess line of soldiers who have not eaten for some hours is easily explicable as an interest resting on a physiological fact. A somewhat more complex but similar chain of reasoning explains the expressed concern of farmers over price supports as an interest. The British desire to trade with the hinterland of Sierra Leone is an interest in much the same sense, resting on similar inferences about material well-being as a motivational goal, but the expressed desire to suppress slavery there is not so obviously an interest. Some inquiry is needed into the differences in the sense of the last example.

If interest is thus restricted in definition, there is a large area of motivation left open. This is the area of belief, of what is thought to be true. In order to take this aspect of motivation into account, the concept of _ideology_ is offered. On the level of inference, ideology as a motivational element is co-equal with interest, for it is possible to infer it from action and expression with just as much validity. But on the level of action, something happens. For example, groups founded upon religious beliefs and possessed with the desire to put their doctrines into action are called interests. There is an overlap between interest and ideology, apparently because almost never does either type of motivation appear in action entirely divorced from the other. There is generally more than a trace of interest apparent in the most altruistic, ideologically-motivated enterprise, and ideology is quite generally belief called to the service of interest.

Here it has been attempted to avoid the confusion caused by this overlap, by utilizing the idea of two levels of observation to abstract

ideology as motivation from the social matrix of action. It is easier to do this because the other concepts relate to action. If, taking a bacteriological analogy, ideology is regarded as a microbe, then the concept here refers to it in its pure, test tube culture state; found functioning in the host, the microbe is a concept already related to others in the scheme. Ideology will never be found, for example, operating in the social context apart from communication, but it may be treated conceptually as a motivating idea, a figment of the imagination quite removed from the level of action.

The definition of ideology requires that several elements be brought together.[1] As an essay into the realm of belief, an ideology is an attempt to place a value on some complex feature of the social system and on the function which it performs. In order to be effective in eliciting action, it must fulfill the task in a consistent way and is therefore usually an integrated system of beliefs. The quest for the value to be placed on the feature generally originates in concern over the feature itself - which implies that actually the value sought through resort to ideology is intended to reinforce a value already placed on the feature. Hence the connection with interest on the level of action. The search for a rationale for the feature carries over into the zone of the "non-empirical", so that ideological beliefs tend to cluster about and be dependent upon some concepts of ultimate causation. The beliefs are thus made adequate to the task of

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[1] The material for this discussion is drawn mainly from Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), p. 349; LaPiere, op. cit., pp. 153, 220; and Karl Loewenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies and Institutions: The Problem of Their Circulation", Western Political Quarterly, December, 1953, pp. 689-706.

fostering the unity and support necessary for the feature of society to operate. Ideology is therefore the selective drawing of the consequences for action of ideas found in the whole inventory of thought and belief of the particular social system concerned.

Interest has been sufficiently discussed in relation to the other concepts as to need little elaboration here, with reference to the Mende. Perhaps the most important observation to add is that, if competence influences interest - with all of the consequences which this has been shown to have for the other concepts - interest also affects competence. It was the heightened intensity of interest in hinterland trade under the stimulus of the "scramble for Africa" which led the British to take the organizational measures necessary to make possible the establishment of administration over the Mende and other tribes.

The close relation of ideology to interest is apparent in the British attitude toward the Mende and other tribes; in fact, it is difficult to say when an interest and when an ideology is the motivating factor. The concern over the slave trade certainly had an ideological background, but it was perhaps not just coincidence that the Great Powers agreed at Berlin and Brussels to certain strong measures to suppress the trade in Africa just at the time that their activity in "enclosing" sections of Africa for themselves came to a climax. In Sierra Leone, the Governor spoke of nothing but the slave trade when he toured Mendeland and other areas in 1894 and 1895, and suppression of the trade was the ostensible reason for stationing Frontier Police throughout the hinterland. But at the same time there was the necessity of defeating the "Sofas" to make it clear that the British actually controlled what they purported to control. Perhaps it would be well to

add, however, that this was the heyday of the theme of the "White Man's Burden", an increment of ideology to the strong stream of intermingling interest and ideology which submerged native Africa.

On the Mende side, ideology played no part up to 1896, so far as the records and accounts show. But it is almost a truism that any social structure is held together by a common core of ideas, so it might be expected that here or in some of the other areas and situations which will be mentioned, some ideology will be devised - whether it be called tribalism, nativism, racialism or nationalism, depending on the nature of the beliefs basic to it - as part of African adaptation to the situation.

To this discussion of motivation a note needs to be added concerning the part which the rules of procedure of the structure play in motivation. Admittedly, they are motivating factors, and might well be aligned with interest and ideology in this scheme. For reasons which will become apparent in Chapter VII, however, they have deliberately been set apart under the concept of social structure, not to be ignored, but treated in a fashion better suited to the nature of the materials on African political systems.

CHAPTER IV

AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: THE MENDE CHIEFDOMS

The Tools of Analysis

A whole battery of analytic devices has now been provided: the conceptual scheme, a typology of policy and a concept of equilibrium as a notion permitting a certain orientation to the data to be dealt with. The colonial administrators are regarded as "leaders", who through their behavior will seek to balance the political system of which they are a part, so that it will move in particular directions. As a plan to achieve and maintain a system in such a state of equilibrium they will have a policy, a deliberately chosen course of action, in which they will strive to take into account the various factors with which they will have to contend in making the policy work.

The idea of policy as a definition or plan of a state of equilibrium is therefore of great importance as a methodological device. One can refer all factors which seem to bear on the political system to the notion of equilibrium, thus taking into account the favorable and adverse effects they may have on the achievement of the goals of policy, the movement in the particular directions desired or planned by the "leaders". Furthermore, a change in policy may be accounted for by showing how the factors in the political system as it existed did not result in that movement in a certain direction which was defined as a state of moving equilibrium.

In making use of the idea of equilibrium in this fashion, the delineation of policy as an identifiable state of affairs and action is of course essential. The typology of policy supplies a whole series of such delineations, so that when viewed in the light of these policies the African political system can be conceived of as slipping from one state of equilibrium to another. The various types of policy provide solid substance for the marking out of such states, while at the same time the idea of the "policy system" as something constituted by the interaction occurring in orientation to the situation created by a policy provides the criterion by which the factors relevant to the maintenance or loss of the state of (moving) equilibrium so defined in policy terms can be distinguished.

Knowing the direction in which the colonial administrator wanted the African to move thus places in the hand a powerful tool for analysis, but it is not all that is needed for reckoning the balance as it shifts, recovers and perhaps slips irrevocably. Some means is required to uncover and treat systematically, as a political process, the whole range of activity and interaction oriented to a policy and its situation. As an analytic device, the conceptual scheme has this function. It isolates the significant factors and reduces the sum total of the activity of the policy system, and of the activity entering into the system from the environment (context) to a few basic ideas, thus making it possible for the human mind to manipulate the data in accordance with the notion of a system revolving about a policy and striving toward a state of moving equilibrium in relation to the goals of a policy.

In setting out to test and elaborate upon the conceptual scheme

which has been settled upon here, it seems proper to begin by discussing the various types of policy and what they imply, as successive models after which policy-makers have striven to shape African political systems. Policy is the heart of the method of analysis. This is particularly true, since, to quote a sentence from the preceding chapter, the "conscious introduction by the colonial power of changes in organizational structure is probably the most dynamic element" in the evolution of African political systems. The other two analytic devices will then be employed to explain the processes through which shifts from policy to policy came about.

In working through the typology of policy to ascertain what each type entailed in the way of planned activity and actual response in African political systems, the history of administration of the Mende will be used as a source of data, thus maintaining continuity of contact with familiar materials. However, since these policies were applied generally, some of the discussion will rest on statements of British purposes in introducing policies which are drawn from sources unrelated to Sierra Leone or Mendeland.

The Policy System of Public Order

The discussion may begin at a point where public order can be said to have been firmly established and the way opened for development of various "modern" features of government, such as European administrative techniques, social services and public works. There is an overlapping, of course, for public order is a continuing problem, while the "modern" features (the making of roads, the employment by chiefs of clerks or go-betweens with some knowledge of European ways)

often appear in rudimentary form as soon as penetration takes place. In terms of African colonial history, however, the distinction is both useful and generally tenable.

In Mendeland, the establishment of control might quite plausibly be dated from about 1895 at the latest, for by this time police units were stationed throughout the Protectorate and there was certainly no doubt whose writ ran in the land. A fundamentally new situation was thus created. From our viewpoint, of course, the most important feature of it was the new political systems brought into existence by the process analyzed in the last chapter. There were in the political system of public order an organizational structure, operating in the milieu provided by a social structure and utilizing it in part to accomplish the objective of public order, a set of communications channels with certain kinds of cues flowing along them, estimates of competence which helped in evaluating these cues as well as in establishing channels of communication, and interests, which in turn were of assistance in ranking competences, thus guiding responses to cues.

In 1896, the organizational structure was established in a final or mature and, as far as the British were concerned, a legitimate form, since legal provision had been made for administration of the Protectorate by means of the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896. The Ordinance provided, most importantly, (1) for three levels of courts for each district: the chiefs' courts with general jurisdiction over natives, a joint court of chiefs and District Commissioner to consider serious criminal cases and the District Commissioner's court, with jurisdiction over land cases (a very important item

for the natives, of course), and disputes between non-natives and natives and among non-natives; (2) that not only was slave trading unlawful but courts in the Protectorate could not consider cases involving claims for runaway slaves; (3) that slaves might purchase their freedom; (4) that there would be a tax on houses (House or "Hut" Tax) to finance the administration of the Protectorate and (5) that the Governor should have power to dispose of "waste or uninhabited lands".

From the native viewpoint, the arrangements under the Protectorate Ordinance were not acceptable, even though the very objectionable provision relating to the Governor's authority to deal with certain lands was disallowed by the Colonial Office. The word never caught up with the deed, and in this respect as in others, the Ordinance raised a hornet's nest in the Protectorate. Hundreds of Mende and other chiefs filed numerous objections with the authorities and with influential friends and acquaintances in Freetown. Not all were pertinent to the Ordinance itself, but here the focus is upon forces and processes, not in legal enactments as such. Therefore all complaints are grist for the mill, especially as in this case they were elicited by a long step forward in the process of establishing administrative controls over the Protectorate, following upon a relatively long period of gradual encroachment upon the independence of the chiefs.

Complaints were raised at various times:

On the domestic slavery issue. One chief feared slaves might become free by going to the District Commissioner. The Temne raised again an old problem, that of slaves running away to the Colony, where they were considered free.

On channels of communication. Resentment was expressed at the neces-

sity of going to the District Commissioner rather than direct to Freetown if the chief had business with the Government.

On the jurisdiction of courts. Any limitation on the powers of the chief in the judicial sphere was objected to, and particular mention was made of land cases.

On the treatment of chiefs and other natives by the administration. There should be no deportation or flogging of chiefs or building of jails in the hinterland. It was complained that the Frontier Police oppressed the natives and in general abused their powers. Often native police were, it was alleged, former slaves of the chiefs in the areas in which they were stationed. (The Governor later admitted that abuses had occurred, but on a decreasing scale. But he also noted that the impression of abuse of authority by government officials was to some extent due to impersonation - in one district in 1899, the District Commissioner had reported that two-thirds of the crime involved impersonation.)

On the Hut Tax. There were many claims of poverty, and some chiefs went on to state that the burden would thus fall very heavily on the chiefs, who would have to pay for their people. Furthermore, the assertion was made that the tax was payment for "sleeping places" (the implication apparently being that the very right to rest under shelter had to be obtained by leasehold from the Government), and later the statement was heard that the tax "took away the rights to the country" which the ancestors had enjoyed.

On general issues. The administration was interfering with ancient customs; the Ordinance would result in wives' leaving their men, etc.

The tax provisions of the Ordinance became the focus of native

resentment as the time drew near for its application to the three districts, two of which included parts of Mendeland, selected for the initial effort. In November, 1897, the Governor rejected the basic points in the pleadings of the persistent Temne chiefs, thus closing the argument as far as the Government was concerned. In January, 1898, collection began, with the Frontier Police strengthened by fifty men and all available European officers on tour to enforce payment. In the Banda-juma district, inhabited by Mende and coastal tribes, there was sullen non-cooperation, with armed crowds much in evidence, and at least one instance of threatening behavior to a European official. Certain Kpa Mende chiefs were arrested for threats to those who paid up taxes, while in the Yonni country there was armed resistance even in February. But it was in the Temne country to the west that real rebellion first occurred, a noted war chief named Bai Bureh taking to the field early in February. The Government forces had their hands full in this area, the troops and police suffering some hundreds of casualties without for some months managing to subdue the rebels or arrest their leader. Then, on April 26th and 27th, the other two districts under tax rose, as did the Panguma district (Mende and certain smaller tribes), where the tax had been postponed for a year. The whole of Mendeland was hence involved in what came to be known as the "Hut Tax War". Most Europeans and the Europeanized Sierra Leoneans in the hinterland were massacred, with the exception of those at or near the larger police posts. The uprising was concerted through a special Poro gathering, from which a call to rebellion and signals as to timing were sent out. There was, however, no common leadership, at least in Mendeland, where each chiefdom mounted its own "war", sending its contingents to attack

whatever objectives happened to be available in the vicinity. In Mende-land, the rising was soon put down, and within three or four months the area was reasonably quiet. The superiority of rockets, artillery and Maxim guns over parties of "war boys" had been demonstrated again.[1]

These events may be analyzed in terms of the conceptual scheme. First of all, the newly created organizational structure, the protests indicate, bore heavily on the social structure in its political aspects at several points. By changing certain rules of procedure in the conduct of affairs in the native society, it threatened to change the evaluation of positions of political significance, such as that of the chiefs. The provisions for judging certain criminal and all land cases, the punishment and imprisonment of chiefs and tribesmen and even the levying of taxes all affected the rules under which the chiefs and the whole society operated. There were no native interests which afforded sanction for the British assumption that they were competent to impose such rules of procedure, except perhaps a diffuse interest in conciliating the British, arising out of the sense that here was an as yet incommensurable force. In the event, resentment over the imposition of new rules of procedure led to a breakdown of communication with British officials in the Protectorate, the first evidence of which was the remarkable persistence of certain chiefs in pursuing direct contact with Freetown authorities to protest against the Ordinance. It developed to the point where police units sweeping through the country to

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[1]The best account of these events from a political viewpoint is the Report by Her Majesty's Commissioner and Correspondence on the Subject of the Insurrection in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, Cmd. 9398, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LX (1899) (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1899), Parts I and II. A description of the military side is found in C. B. Wallis, The Advance of Our West African Empire (London: T. F. Unwin, 1903).

collect taxes began to encounter active hostility.

At the same time that this tendency developed to dispute British competence by rejecting British cues and ignoring the organizational channels of communication, however, a vagueness persisted in the native mind regarding the actual extent of British claims to competence and their relationship to the positions and rules of procedure of the organizational structure. As a result, it was possible for unsupervised native Frontier Police, or plain impersonators of officials, to exact privileges going far beyond any authority the British wished to assert. Such impositions naturally increased the irritation at British domination, expressions of which were accompanied by frequent claims that police personnel were actually former slaves of chiefs or of "big men" in the areas in which they were stationed. Such evidence as there is on the question seems to dispute this claim, which thus is open to interpretation as an attempt to undercut the British claims to competence through the device of placing in doubt their agents' competence under the rules of procedure of the organizational structure by invoking the rules of the social structure. That such assertions were made and persisted without, so far as the record shows, any thoroughgoing effort to ascertain their basis in fact is in itself of course an indication of the state of communications between administrators and native rulers.[1]

In adopting the policy enshrined in the Protectorate Ordinance,

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[1] At a later date, when "court messengers" had replaced the Frontier Police, the mode of recruitment paid attention to the connection between communication and competence. Recruits were supplied to the District Commissioner by the chiefs, who were thus robbed of any *prima facie* grounds for disputing the competence of the messengers or district police. See T. J. Alldridge, Sierra Leone, A Transformed Colony (Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1910), p. 125. More recently, court messengers have been recruited from among discharged soldiers.

the British to some extent predicted and attempted to adjust to the factors which would affect the pursuit of the policy. From the first, colonial servants were enjoined to restraint in their dealings,[1] obviously to avoid impinging upon the native social structure any more than was absolutely necessary to carry out policy. Police discipline, that source of native complaint, was constantly tightened up during the years before the rebellion, official figures of prosecution for breaches of police regulations showed. Considerable effort was made to communicate to meetings of the chiefs the reasons for the Hut Tax, and to obtain some expression of assent. On the other side of the coin, calculations of competence to put over the new tax were obviously made, since the effort was concentrated initially on only three districts and the Frontier Police were strengthened.

The main error in prediction was of course the failure to assess correctly the staying power of Bai Bureh. But in Mende country, specifically, there was an error in assessing interest and perhaps ideology as factors affecting communication and hence competence. The pressure brought to bear to collect the tax activated certain existing but largely latent rules of procedure associated with the Poro. As noted, the body of practice and belief of the Poro society was shared in common by the Mende, making possible the use of the Poro as the channel of inter-chiefdom negotiations for cooperative action. But the more common pattern was inter-chiefdom hostility and distrust, which consti-

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[1](Police Inspectors) "will on no account attempt . . . to assume the offensive in any way with the people or their domestic institutions". Quoted from instructions to Frontier Police printed in the Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, 1890, pp. 71-72. Cited by J. D. Hargreaves, "The Evolution of the Native Affairs Department", Sierra Leone Studies, New Series, December, 1954, pp. 168-184, on p. 179.

tuted a barrier to such communication and cooperation. Under the stimulus of the emergency created by the attempt to collect the tax, however, those who found a common cause in resistance to the tax also found in the Poro a ready-made instrument for coordinating their efforts to resist. The signals for the armed rising sent out under the aegis of the Poro were understood because the institution was shared by all Mende, and their efficacy as cues was no doubt strengthened by the fact that the disturbances which had already taken place displayed a disposition to resist.

Such calls to rebellion could jump the barriers normally hampering communication because strong motivation existed. In the main it was material interests which contributed, but, since social structure usually has an overtone of moral evaluation, the Protectorate Ordinance seems also to have been experienced as a threat to the bases in belief of the Mende social order. There is evidence of Mende ideology coming into play, for example, in the reference to "rights to the country" (i.e., land) in conjunction with references to ancestors. It may well have been that the beliefs associated with the Poro itself were articulated in somewhat this fashion to bring the procedures for coordination among chiefdoms into effective use, although this analysis must remain inconclusive, because not enough is known about the Poro and its role in the uprising. This much can be said, however: the Hut Tax levy and other provisions aroused the Mende enough that channels of communication among chiefdoms were momentarily cleared. This enhanced Mende military competence, but since coordination extended only to the initial attack, the effect of this was soon lost and the hostilities degenerated into a series of "wars" waged by individual chiefdoms.

Although British military power soon restored the lost equilibrium, the rebellion produced certain slight but significant changes in the behavior of the colonial administrators - in other words, in what their policy recognized and predicted. The Hut Tax was continued, but organizational structure was changed so that almost all authority over land was returned to the natives. For the rest, the rules of procedure of the organizational structure discouraged intervention in chiefdom affairs; in Lord Hailey's phrase, what was established after the rebellion was a "regulated system of administration through the chiefs."[1]

One example of this circumspect policy was the already cited case of recruitment of the court messengers. More notable, perhaps, was the apparent modification of the rather headlong pace at which British anti-slavery convictions had formerly been pursued. It will be recalled that the suppression of slavery had ostensibly been a primary reason for the establishment of administration. The provisions of the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896 concerning slavery were repeated in the legislation of the early 1900's[2] which reorganized the Protectorate along the lines of post-rebellion policy, and a provision against bequest of slaves was added. For a quarter of a century thereafter, however, the authorities did nothing more about slavery, although the legislation was not very effective, and even as late as 1924 it was reported that the institution was "only gradually dying out".[3] It was

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[1] Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories (5 Parts; London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1950-1953), Part III, p. 300.

[2] Protectorate Ordinance of 1901, Sections 10 and 38, and Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1903, Section 5.

[3] League of Nations Document A25(a), 1924 VI, Geneva, Sept. 5, 1924, p. 10, "Memorandum from the Sierra Leone Government".

finally abolished only in 1928, under the glare of investigation by the League of Nations Temporary Commission on Slavery and the stimulus of a decision by a Sierra Leone court in 1927 that an owner had the legal right forcibly to reclaim a runaway slave should the latter be found in an area where slavery was legal.[3]

This live-and-let live attitude toward slavery can perhaps best be explained as a manifestation of the more cautious policy adopted after the rebellion, and of the new equilibrium predicted or planned then. Some chiefs - not a great many - had protested before the rebellion about the effect upon slave holders of good communication with emancipated Freetown and of legal discouragement of slavery. They feared the breakup of the social structure upon which the positions depended; the flight of slaves was all loss and no gain in an agricultural society depending, for the most part, upon the amassing of cheap labor for the surplus supporting the chief's establishment. But the various administrative officers who testified at the hearings on the causes of the rebellion almost universally pressed this line of argument to the extreme, attributing the war largely to a desire to continue not only holding slaves but taking them as well. If this really represented the conviction of officialdom and was not merely an appeal to a predominant ideology of their countrymen, then it could be argued that a "softer" line on slavery was felt to be important in preserving public order.

In the event, neither the apparent expectations of the chiefs nor of the colonial officials seemed to be justified. The rather abrupt termination of slavery occasioned little disturbance in Mendeland

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[1]C. R. Lewis, Sierra Leone, A Modern Portrait, (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1954), p. 67.

or Sierra Leone as a whole, although some 200,000 slaves were estima-
ted to have been freed. This uneventful end to an institution possib-
ly important enough to fight about thirty years before is a little
startling, unless one stops to consider that perhaps the predictions
of both policy makers and chiefs regarding the forces at work were at
fault. If more were done, presumably ran the argument of officials who
took protests by chiefs seriously, as indicating a major cause of the
rebellion, the effect might be extreme unrest in the Protectorate. Hence
the authorities should rest content and let events take their course
under the legislation already provided.

But slavery did not disappear, and neither was there unrest when
it had to be abruptly abolished. The chiefs who protested (as well as
the officials who took them seriously) therefore seem to have assessed
their positions in native society poorly, and in fact the slave owners
found that they could get along without slaves about as well as with
them. If, as seems likely, this was the case, then one must look some-
what afield for an explanation.

The relationships demonstrated in deriving the concepts permit
the hypothesis that given the opportunities new communications provide
and the obvious interest of slaves in being free, there would be a
breakdown in the slave-master relationship if, as was the case, the
competence of the masters to administer sanctions was drastically cut
down. But the validity of the hypothesis depends upon whether or not
a real behavioral alternative was offered the slaves. The fact that
most of the freed slaves stayed on the same land or moved to poorer
land nearby, and that there was no great influx into the Colony in
those years (the Mende population of the Colony actually fell between

1921 and 1931) indicates that new communications did not mean much. They could still make a living only on the land and hence under the domination of the chiefs and "big men", since rights to land were un-affected by European rule. This seems to be the explanation of the uneventful passing of slavery, and it raises questions about types of conditions in the context or external balance of the system which must be taken up later.

The Policy System of Supervision

Returning to British post-rebellion policy, one finds plenty of evidence in legislation of the circumspect nature of objectives and the manner in which they were defined and pursued. The main items of legislation were several acts replacing and adding to the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896.[1] They did not go very far in predicting what should be made to happen in the period which falls under Stage II of the typology of policy. The existing administrative and judicial authorities in the native social structure were legally recognized and, so defined, were given a place in the organizational structure. The organizational rules of procedure imposed upon them were minimal, however, and constituted in the main restrictions upon activities rather than statements of new duties. Thus, the chief was legally required to collect Hut Tax, under pain of punishment. Such acts as levying war, erecting stockades and loopholing walls were made offenses, "seditious acts" were made punishable by deposition or banishment of the chiefs con-

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[1]The two Ordinances listed in note 2 on p. 108, plus the Protectorate Native Law Ordinance of 1905. These, with amendments, are Caps. 167, 169 and 170 of the Laws of Sierra Leone (3 vols; London: Waterlow and Co., 1925).

cerned, and the District Commissioner was given power in 1913 to settle any disputes arising which might lead to a breach of the peace.[1] These included, especially, land disputes between chiefdoms and "matters . . . which have their origin in Poro laws, native rites or customs". This amendment to the law governing local administration was made at a time when there was a recrudescence of illicit "medicine" taking the form of ritual killing by such secret groups as the Human Leopard and Alligator societies. In these matters a chief might be either unwilling or simply powerless to act - as he would of course be in connection with a dispute of his own with another chief - and it seems fairly obvious that the amendment to the law was made to enable the District Commissioner to step in only when a problem had reached the point where it was apparently beyond the capacity of the native rulers to settle and thereby restore public order or remove a potential threat to it.

By the same set of legislation the native courts were until 1926 restricted in their activities only by prohibition of penalties involving death or mutilation,[2] and by the assignment to the court presided over by the District Commissioner of major criminal cases and those concerning witchcraft or inter-chiefdom land disputes. There was no review or appeal as a matter of routine of cases heard by the native courts.

Almost the only new duty formally imposed on the chief, other than that of collector of tax, was that of acting as sanitary authority

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[1] H. O. Newland, Sierra Leone, Its People, Products and Secret Societies (London: John Bale, 1916) p. 139.

[2] R. L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (2 vols.) (New York: MacMillan, 1928), Vol. I, p. 865.

of any area declared by the Governor to be a sanitary district [1] -
which was likely to be any large town. As sanitary authority the chief
was expected to enforce, or collaborate with European medical and ad-
ministrative officers in enforcing, rules regarding such things as town
planning, waste removal, drainage, sewage and burial. He was expected
to provide the labor to carry out work required for sanitary purposes
just as he was expected without so clear a legal sanction but in accor-
dance with native custom to provide labor for roads and the transport
of travellers. Another duty formally provided for in the Protectorate
Courts Ordinance was that assemblies of chiefs should advise the Gov-
ernor on proposed legislation affecting natives, and on changes which
might be made in native law. However, this new duty was never required
of the chiefs, for such assemblies never met.[2]

British interest, it would appear from the evidence, extended
very little beyond the range which had impelled them into Sierra Leone
in the first place. It was exhausted when taxes were collected, ele-
mentary justice according to the lights of the administration was done,
travel routes kept open and maintained in some reasonable condition and
public order was maintained. Little was required of the colonial offi-
cial (of whom there were very few) but to keep up the meager flow of
cues necessary to secure these ends, and little was sought of the na-
tive leaders but to carry on in the old ways, modified only in the few
respects mentioned above.

Why this was so is a question already partially answered; such a

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[1] Public Health (Protectorate) Ordinance of 1915, Laws of Sierra
Leone, op. cit., Cap. 172.

[2] Buell, op. cit., p. 866.

policy by predicting little created an equilibrium at bargain prices. A few assiduous colonial administrators, backed by some native police, could administer millions of people at little or no financial cost to the mother country. But there was perhaps another reason; there was current until the turn of the century and even later the view that African societies exposed to European influences would alter rapidly in the direction of these "stronger" institutions and thus drastically change their nature overnight. This would of course occur in conjunction with a rapid development of the local economy which would as a matter of course augment the benefits of colonial status. As examination of accounts of Africa of that period will reveal, there was almost boundless confidence in the possibilities of trade and commerce, and it would seem that the assumption of almost automatic change in the economic sphere was carried over to the human side, so that there was at least implicit the expectation that the African would as a matter of course become much more like the European.

Now, although the results of many years of contact make this view seem naive - as well as revelatory of extreme ethnocentrism - it was not absolutely without foundation in either logic or fact. The case of the chiefdom clerk or literate chief, analyzed in terms of the conceptual scheme, will illustrate the point.

British-Mende contact created a need for communication, and even before actual British administrative control was established some of the chiefs had found it expedient to utilize the services as clerks of literate or semi-literate Creole traders or artisans who happened to have wandered from Freetown or elsewhere to the chiefdom. Later, the post of chiefdom clerk became an official position, the holder being an

employee of the chief concerned. In the beginning, the position was identifiable only through the action of the chief in calling in someone to write or read an English language communication (since Mende had not then been reduced to written form). Gradually, however, the position evolved until by the mid-1940's the duties of the clerk consisted "in keeping Court and other chiefdom records, in supervising the assessment and collection of House Tax, in collecting Court fees and fines, in acting as the Chief's secretary and his general go-between with the Administrative Officer", as well as keeping accounts and performing miscellaneous tasks.[1]

The building of such a position as that of clerk - and it is precisely this that happened, witness the fact that the semi-literate Creole who was the prototype of the clerk obviously could not hold the position whose duties are described in the quotation above - is in miniature the transformation which it was confidently expected would take place throughout African society. This phenomenon can therefore be examined to find out wherein the view that contact would lead to transformation was naive and wherein it was a true insight. It would appear that it was in large part through the process and constantly increasing requirements of communication between African rulers and European administration that the clerk's position developed as far as it did. At first, the impinging British required relatively little in the way of communicative skills on the part of the natives. Ability to translate or write a letter in English was enough. After administration was established, however, the requirements of communication of information to

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[1]K. L. Little, _op_. _cit_., p. 210.

the supervising British officials dictated a beginning to the keeping of chiefdom records of one kind or another. At this point, too, certain non-communicative skills. such as accounting and perhaps some sense of the principles behind British law and administrative practice, began to be desired. All of this meant a progressive change in the definition of the clerk's technical competence, and the men to fill the position in the various chiefdoms in a certain measure began presumably to be selected according to their ability in these certain respects. This by no means implies that the people selected were always satisfactory - British complaints of inadequacy of records, financial irregularities and nepotism are compelling evidence to the contrary - but certainly criteria were established which differed in nature and complexity from the earliest ones.

For all his failings, however, the chiefdom clerk does approximate to the idea of what contact with the European would do to the African. He is a relatively "westernized" type, who is literate in one or more languages including English, who uses many non-African items, as for example European clothes, as part of his way of life, and who utilizes effectively in both work and leisure time certain techniques and procedures introduced by the colonial power. His case is thus one example of the kernel of truth in that great assumption which was spoken of earlier. Stated in terms of the scheme of concepts, the assumption was that establishment of communication with Africans would reveal to them interests of which they had no inkling, and they would hasten to develop the competence required to indulge these interests. The process would lead to a thoroughgoing alteration in social structure, in the direction of the European example. The African would of course

have the assistance of missionary effort and the economic development accompanying the opening up of the "dark continent". And such was the case with the chiefdom clerk, presumably, since he was always a native who had somehow been motivated or guided into getting himself trained for the job, and who in the process tended to take on European ways.

However, if the predictions of changes of this kind in African society were therefore not entirely naive, they were certainly much overdrawn. The case of the chiefdom clerk or the literate chief will show how much this was the fact.

The clerk or the literate chief constituted the effective link between the organizational structure and the social structure, since communication had largely to pass through them. Occupation of such a strategic position permitted the clerk under some circumstances to gather to himself considerable competence in fact. Communication thus stimulated competence, in an entirely non-legitimate, non-technical sense of the term.[1] Even as early as 1908, for example, clerks were observed to play a "very important" part in chiefdom affairs.[2] Little noted forty years later that "In extreme cases . . . he is virtually the 'manager' of the chiefdom, so far as the machinery of the Native Administration is concerned". This situation places "a special premium on the possession of literacy and offers rare opportunities to any person who cares to take advantage of them".[3] In other words, the

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[1] See p.90 for a discussion of these various aspects of competence as a concept.

[2] Alldridge, op. cit., p. 176.

[3] Little, "Mende Political Institutions in Transition", Africa, January, 1947, p. 18.

special technical competence (literacy) of the clerk made it difficult
for those not possessing it to control him, as his advantageous posi-
tion promoted opportunity for him to advance his own interests. This
is of course a dilemma not unknown elsewhere.

On the other side of the matter, the traditional authorities fre-
quently were inclined to take no more interest than absolutely neces-
sary in the relations of the chiefdom with the colonial administration.
To the extent, presumably, that their apprehension of the sanctions
which the British were competent to bring against them permitted, they
were inclined to dispute the legitimate competence of the clerk or
chief as conferred upon them by the British. The clerk in Mendeland
tended to be scorned jealously as a "small boy" by the important older
men of the chiefdom.[1] One literate chief, placed in the same position
as the clerk by a requirement that financial estimates be submitted for
the chiefdom, reported to Little that he was dismissed by the advisers
whom he wished to consult with the remark, "Oh, go away, and don't
bother us with white man's business". In such circumstances the compe-
tence in fact of the clerk or chief was likely to be less extensive
than his legitimate competence as conferred in the organizational struc-
ture.

Literacy and a general acquaintance with western ways could even
be a positive detriment, if the process of acquiring them had placed
the individual somewhat apart from the tribal life and those, rooted
deep in the traditional structure, with whom he had to work. The case
of a literate Temne chief, as assessed and reported by administrative

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[1]Little, *ibid.*, p. 18.

officers, seems to fall into this category. The Temne are the largest
tribe in Sierra Leone after the Mende, and have a social structure much
resembling that of the Mende. For the purposes of this illustration,
it is not necessary to go into the differences between the two systems.

In 1943, the small related chiefdoms of Malal Rochen and Malal
Mara were by consent amalgamated under a chief selected from the former
chiefdom, under the stipulation that after his death the chieftainship
would go to a member of a certain one of the several descent groups in
Malal Mara which were entitled to supply chiefs for that chiefdom. When
the chief from Malal Rochen died in 1951, this agreement was brought
into play. The candidate eventually selected from the house entitled
to provide the chief under the agreement was a produce examiner and
former clerk for the provincial administration, who had been educated
at the main government secondary school in the Protectorate.

After the election, the district commissioner observed that
"the new Paramount Chief has less knowledge of native law and custom
than most (colonial service) cadets with two months experience in the
country. As a result he will be very much at the mercy of his elders
and for some time will require constant advice and support in order not
to get into the hands of wrong advisers". A principal officer of the
chiefdom, he remarked, had immediately asked the commissioner's permis-
sion - required by Ordinance - to levy on the populace a certain trib-
ute which he claimed was customarily collected upon the election of a
new chief. This the commissioner labelled "nothing more than a 'try
on' of a sort to which the new chief is likely to be subjected", and
he likewise summarily quashed an attempt to persuade the new chief to
set up his headquarters in the former capital of Malal Mara, rather

than in the town agreed upon in 1943, a proposal openly acknowledged as a move preparatory to calling out chiefdom labor to repair all of the descent group houses in the former capital.

This case illustrates that it would not do for the British authorities just to create literates to function as chiefs or in other official positions closely tied in with the African social structure. If the African officials were to be effective and satisfactory in their jobs, they had to know the rules of the game as played both in the organizational and social structures. Their ability to play the game, even so, depended at least to a considerable extent upon the knowledge and consent of others to the same rules.[1]

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[1]A debt of gratitude is due Dr. Vernon Dorjahn, formerly of the Department of Anthropology of Northwestern University, for permission to examine and abstract from copies of official records relating to chiefdom succession in Temne country, which Dr. Dorjahn obtained while doing research in Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER V

THE MENDE AND THE POLICY SYSTEM OF REFORM

The External Balance and Policy

In this section the discussion moves on to the next stage of policy, an active effort to stimulate social, economic and political evolution in native society through operation of the mechanisms of government. It is called for short the policy system of reform.

In the foregoing section, the foundation was laid for the creation of an understanding of why such a change in the policy pursued by the Sierra Leone authorities took place. The facile assumption of a ready African adaptation to European ways, made implicitly or explicitly, was clearly proved invalid. The proof came not only in Sierra Leone, but all over Africa, and it posed important questions which the British authorities felt it incumbent upon them to answer. However, although the pertinence of a change in emphasis to the general problem of adaptation was plain enough, in Sierra Leone as in British Africa as a whole, there was apparently no situation in the Protectorate and Mendeland which made a change in policy imperative.

The policy of reform did not originate in Sierra Leone, among the administrators who had to cope with the problems of adaptation there - far from it. The legislation and hence the organizational structure and policy described above remained in operation into the 1930's. Little was done in those years to encourage and stimulate

the natives to adapt themselves so as to become better integrated into the social, political or economic organization of the modern world. For example, in 1926 only about two shillings per head (perhaps $0.50) was spent on "native welfare" in both the Colony and Protectorate,[1] which probably meant even less per head in Mendeland, for the Colony altogether had a more highly developed set of government services. On the other hand, there was little pressure for change in policy from the Africans.

It was in imitation of other British African territories, in pursuit of a policy sponsored generally by the Colonial Office to cope with the problem of adaptation and in relation to a set of beliefs firmly embedded in British thought and therefore in the thought of the colonial servants that the administration of Sierra Leone acted. The change in the state defined as equilibrium, or rather as moving equilibrium, occurred because of a change in the behavior of the officials themselves, representing what they brought to the system from outside of it, not a direct reaction compensating for change in some other element in the policy system of supervision. The alteration of policy was thus essentially a matter of external rather than internal balance of Mende and Sierra Leone political systems, although an anticipation of a possible change in the internal balance due to uneven adaptation of African participants may have been a stimulus.

Since this is the case, what now has to be considered is the doctrine of indirect rule, which was the form of statement of policy that brought British beliefs and, ultimately, British official activity to bear on the problem posed by the differentials which existed with

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[1]Buell, op. cit., p. 896. "Native Welfare" meant the following services: Agriculture, Veterinary (unimportant to the Mende, as they do not keep cattle), Forestry, Medical, Sanitation and Education.

regard to African adaptation to the colonial situation. Indirect rule is a concept which has had a vexed history, owing to the many different interpretations and value judgments carried forward under its banner to the point of administrative application. If, however, one accepts the literal meaning of Lord Lugard's words, his definition of it is the most serviceable:

> Rule by native chiefs, unfettered in their control of their people, yet subordinated to the control of the Protecting Power in certain well-defined directions.[1]

By utilizing this definition, one can get at the common core of meaning that lies behind all of the permutations of colonial policy which from time to time have been characterized as "indirect rule". The portal by which one can enter to examine what the definition implies is the phrase "control of the Protecting Power _in certain well-defined directions_".

The system of local administration just described for Sierra Leone was by this definition indirect rule. In fact, it was the very quintessence of indirect rule if considered from the standpoint of the degree to which the chiefs were left "unfettered" in exercise of control over the African population. In this case, indirect rule was a plain case of expediency, a function of interest in maintaining public order and later in supervising certain minimum activities with as little expense as possible. But there was control by the colonial administration in "certain well-defined directions", minimal though they were.

The motivating factors behind British conduct under the policy system of reform were, however, quite a different matter from those under the policy systems of public order and of supervision. What is

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[1]Quoted in R. E. Robinson, "Why 'Indirect Rule' Has Been Replaced by 'Local Government' in the Nomenclature of British Native Administration", _Journal of African Administration_ (July, 1950), pp. 12-15.

being taken up now is the application of a _doctrine_ of indirect rule to Sierra Leone, and as a doctrine indirect rule implied quite drastically altered beliefs about what "fetters" there should be, and hence what "control in certain well-defined directions" should constitute. A new wind began to blow in British administered tropical Africa in the 1920's, as new directions in which control should operate were defined. This revised concept of indirect rule emphasized an ideology as defined here, for it comprised a set of notions about techniques for altering African social systems which was informed by a set of ideals and beliefs. Therein lay the difference between the new policy system and the old.

The chief prophet for this "progressive" version of indirect rule was Sir Donald Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika and Nigeria from 1925 to 1935. One can turn to him for an outline of the doctrine which his interpretation of indirect rule constituted. Moving on from the old argument of expediency as a reason for relying on the customary authorities for most of the little that was done in the way of administration, Cameron maintained that "in accord with . . . accepted forms of British colonial policy our object is to teach these people and train them so that eventually . . . they may be able to stand by themselves." The essential word here is teach: "teaching the chiefs and people habits of responsibility in public affairs, probity in the handling of men and money and obedience to constituted authority". But it was expedient to do this through indigenous institutions (a sort of "on-the-job-training", or learning by doing). Moreover, it was declared, preservation of native institutions was in many cases the only way to prevent the Africans from "going under and becoming a servile people" - servile either to educated, urban classes of Africans, as on the west

coast of Africa,[1] or to white settlers.

The ideology behind this doctrine of indirect rule was thus a kind of "conservative liberalism". It was right as well as expedient to conserve African institutions, in order to preserve a possibility of self-determination, and in view of the need of Africans to cope with the modern world as it impinged upon them, this same doctrine of self-determination made it just as right and very necessary to encourage economic, social and political evolution from the foundations provided by native social structure.

What was to be done to implement this ideology? First of all, democracy should find its place within the tribal structure as well as in relations between it and the authorities of larger political units within whose boundaries the tribe lived. Cameron would have agreed whole-heartedly with Lord Hailey's observation that "There is general agreement that no form of constitution can be satisfactory if it results in vesting political authority in a minority of the population, or fails to provide means by which the people at large can share in the responsibility involved in its exercise."[2] Apparently assuming "democracy" as an inherent attribute of African society, Cameron declared that

> Care should be taken to preserve the link . . . right up from the bottom to the top so that the humblest peasant at the bottom may have a recognised avenue of approach to the authority at the top. The villager to his village head and council of elders and through them to the next in authority on the native side; to the administrative officer at any stage.

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[1] Cf. Sir F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (2nd ed.) (London: Blackwood, 1923), pp. 83-93, especially p. 90, which reads, "It would be unjust to place under their (Europeanized Africans') control the interior tribes, who themselves have a right to a measure of self-government."

[2] Lord Hailey, op. cit., Part IV, pp. 5-6.

Second, there was the educational aspect, the "teaching" of African po-
litical authorities how to carry on along the lines required in the
modern world. Cameron declared, "We must seek an ordered and systemat-
ic development of Native institutions so that they may become attuned
to modern conditions and (we must) gradually lead the Native Authori-
ties to realize that this must be the aim." Thus indirect rule in the
Cameronian sense demanded the "continuous guidance, supervision and
stimulus of European officers".[1]

Cameron also proposed that African political authorities should
be clothed with legal authority enforceable in a court of law, and such
powers should be extended only as the capacity of the particular "Na-
tive Authority" for discharge of duties was demonstrated. There should
be local treasuries to promote the growth of a sense of responsibility,
and a judicial arrangement established by legal enactment and, like the
rest of the system, subject to tactful and cautious supervision so that,
again, the chiefs could be taught to carry out these duties "in accord-
ance with civilized standards".[2]

Just as the heart of this "progressive" doctrine of indirect rule
was ideological, so the core of its practice was legislation. For Men-
deland and Sierra Leone in general, a body of legislation[3] passed between

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[1]Margery Perham, "A Re-statement of Indirect Rule", _Africa_, Ju-
ly, 1934, pp. 321-334, at p. 325.

[2]This summary of Cameron's views is taken from Sir Donald Cam-
eron, "Native Administration in Nigeria and Tanganyika", _Journal of the
Royal African Society_, Extra Supplement, XXXVI, November 30, 1937.

[3]Protectorate Courts Ordinance of 1932, Protectorate Ordinance
of 1933, Tribal Authorities, Chiefdom Tax and Chiefdom Treasuries Or-
dinances of 1937. These, with amendments, are in the order of listing,
Caps. 149, 185, 245, 29 and 30 of the _Laws of the Colony and Protector-
ate of Sierra Leone in force on 1st January, 1946_ (5 vols; London: Ro-
worth, 1946).

1932 and 1937 sketched in the main outlines. Lord Hailey[1] sums up the provisions of these ordinances as follows:

> In this system, the Tribal Authority is the primary unit of local rule, both for the maintenance of law and order and for the provision of local services. (It) is defined as meaning the Paramount Chief, the Chiefs, the Councillors and men of note elected by the people according to native law and custom, when appointed by the Governor as the Tribal Authority for any specified area. . . . (It) may issue Orders on its own authority or may make Bye-laws for these purposes, subject to the approval of the Governor. . . . The Provincial Commissioner may direct a Tribal Authority to issue Orders . . . and may in default issue such Orders himself . . . they have power to levy rates for sanitary purposes in the towns. Their Treasuries are credited with the collection of the annual Chiefdom Tax. This Tax is the main basis of the funds from which the Native Treasuries defray the emoluments fixed for the Chiefs and from which the Native Administrations provide local services for the community. . . . The rate of the Chiefdom Tax is fixed . . . but the obligation for its collection rests on the Chiefs and Headmen.

With reference to the court system, Hailey states,

> The powers of the Native Courts were now defined as extending to all civil cases triable by native law arising exclusively between natives (with certain minor exceptions). . . . In criminal cases the Ordinance repeated the provision that any punishment inflicted must not involve death, mutilations or grievous harm, but now added that a sentence must not exceed a period of six months imprisonment or a fine of ten pounds. . . . It is laid down that where a person is sentenced by a Native Court to imprisonment exceeding fourteen days, he must be sent at once to the District Commissioner with a statement of the case, thus providing an automatic form of appeal, and the District Commissioner is empowered to revise the period of imprisonment or to substitute a fine or to quash the conviction. . . . Further, a District Commissioner has at all times access to the Native Courts and may either . . . reduce or modify any sentence or decision.

In other words, "control . . . in well-defined directions" was carefully augmented by the Ordinances through extensive changes in

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[1]Lord Hailey, op. cit., Part III, pp. 301 ff.

provisions regarding who could do what legally. The main changes in directions in which control should be exercised lie in the provisions of the Tribal Authorities Ordinance of 1937, which specify the matters on which the Tribal Authority might act. They may issue orders regarding gambling, carrying of weapons, acts threatening the peace, pollution or obstruction of water supplies, tree cutting, the spread of contagion, provisions for adequate food cultivation, registration of births and deaths, as well as other matters which might be legally provided for by future ordinances. With reference to bye-laws, they might set aside land for development in or near towns, provide public services and charge fees and rates for these, regulate building and street trading and the provision and operation of such things as markets, slaughterhouses, wash houses and cemeteries.[1]

There were also major changes in the court system, where, although it was asserted that courts continued to be recognized as constituted under native law and custom, the sub-chiefs' courts were in fact "suppressed" and there remained only the chiefdom court, usually comprising the Paramount Chief as President and three or four members of his Tribal Authority sitting in rotation. That "automatic form of appeal" from these courts which was provided was an important new measure of control. The District Commissioner, in addition to undertaking these duties of supervision in his administrative capacity, also continued to act as magistrate, exercising authority in more serious criminal cases and with respect to matters involving witchcraft, cannibalism and inter-chiefdom or factional disputes, which were liable to cause

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[1] Laws of Sierra Leone in force on 1st January, 1946, Cap. 245, Section 8 and Part II entire.

breaches of the peace uncontrollable by native courts.

Conceptual Analysis: The Objectives of the Policy

Examination of the foregoing pages reveals the elements of the conceptual scheme emerging clearly. Most obvious, of course, is the organizational structure which is specified in broad outline by the legal enactments of the Sierra Leone Legislative Council. One finds also in the Tribal Authority and the Native Courts the social structure in certain of its aspects fixed in a statutory mold, and thus adapted as part of the organizational structure.

It is immediately noticeable that the legislation establishing the organizational structure and relating it to African social structure seems to be closely modelled upon Sir Donald Cameron's ideas about the means of implementing his doctrine of "progressive" indirect rule. The Native Treasury, the provisions for a Tribal Authority with a considerable scope for activity of a modern character and Native Courts legally constituted with provision for supervision, all seem to correspond closely with his prescription for a successful system of administration (successful of course in terms of a policy of native adaptation to western ways). Considering this and the timing of legislative action in Sierra Leone in the heyday of the Cameronian doctrine, and armed as well with the knowledge that the doctrine was actively sponsored by the Colonial Office in those times, one is justified in assuming that something of Cameron's notions lay behind the changes in Sierra Leone policy.

If this is so, then in utilizing native social structure to the extent provided for in the legislation, the authorities in Sierra Leone met the "conservative" portion of the ideological demands which the doctrine imposed. Native institutions were to be conserved, thus preserv-

ing the possibility of the native groups' coming "to stand by themselves" in the modern world. Furthermore, the stipulation that the Tribal Authority, not the chief alone, was to be the legally responsible entity in the tribal system (this constituted no change from previous practice in Sierra Leone law) conformed with the doctrine, since it preserved "the link . . . right from the bottom to the top" which was thought to exist in native society as a manifestation of democracy.

The adaptation of the organizational structure in this way thus served ideological ends both in preserving the social structure itself as part of the machinery for governing the social unit, and in the insistence upon allotting the responsibility for government to a group rather than a single individual. Both measures rest on the same beliefs, so deeply ingrained in western thought. First, that there is a "categorical imperative" upon which a program for action can be rested - namely, human happiness or welfare in some preferred form or other. Second, that the only way to assign priorities to the various human values which are offered by participants in the system at any time and place as "imperatives" (since there are always sure to be differing opinions) is to decentralize the process of deciding among alternatives to those groups or individuals whose lives and presumably happiness or welfare will be affected by the decision made. Among other techniques by which this end may be achieved, the doctrine of democracy holds, are local government - the use of the localized group - and arrangements which insure that the voice of the "humblest peasant" may be heard in that localized group.

But what of the "liberalism" side of the "conservative liberalism" of the doctrine? Obviously, the organizational structure was also

attuned to this ideological requirement of the doctrine. This liberal-
ism starts from the assumption that the "primitive peoples" must cope
with unprecedented pressures of modern life if they are to maintain a
viable polity and hence a democratic cast to their relations with the
outside world. In other words, they must be competent to conduct their
affairs if they are to control them, and hence their own lives.[1]

This requires that achievement of "civilized standards" of which
Cameron spoke. This phrase, and that becoming "attuned to modern con-
ditions" to which he also referred, are catch-all terms covering social
services, public works or utilities, financial and administrative tech-
niques and modern innovations in general. Therefore, the ideology of
"progressive" indirect rule proclaimed, teach the native about these if
you will preserve his ability to determine his destiny for himself.

In this manner the paradox between the goal, a large measure of
political self-sufficiency, and the means, a larger measure of control
of African society in the form of "guidance, supervision and stimulus"
by colonial officials, was doctrinally resolved. In order to preserve
the ideals of democracy and self-determination it is necessary for the
African to learn. It was for the teaching of performance to required
standards of competence implicit in the organizational structure that
the Sierra Leone legislation provided.

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[1]Here is found the connection which is made in British politi-
cal thought between the ideal of democracy and the concept of "effi-
cient local government". Britons are proud of their local government
system, not merely because it is efficient in providing important ser-
vices for the local population, but because (it is asserted) unlike lo-
cal administrations on the Continent, also efficient, the services are
local and hence democratic. The implication of the comparison is that
if services are not provided efficiently on the basis of local control,
they will be provided with control residing elsewhere, to the presumed
detriment of democracy.

Fresh resort to the clerk of the example in the preceding chapter will help open the discussion of how these ideologically-inspired ends were to be served. The clerk's position was an organizational necessity, for the operations in which he engaged were essential in order that the colonial administration might maintain easy communication with the chiefdom administration, including, through the records he kept, a check on its operations. The chief presumably employed him because of this necessity, imposed by the existence of the colonial regime. In these circumstances, his activities were in principle subject to a review for adequacy from two sides.

Unfortunately, however, those with the most highly developed ideas of what should be expected from the chiefdom clerk were colonial service personnel, who were ordinarily situated far from him in terms both of distance and common experience. They therefore communicated with him less frequently and less effectively than might otherwise have been the case. The least notion of what was required was possessed by those in daily communication with the clerk, because so many of his duties were imposed from outside the tribal society and might well be responses to some necessities not clearly apparent to these constant companions. Since those in the best position to exact compliance with the appropriate rules of the organizational structure thus very often had no standards against which to measure performance of the clerk's duties, there might be no distinct minimum or maximum permissible deviation from the rules set to guide and control his performance.

As noted above, this posed a problem of what has been called competence in fact. Ideally, a chiefdom clerk - and for that matter any other servant of the chiefdom administration from the chief on down -

should work in a milieu where ideas regarding what is expected of him and what he in turn may require of others set limits on the range and character of his permissible activities. There should be a lower and an upper limit, defined by the fact that beyond these boundaries activity or inactivity of others would block a course of action adopted by the official. Implied in this ideal is a technical competence corresponding to the area of permissible competence in fact, so that these permitted activities may be carried on effectively.

The ordinances listed earlier provided a general framework of such ideally conceived competences, outlining what was in Chapter III defined as legitimate competence. Indicating as they did positions and activities within the envisaged organizational structure, and the relationships among those positions, the ordinances made at least a beginning in stating permissible limits and prescribing suitable levels of effectiveness for activities. These provided standards to which those holding the various positions should be required and able to conform. These standards are, of course, the rules of procedure of the organizational structure, which may be largely implied rather than stated in legislation.

The legislation creating the organizational structure furthermore not only provided definitions of legitimate competence as standards against which to check the actual performance of the clerk or other African officials, but these legal prescriptions were also designed as cues (like legislation in general) for all those participating in areas of activity interpreted as falling within the law. The itemization of matters concerning which chiefdom administrations might

act[1] offers one example of this function of legislation. For those who understood the law and something of the nature and meaning for human life of the activities to which the various items refer, the legislation was information communicating a program for organizing the activity of a chiefdom administration, as well as a standard against which the activities could be measured. Its aim was tutelage, or at very least to define what was to be taught and the responses which were to be sought.

Both of these aspects of legislation played their part in the policy of reform. In providing the legal underpinnings for the organizational structure, the advocates of the Cameronian doctrine were in a sense proposing a method for assuring that competence in fact and technical competence of the clerk and other chiefdom officials would be coordinated and developed in the changing African political system, in a reasonable facsimile of the model furnished by the applicable definitions of legitimate competence. A concordance of these three aspects of competence in a political system evolving in the context of social and economic reform was to be sought by manipulation of cues according to a plan laid down in legislation. The method owed much to both the "conservative" and the "liberal" tendencies in the doctrine of indirect rule.

For example, the invocation of the Tribal Authority rather than of the chief alone, as "the primary unit of local rule", was a "conservative" measure, obviously intended to call forth those presumed democratic tendencies in native society of which Cameron spoke. By making

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[1] See p. 128.

the exercise of the relationships thus presumably involved in the practices of consultation between chief and elders in the pre-contact social structure a part of the legitimate competence of the holders of the positions falling within the legal description of the Tribal Authority, the social structure was manipulated in such a way as to utilize the communications network through which these democratic tendencies were supposedly manifested. The legislation constituted a cue to respond in a way that was assumed to be customary in the social structure, so that under the conditions established, habit would reinforce the cue, and the cue the habit of consultation, the consequence being closer contact and more communication between chief and elders than ever before.

The result of thus exposing the members of the Tribal Authority to problems of administration in the new era would, in theory, be to increase their technical competence (awareness and comprehension, essentially) with regard to the activities of the chiefdom administration. In consequence, there would begin to be established some checks or limits upon the permissible activity or lack thereof, as the case might be, on the part of chiefdom officials, beyond those prescribed by law and enforced upon opportunity by visiting colonial servants.

On the "liberal" side, to take another instance, the Chiefdom Treasury and Tax Ordinances sought, by prescribing such changes in the rules of procedure of the social structure as the substitution of a fixed tax for customary tribute and the handling of funds through a budget and accounting system, to keep constantly before the Mende the idea that to some extent it was possible for them to carry on development activities themselves. By making the wherewithal for modern tribal administration highly visible, the legislation was calculated to

furnish a permanent cue, just as were the treaties mentioned earlier. In combination with the list of activities which the Tribal Authorities Ordinance permitted chiefdom administrations to undertake, it was intended to direct the chiefdom into a program of change along certain economic and social lines, the appropriate limits and checks on the competence of chiefdom officials to be maintained in this situation by the constant association of the Tribal Authority with the various activities.

The rub was of course that the cues communicated by legislation would most certainly not automatically be comprehended so that a tendency toward correspondence of legitimate, technical and factual competence might be stimulated. The segregation of funds through the Chiefdom Treasuries device came closest to the mark, at least in theory, since the economic element involved would presumably operate to arouse the interest of the Mende in disposing of these visible and available resources to advantage. Eventually, a common sense interpretation of human nature would lead one to predict, the Mende whose taxes supported the Treasury would as a matter of interest insist upon certain standards in the expenditure of the money and in the conduct of the officials responsible in one way and another for getting results with it. In terms of learning theory, the assumption was that the cues supplied by legislation would elicit the desired responses by manipulation which associated the rewards of thrift and good financial management with the "drives" or interests residing in African breasts. But in fact even this was problematical; the Treasury system had to be set going among people absolutely strange to the concepts underlying it, including any very highly developed ideas of money as a unit of exchange and calculation, before it could work its wonders.

From this kind of situation arises another and perhaps more significant phase in the process of tutelage and development of a greater degree of concordance among the various forms of competence. In order to reinforce and summate, to supplement and interpret in more detail the cues supplied in legislation, it was necessary to place at the point of personal contact with the African social structure in its political aspects individuals who were technically competent to communicate to the Africans the content of such primary cues in their full meaning and implications, and to supply from their own training and experience more detailed cues. This represented in principle no change from previous practice, for the district administrator or commissioner had always served in this manner. But in fact, under the policy system of reform, this meant a drastic increase in the complexity of communication in several directions, which in time quite altered the nature of the colonial servant's job.

First, in the number of colonial servants involved in the processes of tutelage and therefore in communication of cues. Many of the powers itemized in the Tribal Authorities Ordinance and the duties assigned chiefdom administrations in other legislation are related to technical services. Therefore the consideration of technical competence in such fields as engineering or agriculture demanded, insofar as the activities legally provided for were actually undertaken in a chiefdom, communication other than through the administrative officers themselves. There thus might not be merely one "teacher" presiding over the officials of the chiefdom as pupils, but a whole group of colonial service officers, each working in the field of his own peculiar technical competence or qualification.

Second, and corresponding to the above development. complexity of communication might be increased through expansion in the number of African officials participating in the local political unit, since there would have to be African counterparts of the various colonial service technicians. In fact, it can be said that there would have to be an increase in the number of participants on both sides and furthermore an increase in the range and number of cues passing between British and African participants in the political system roughly in proportion to the extent to which the itemized powers and other duties were actually operative in the given case. This simultaneous increase in the number of participants and the range of cues raises many problems of communication - among the European participants, between Europeans and Africans, among the Africans themselves. Leaving the first problem aside, the latter two questions may be considered as a third direction of growth in complexity.

The very nature of the process of communication changed with the heavy emphasis upon teaching the African. "Leading" native rulers to adopt their ways meant encouraging change up to the practical limits of native competence existing at a given time. Therefore, the communicative process between European and African became, ideally, less a matter of issuing orders and more a matter of exchange of information and cues, since the teacher's guide is in large part the pupil's response. Such devices as the Chiefdom Treasury, the Tribal Authority as a statutory body and practices like the automatic appeal or review of court cases gave an opportunity for such persistent inculcation of new rules of procedure governing African activities.

It was not enough, as noted, to instill the requisite technical

competence into African officials, for the expansion in variety of activities in the African political system raised questions of the permissible limits of activity, or competence in fact, in the activities of the officials. Although the colonial servant could intervene where required, he could be none too certain that official abuses and failures would come to his attention. His channels of communication with the African side of the political system were tenuous at best, and many matters competed for attention. Furthermore, intervention violated the interest in economical administration and did not conform with the ideology of indirect rule. The solution was to disseminate more widely an awareness of the rules of procedure and the legitimate competences envisaged for the organizational structure. To do this, the colonial servant's communications had to range widely over the social structure, a reason for the statutory endorsement of the Tribal Authority, the insistence on keeping of records of meetings, court cases and finances, as well as for frequent tours of the district and chiefdoms.

The aim of all this was partially to check directly on the performance of officials in the African political system, but it was also in part that a more widely spread knowledge of the envisaged activities and rules of procedure of the chiefdom administration should exist. In other words, there had to be developed through a process of tutelage the technical competence to control local affairs, as well as the technical competence of holders of certain positions to exercise the skills associated with those positions as sets of activity. Only if there were such widespread knowledge, which of course meant communication among the Africans subject to the system of administration, could the technical competence to control local affairs exist. There had to be

knowledge of and concern by other Africans for the activities of those officially active in the African political system, and by officials for other officials, from the chief as responsible head of the administration down to the villager who by his cooperation or non-participation might make or break a policy, if there were to be appropriate limits on competence in fact.

Resources and Communication

If the essential point of the policy system of reform was to teach the African new ways in the conduct of government - new objectives as well as new methods - then the communication to him of the ideas and skills required necessarily became important in the scheme of things. Obviously, the first problem for the British was their own competence in providing the personnel for the organizational structure necessary to meet the requirements of communication of various kinds of cues to the African. Such competence is a function of two things: the availability of suitable human material trained to carry on in the various fields of endeavor in which change is sought, and of financial resources sufficient to support the staff which it is possible to assemble.

In Sierra Leone as elsewhere it is probably permissible to assume the availability over the long run and on the average of technically competent European manpower, for Great Britain and the Commonwealth offer a large pool of trained personnel for the relatively small demands of the colonies. Of course, plenty of instances can be offered of shortages - in point of time, for example, the war and postwar years and in point of skills, such problems as the lack of highly trained

agricultural specialists which led to the proposal in Sierra Leone that the Agricultural Department staff be doubled by hiring less qualified men to work in the field under supervision of the professionally qualified men available. But the statement above refers to the long run and the average situation, and if these qualifications are accepted then it can be said that technically competent European staff has not been a great problem as a matter of human resources.

But the employment of such staff depends upon the availability of funds, and financial resources are quite another matter. The existence of adequate resources for an active program of reform is one of those "dimensions" of the situation which are of such great importance. African political systems cannot be compared at different times and different places without reference to this universal problem. Increases in the staff of various departments of government depend upon the amassing of resources to keep them at their jobs. So likewise does the creation, maintenance and enlargement of the groups of Africans who as "pupils" are on the receiving end of communication during the process of reform.

Therefore, budgets, and the manpower whose cost as both European teacher and African pupil is covered by them, can be used as some sort of measure of the scale of the communicative effort. In part, the resources represented in this way are something that is _brought to_ the local scene and the local African political system, as grants of money from the colonial government or as staff advice and assistance. As such, they are a manifestation of the external balance of the system, bearing on it mainly through their effect on British competence to carry out the policy settled upon. However, in part resources may and in

fact must be generated within the African political unit itself. This is to say that resources are raised and used locally, and since they are accumulated by action taken within the system, they require, unlike external resources, to be accounted for by resort to examination of the operation of the system itself. Funds originating in an imperial grant or from customs duties, for example, may be used to affect the African political system but have no relation to it with regard to their origin, while taxes locally exacted from the population do, since the activity they involve is part of the local political system.

If the external aspect, what the British brought to the effort to reform the African political system, is examined first, it will be found that financial statistics are rather unsatisfactory. The money spent on assisting and stimulating the local political system flows from many sources and is expended in a great many different ways, and the budgetary estimates available are not in sufficient detail to give a full picture. A better index of the communicative effort the British made in Sierra Leone at any given time is the manpower authorized in various fields of activity of the territorial government.

The total civil establishment or "senior service", manned mainly by British Europeans, has grown over the years; in 1925 it was 217, in 1939 a total of 235, 497 in 1949,[1] and 756 in 1955. In part this growth reflects the increasing complexity of governmental operations overall - people have had to be hired to supervise civil aviation, to

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[1] The sources for these figures are: for 1925, T. N. Goddard, The Handbook of Sierra Leone (London: Grant Richards, 1925), pp. 262-265; for 1939 and 1953, C. R. Lewis, op.cit., p. 217; for 1949, H. S. Childs, A Plan of Economic Development for Sierra Leone (Freetown: Government Printer, 1949), p. 41 and for 1955, Sierra Leone, Staff List (Freetown: Government Printer, 1955).

collect the relatively new income tax, to make geological surveys. But the services which deal most directly with the African have also grown tremendously. In Sierra Leone in 1925 there were only 97 positions established in those services bearing the brunt of communication. Thirty men staffed the provincial administration, twenty-four the medical and sanitation services, eleven the educational service, eleven the Lands and Forests Department (the breakdown including at least four forestry employees and five agriculturalists) and twenty-one the Public Works Department. In 1955 the table of organization called for the following senior service staff in these categories: Administration, 76; Agriculture, 46; Education, 74; Forestry, 21; Medical, Health and Nursing, 108 and Public Works, 102. In addition, there were some new units dealing with the African on the local scene, such as the Cooperation, Labour and Welfare Departments, whose organization plans called respectively for five, seven and four senior service personnel.[1] The total is 443 posts.

From administrative and other reports can be gleaned something of the nature and aims of communication in these fields. The Education Department, for example, is interested not so much in running its own schools, of which there are only a few, although important ones, but rather in supervising the standards and operations of mission and chiefdom schools. The Forestry Department has a program for establishing "forest reserves" under its own control, or "protected forests" under chiefdom control. In the Protectorate, "Native Administrations are, within the limits of their competence and funds, responsible for protec-

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[1]H. S. Childs, op. cit., p. 41, par. 217.

ted forests, but Government has sanctioned departmental financial and technical assistance."[1] The Medical Department trains chiefdom sanitary overseers and dispensary attendants[2] and inspects and supervises dispensaries, as well as operating numerous dispensaries itself. In agriculture, "The need for supervisory staff . . . is one of the essential conditions of agricultural development. Farmers have to be wooed to new ways, and there cannot be too much advice and help given on the spot, in the field."[3] Demonstration and "extension work", as well as experimental projects and stations, are thus required of the agricultural specialist, and this is apparently the phase of the work which has most stimulated the recent growth.

In every case the end which the particular department has in view is to be accomplished in some part by modifications in the behavior of Africans upon whom the agency is prevailed to act. This is the point where the African political system - the local administrative unit - becomes of significance as a focus of communication, promoting the effort at social, economic and political reform of native society. The budget of the chiefdom is therefore a reasonably good measure of the communicative effort, and of its effectiveness, in a particular administrative unit at a particular time. In its expenditure headings - Administration, Agriculture, Education, Forestry, Medical and Health, Public Works, Extraordinary (capital expenditures, in the main) and "Miscellaneous" - the budget shows the general functions which it is

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[1]Sierra Leone, Report of the Forestry Department for the Year 1943, (Freetown: Government Printer, 1944) par. 8.

[2]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces for the Year 1951 (Freetown: Government Printer, 1953), par. 168.

[3]Childs, op. cit., par. 59.

government policy to stimulate in the Mende political system. Changes

in quantity and classification of expenditure also give some clues as

to the effectiveness of British policy, as the examination of summaries

of the expenditure estimates of Sierra Leone chiefdoms over the years

will indicate.[1]

Number of	1942	1948	1951	1953
"Reformed" Chiefdoms[2]	97	136	140	144
Administration	₤ 53,491	₤ 83,870	₤ 153,661	₤ 191,680
Agriculture	1,606	4,380	5,876	6,239
Education	467	6,565	19,303	25,251
Forestry	781	2,786	7,360	9,162
Medical and Health	751	8,160	18,827	24,999
Works	1,848	6,194	13,898	16,717
Miscellaneous	18	4,046	38,112	60,173
Extraordinary	14,576	26,844	71,706	126,517
	₤ 73,453	₤ 142,844	₤ 328,743	₤ 440,265

[1]Source is Sierra Leone Protectorate Handbook (Bo: Chief Commissioner's Office, 1952), p. 16. In Mendeland, the administrative item covers the salaries of chief, speaker (or speakers, in a large chiefdom), a number of sub-chiefs and one or more clerks. In 1951 there were 1010 "Chiefdom Messengers" or tribal police. Agricultural expenditure consisted largely in wages for "Chiefdom Agricultural Overseers", costs of running seed farms and loans to farmers. The item of education covered the cost of thirty-one Native Administration schools and contributions to mission schools, while forestry costs were those of paying forest wardens and maintaining about one hundred square miles of "protected forest". The medical and health expenses of the chiefdoms in 1951 were for the upkeep of dispensaries and the wages of sanitary employees in the "health areas" - formerly sanitary areas. Miscellaneous, works and extraordinary items have to do with construction and maintenance of minor roads, public buildings, water supplies and the purchase of capital equipment.

[2]"Reformation" of chiefdoms to bring them within the scope of the new Ordinances has been a long-drawn out procedure. Only two were reformed in 1936, the first year, and by 1948 only 136 (with 128 Treasuries) out of about 200 chiefdoms had been converted. The latest annual report (1953) indicates that the process is now virtually completed, only four unreformed chiefdoms, two of them Mende, remaining among a total of 148 chiefdoms in the Protectorate.

As the figures show, the application of the Ordinances to the chiefdoms has been accompanied by a process of amalgamation, aimed chiefly at creating more viable units, from a financial standpoint. This

The figures seem to show that the activities of the "non-administrative" or technical portions of the chiefdom political units have increased in comparison with administrative activities. The percentage of administrative expenditure dropped from 73.6 of the total in 1942 to 58.7 in 1948, 46.7 in 1951 and 43.5 in 1953, despite the practice of giving the chiefs and other "official" members of the Tribal Authority fifty per cent of the receipts from the Chiefdom Tax, the main source of revenue. In recent years the receipts from the Chiefdom Tax have ballooned as rates have been doubled, tripled and even quadrupled, which means a proportionate increase in salaries under the rule.

Passing beyond this evidence of a shifting emphasis, one can account in part for the many-fold increase in expenditure under other headings by reference to inflationary trends and to the spread of the treasury system as chiefdoms have been "reformed". However, these factors can account for it only in part, for in general it was the smaller and financially weaker chiefdoms which were left untouched until recent years, so their contribution to the swelling total budget as they have been amalgamated or reformed would be disproportionately small. For example, the sixty-odd chiefdoms taken into the treasury system between 1948 and 1953 certainly added far fewer than fifty per cent to the total number of taxpayers under the system, as might be calculated from the fact that they numbered about one-third of the total chiefdoms in

process has not occurred in Mendeland nearly so frequently as elsewhere in the Protectorate. A large proportion of the Mende chiefdoms, furthermore, were converted quite early (1942 or before, forty-six of the sixty-odd Mende chiefdoms having been among the first ninety-seven), so the summary of budgets for all Native Administrations in Sierra Leone from 1942 can be taken as to a considerable degree representative of Mendeland, too.

Sierra Leone before the policy system of reform was undertaken. Like-
wise, inflation, while severe, will not account for the huge increases
in the budget.

It may be concluded upon this somewhat infirm evidence that the
policy system of reform has actually resulted in a considerable broad-
ening and deepening of communication between European administration
and the Mende. However, this certainly has been an uneven development.
Not every Chiefdom Treasury contributes to each type of service; for
example, in 1948 only 100 of the 128 treasuries provided for any medi-
cal expenditure, 56 for education, only 51 for agriculture and 45 for
forestry. The scale and kind of development taking place in the activ-
ity of the local political system are therefore very uneven. The prob-
lem of "attuning" the African to modern life by developing all of these
services in all chiefdoms is of course much exacerbated by the fact
that the average chiefdom, even after the numerous amalgamations of the
past decade, numbers about eleven or twelve thousand souls.

Some Difficulties in Execution

The last few pages provide a background for a closer analysis of
the communicative effort involved in the policy of reform or indirect
rule of the Cameronian variety, by indicating the source and variety
of the resources deployed, as well as the range of matters with refer-
ence to which African adaptation was sought. It is now time to turn to
a discussion of the process of interaction thus set going in the local
political system, as it seems actually to have taken place in Mendeland,
using, of course, the conceptual scheme as a framework of inquiry.

Since the resources available are of such obvious importance in the communicative effort, it seems appropriate to start with the problem of finding them at the local level. The generation of resources usable for the reform of a chiefdom depended upon the competence of the British administrator, upon the creation of interest in reform among the Mende, or both. The colonial administrator had to be competent to impose the taxes necessary to win financial resources, unless action were taken on the sole volition of the African authorities, just as he had had to be when the Hut Tax was introduced. Indeed, the Chiefdom Tax is collected with the House (Hut) Tax and is then handled as a rebate to the Native Authority, a method which illustrates the identity of the problems presented by the two taxes in administrative eyes.

It was apparently sought to lessen the demand on British competence, in the whole business of introducing the reforms in chiefdom administration, through adaptation of some of the rules of procedure of the social structure. Chiefdom tax was merely substituted for customary tribute when "reform" took place, and fees to the chief and other judges in the native courts were continued, although the payment passed through the treasury accounting system. No new taxes which might have aroused popular resistance were imposed. The upshot was that some chiefs, whose income and hence interests were hurt by the bookkeeping controls imposed, were reluctant to consent to reformation of the chiefdom organization. But the move was correspondingly more popular with the people, and particularly in Mendeland there was actually movement of population from unreformed to reformed chiefdoms.[1] The competence

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[1]Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories (5 Parts; London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1950-1953), Part III, p. 305.

of the colonial administration in putting over the reform was thus en-
larged by the techniques used to arouse the interest of the Mende.

However, the interest so manifested passed over hardly at all
into the realm of self-help in carrying forward the attempt to control
and utilize resources. As already pointed out, the Chiefdom Treasury
was a device to make it possible for, and even to stimulate, African
authorities to exercise control over such resources as were available
to them in order to finance changes in material conditions and way of
life. But at least in Mendeland not much response seems to have been
elicited. There is little evidence in the official reports of any urge
to alter matters strong enough to bring about local taxation other than
that imposed by the colonial authorities.

In 1948, for example, a "special education levy" of sixpence per
taxpayer was recommended[1] by the Protectorate Assembly, an advisory
body drawn from the chiefdoms, but summaries of chiefdom budgets show
no such revenue in subsequent years. Apparently the suggestion died
aborning. Elsewhere, the immense increases in the revenue of the Chief-
dom Tax in recent years are said to reflect not only prosperity but
also the "willingness of the people to contribute to the district de-
velopment programs".[2] The rates are, however, actually set by the Pro-
vincial Commissioner, although presumably after some reference to local
opinion; and his influence in the matter is revealed in the fact that
rates are usually uniform for districts and often even for provinces,
perhaps one or two chiefdoms receiving a special rate. Therefore, the

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[1]Ibid., p. 309.

[2]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces
for the Year 1952 (Freetown: Government Printer, 1953), par. 61.

recent increases in the rates for the Chiefdom Tax are not unambiguous evidence of native interest, particularly in view of the tax riots which have occurred so frequently during the past two years.[1]

Another comment runs,

> In general Native Administrations are still reluctant to take the initiative over the expenditure of the funds voted in their estimates, except insofar as payment of salaries is concerned. Even where some interest is displayed there is too easy satisfaction with poor work by contractors and little sense of responsibility for ensuring that the taxpayer's money is spent to advantage.[2]

The expenditure of funds voted by the Native Authorities falls by default to the District Commissioner.[3]

This lack of interest in the kind of chiefdom activities which the colonial administration hoped to encourage is correlated in many ways with other of the concepts in the scheme. Lack of interest is both cause and effect, in other words, in relation to other elements in the political system. As the last quotation indicates, the members of the Tribal Authorities in general did not feel deeply enough involved in the business of managing the resources of the chiefdom to develop to the permissible limits of the organizational structure a competence to conduct chiefdom affairs. They did not influence the use of funds so much as the colonial authorities wished them to, let alone

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[1]See statement of Dr. M. A. S. Margai, Chief Minister of Sierra Leone, blaming the riots on the level of taxation and announcing that rates would be held to the level of 1955 pending further consideration. Sierra Leone Daily Mail, January 27, 1956.

[2]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces for the Year 1953 (Freetown: Government Printer, 1955), par. 105.

[3]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces for the Year 1952, par. 72.

influence the raising of revenue, because they did not care.

As cause, lack of interest in raising and dispensing resources strongly affected the intensity and range of communication between colonial service officers and Africans. Without funds, the chiefdom could support only a minimum number of employees in the various technical fields listed in the summary budget. On the colonial administration's side, there was in Sierra Leone an inability, largely financial in origin, to create the organizational structure required to put the policy fully into operation. The result of the relative failure on both sides to supply the necessary staff was that:

> The Native Administrations are dependent to an unusual extent on the activity of the District Officers, who have in the Protectorate to undertake a variety of tasks which would normally fall on officers of the professional (technical) departments of Government or upon technical subordinates such as are elsewhere maintained by Native Administrations. This extends even to the management of Native Administration schools, for although they are nominally managed by the Paramount Chief and his Council, they are in practice supervised by the District Officer.[1]

The consequences for communication of such a situation are apparent. Since cues passed mainly through the administrative officers, they by force of circumstance must have been more limited in quantity, range and effect than if a full complement of specialized personnel in technical fields existed on both sides. The process of amalgamation of chiefdoms is of course an attempt to meet the situation by alterations in the basic framework of the organizational structure. Fewer chiefdoms mean more resources with which to develop a technical staff for each chiefdom which survives, and by the same token it can mean

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[1] Hailey, _op. cit._, p. 310.

somewhat less difficult jobs of supervision for colonial service officers, who have to communicate with the African at fewer points and can thus do a more thorough job of conveying cues to him.

Lastly, lack of interest on the part of the Tribal Authorities seems to have brought about problems of communication between them and the District Commissioners and other government officers. However, this can be interpreted as an appearance behind which lie other reasons. Lack of interest is an effect, as has been remarked, as well as a cause. With respect to the preparation of estimates, for example, the problem of technical competence goes very deep: "In some cases the Tribal Authority is said to show little or no comprehension of the proceedings".[1] Competence in this very basic sense, therefore, has much to do with interest, and much to do with communication, since anything very complex must be comprehended to be communicated, i.e., must be a cue rather than merely a stimulus.

Furthermore, there is an organizational component to be considered when the problem of communicating cues is discussed. In recent years, the Tribal Authorities have been called "too large and unwieldy . . . to be really effective instruments of local government in a rapidly developing community",[2] and "the rather nebulous Tribal Authority organization".[3] A former Chief Commissioner of the Protectorate has

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[1] Hailey, op. cit., p. 307. (Underlining supplied.) Even as late as 1945, Little reports, only 14 of 300 members of Tribal Authorities in a sample of six Mende chiefdoms had any form of schooling. The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 208.

[2] Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces for the Year 1951, par. 74.

[3] Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces for the Year 1952, par. 96.

written, "The full Tribal Authority . . . remained in the background (under indirect rule), only evoked into action at a crisis when chief and executive were too oppressive, or when the District Commissioner or the Provincial Commissioner, as at elections, called upon the people to show which principal men ought to be consulted; since the chief naturally tended, and tends, to look upon the Tribal Authority as composed of the chiefdom officials and his friends and supporters."[1]

In other words, the effort to assimilate to the organizational structure patterns of activity already existing in the native social structure has been less than successful because the communicative capacities of the social structure itself have been overestimated. As the problem was put elsewhere,

> The main weakness in the system of chiefdom administration lies in the failure so far to devise a satisfactory method for the discharge of the day to day business of the chiefdom. The Tribal Authority bodies have too large a membership to be convened frequently with the result that the conduct of affairs devolves mainly upon the Paramount Chief, with consequences which may be good or ill but in neither case can be regarded as healthy. Moreover the process of amalgamation . . . may actually add to the problem by increasing at once the size of the chiefdom and the difficulty in convening meetings of the Tribal Authority.[2]

The alleged lack of interest which the Tribal Authorities display in the expenditure of chiefdom funds - in the administrative operations of the unit, in other words - therefore stems in good part from geographical distribution, numbers and the lack of devices of communica-

[1] J. S. Fenton, Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone (Freetown: Government Printer, 1951), p. 5.

[2] Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1952, par. 95.

tion to overcome these obstacles to the working of the political process among the members. No detailed direction of policy is very feasible under these circumstances.

Problems of Competence: The "Man Between"

It would not do to overemphasize the part the British hoped that the Tribal Authorities would play in the African political system under the policy of reform. The failure of the Tribal Authorities effectively to participate in the activity of the local political system was a matter of concern to the British largely for two reasons: the commitment to the democratic ideology and the desire that those undertaking to perform tasks in the local system should have appropriate competences in fact to enable them to carry through their work within the recognized limits.

There was never any intention, however, that the rules of procedure of the organizational structure should permit only "committee rule", the theory being merely that the wide scope of communication implied in the active participation of the Tribal Authorities would lead to a common interpretation of the competences of holders of official positions in the administrative organization and hence facilitate direction and control. The chief and his officials were to carry forward most of the activities of the chiefdom administration.

As working parts of the organizational structure, the chief and other officials with functions under the policy system of reform were expected to display a modicum of technical competence as well as the somewhat allied competence in fact. One type of competence would be of little use without the other, for if the chief or other chiefdom offi-

cial did not know what to do or did not have the initiative to do it, possession of influence or competence in fact enough to carry his subjects along in a course of action was of little use to the colonial administration. On the other hand, in the absence of competence in fact, technical competence was of little avail in cases where the task at hand required the cooperation or compliance of other persons. There is a kind of equation here: if Z is the result of activity, X is technical and Y factual competence; then X times Y equals Z, and the result Z will be greater or smaller as either element on the other side of the equation varies.

One can first take Y as a constant and consider the results of a variation in X, technical competence. In effect, this is what the British did in Mendeland in utilizing the services of the chief in their structure of administration. They took his legitimate competence in the social structure as a fact, and incorporated position, holders of the position and the rules of procedure too, by and large, into the organizational structure as a sort of major premise. They then proceeded to extend the cloak of this legitimacy (what was competence in fact from the viewpoint of the organizational structure) by assigning new sets of activity to the position of chief. Having done all this, it was then necessary to build up in the holder of the chief's position a certain technical competence, or to reinforce that which existed in him, by communication of appropriate cues. To a lesser extent, the legitimacy of the chief's position was extended to other officials of the local political system, such as that of clerk, as they were created. The same problems of technical competence of course existed for them.

If the problem of concordance of competence in fact with legit-

imate competence could thus be taken care of (and the history of Mende

and other chiefdoms in Sierra Leone indicates that the assumption was

on the whole valid), then the results achieved in the chiefdoms could

be judged largely in terms of technical competence of the chief and o-

ther African members of the organizational structure at the level of

chiefdom administration. The testimony of colonial administrators in

Sierra Leone is emphatic on this point:

> The quality of work done in Native Administrations . . .
> depended nearly always on the Paramount Chief. If he was a weak
> reed too much inevitably fell on the District Commissioner with-
> out whose supervision the conduct of affairs would be corrupt,
> chaotic and irresponsible.[1]

Another report states that "Where there is a good literate chief the

results are satisfactory, and where there is a good chiefdom clerk with

a good illiterate chief the same can be said."[2] Still a third is ci-

ted to the effect that

> The success or failure of a chiefdom administration as an
> instrument of local government is entirely dependent upon the
> character and calibre of the Paramount Chief. When there is a
> good chief all may be well, but where there is a weak, corrupt,
> lethargic or unpopular chief a Chiefdom Administration can hard-
> ly be expected to function successfully . . . the system of na-
> tive administration . . . is merely a method by which a chief
> rules, or misrules, and . . . it reflects primarily his own
> personality.[3]

As the second man cited states, however, "Unfortunately, few

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[1] Sierra Leone, *Report on the Administration of the Provinces*, 1952, par. 77.

[2] Sierra Leone, *Report on the Administration of the Provinces*, 1952, par. 76.

[3] Sierra Leone, *Report on the Administration of the Provinces*, 1951, par. 94.

chiefdoms come within either category" - having a good literate chief or a good illiterate chief and a good clerk. For clerks, the standards of education were generally low; in one Mende district "few chiefdom treasury clerks are able to balance their books or to post a vote service ledger correctly", and there were numerous irregularities by chiefs as well as clerks in the handling of funds.[1] The problem of recruiting capable clerks was called "formidable". With regard to chiefs, of course, the colonial administration is able to exercise little influence, since it is the practice to accept the man, no matter what his training or experience, whom enough of the Tribal Authority agree on to make it likely that he will have the competence in fact that his position calls for. Such advantage as may be had from the structure of African society is taken, to strengthen the foundations of the organizational structure, even at the expense of technical competence.[2]

However, as some of the quotations above imply ("weak", "unpopular"), competence in fact, the factor Y of the equation, is by no means a constant in Mende society. It is not permanently assured by an initial display of strength in the form of popular support as the Tribal Authority elects a chief. Nor is it assured by an assertion, in the recognition of the election by the colonial administration, of the latter's support for the chief's claim to legitimacy.

These points can readily be illustrated by reference to official reports concerning certain Mende chiefdoms which have had troubles in

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[1]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1951, par. 99.

[2]However, Little reports that in 1945 nearly half the Mende chiefs were literate, an average rather above that for the Protectorate as a whole. The Mende, p. 211.

the past few years. In the Small Bo chiefdom of Kenema district there was unrest throughout 1949 and 1950 because of the "maladministration of the Paramount Chief, who laid himself open to complaints of extortion, of holding illegal courts and of partial court judgments. . . . One result of this was that the young men of the chiefdom progressively disregarded the restraints of chiefdom discipline and became increasingly ready to take matters into their own hands". Despite several attempts by the District Commissioner to settle matters, riots occurred, the chief was driven out and finally resigned. These events, however, apparently stimulated rivalry among factions contending for the chieftaincy, and in early 1952 there were more riots, even though ringleaders of the previous disturbances had been arrested. Some of the minority faction in the chiefdom actually left their homes in fear, and a police detachment finally had to be stationed in the chiefdom to maintain order.[1]

In the Jawi chiefdom of Kailahun district and the Niama chiefdom of Kenema district, during 1953, considerations of a different order concerning the position of the chief arose - cannibalism scares and "murder and mutilation for magical purposes". In the latter chiefdom a man committed "a peculiarly disgusting murder", the victim being his own grandson. It was a case in which "the motive appeared to be mainly political, being an attempt to unseat the Paramount Chief by planting responsibility for the murder on him". In Jawi chiefdom the problem

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[1]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1951, par. 20-25; and Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1952, par. 9.

was more serious, for "allegations of murder were formally brought against the Paramount Chief, backed by intense excitement and almost hysterical belief in the truth of what was alleged". Although the accusers were convicted of extortion and conspiracy, a police detachment had to be placed in the capital to protect the chief. Even so, the Native Court ceased to function as the ferment continued. In commenting on these two cases, an official report states, with general reference to this kind of occurrence, that

> Fear of the occult, and positive physical fear, tend to take the place of reason. Political intrigue is ever ready to turn these things to advantage, and indeed ritual murders and the use of cannibal medicine are almost invariably found to be associated with chiefdom politics.[1]

In such cases as these, ideology operated to the detriment of the chief's competence, the belief in black magic serving to offset the ideological component of the chieftaincy, which, as the ethnographic account shows, was only very slight among the Mende. In other words, even within the native social structure upon which the British placed so much reliance, there were factors which might be brought into play to challenge an otherwise unassailable position and thus to damage the organizational structure.

There is an important point of difference between the case of the Small Bo chiefdom and those of the other two which illustrates the problem posed by the fact that technical competence and competence in fact are both variables in our equation, X times Y equals Z. In the first case, the Small Bo chief was finally characterized as "worthless"

[1]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1953, par. 27-30.

- in other words, not technically competent - as well as incompetent in fact, and therefore was allowed and perhaps encouraged to resign. In the other cases, however, there was presumably no question of the technical competence of the chiefs involved, but only of competence in fact - and that question was raised on grounds particularly offensive to the British for ideological reasons.

The problem of technical versus factual competence might arise in contexts offering varying kinds and degrees of difficulty. In Bo township and other places in the Protectorate, there were riots in 1955, culminating in attacks on chiefs. These disturbances were set off by a drastic rise in the Chiefdom Tax rates to cover the cost of development projects undertaken by the District Councils,[1] under the sponsorship and urging of the colonial administration. But presumably, the chiefs and other officials were not at fault, from the viewpoint of the administration, which stimulated the new taxation. To take another example, in 1951 there were troubles in the Sowa chiefdom of Pujehun district somewhat similar to those which occurred the same year in Small Bo chiefdom. The Provincial Commissioner found that the chief had committed certain acts of maladministration "not of so serious a nature as to merit deposition". Although the chief was forced by continued disorder to leave the chiefdom, he did not resign. It was only after two years of deadlock that the administration finally partitioned the chiefdom among neighboring units, thus eliminating the problem.[2]

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[1]See Chapter VI for a discussion of the District Councils.

[2]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1951, par. 16-19, and Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1953, par. 97.

It was with reference to instances such as these that an official report remarked that the colonial administration faced "a difficult dilemma, since to abandon a chief, who, whatever his shortcomings, has not deserved deposition under the law, and whose primary failing appears to be that he has lost the confidence of his people, may be as distasteful as it is useless to attempt to compel hostile or reluctant people to accept back a chief from whom they have, for whatever reason, resolved be quit."[1]

The important point here is that the chief - or the clerk and other officials in some cases - is the "man between", the "marginal man" of sociological notoriety. By virtue of the adaptation of his position in the social structure into the organizational structure, he has two sets of rules to go by, as was pointed out in the discussion on the policy system of supervision.[2] The reconciliation of these two sets of rules poses him a difficult problem. There is the job to do in the organizational structure, and this involves eliciting responses appropriate to the policy of the colonial administration from people with whom he has relations on other bases and with whom he is therefore constrained to get along. A conflict may occur; it may be that two sets of those "minimum action patterns necessary for holding a given position in a group", as one definition of role reads,[3] cannot be followed at the same time, and someone will therefore be offended. The

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[1]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1951, par. 12.

[2]See pp. 118-119 above.

[3]Scott A. Greer, Social Organization ("Short Studies in Sociology"; Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 22.

result will be opposition and hence by definition some loss of competence in fact in some activity.

Under these circumstances, there are several sets of limits on performance. Two are the aspects of technical competence mentioned earlier: awareness of what the rules and specifications of the positions are and capacity and willingness to perform to the standards set by these rules and specifications. A third set of limits are social ones, which are summed up in the phrase competence in fact. These limits or aspects of competence are interrelated; for example, an individual with a winning personality or excellent imagination, or possessing a certain manual or mental skill, is likely to be the person with more competence in fact within a situation where the particular attribute is useful. The interrelationships, in other words, are part but not all of what we call the phenomenon of leadership. Competence in fact is leadership manifest; technical competence will comprise elements of leadership ability which contribute toward making leadership itself possible.

Operating within these limits, the chief, the "man between" can make a personal adaptation to the conflicting demands of the two sets of rules in one of several ways. Broadly, his choices are (1) to stick close to the traditional modes of conduct, neglecting the rules of procedure and sets of activities of his position in the organizational structure. If he does this, he will respond only minimally or not at all to the cues aimed at him, and will therefore serve to block communication between European and African rather than facilitate it. (2) To rely to a large extent on the authority vested in him as part of the organizational structure, thus utilizing a factual competence

other than his own to achieve the ends at which he aims. This course of action is just as likely to block channels of communication, if it is not the result of a block already existing, due to resentment against him on the part of the tribespeople. Or (3) to try to strike a nice balance between the two sets of demands on him, denying the organizational rules of procedure as little as possible while acting only with great care as the agent of the European administration in imposing its will upon the social unit over which he is set.[1]

From the British viewpoint, the judgment entered concerning the performance of a chief always related in part to what sort of choices he made among his alternatives - actually, how he combined choice (1) and choice(2), since they were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Only in the extreme case would there be simple rejection of European influence, or on the other hand thoroughgoing commitment to European policy; in most instances the first two choices would be combined in some version of choice (3).

From the standpoint of the colonial administration, the course of action adopted with respect to choice (1) would be a matter of technical competence on the part of the African involved. The course of action adopted with respect to choice (2) would be a matter of competence in fact. If the chief did not try or was not personally able to conform to and pass on the cues transmitted to him, then he would not be technically competent. If he was unable to carry on his public duties without undue reliance on British backing to obtain the compliance of his people, he would be incompetent in fact. This carries us back

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[1]This presentation is adapted from Greer, _ibid._, p. 23, where he uses the example of the foreman.

to the equation, X times Y equals Z, choice (1) giving a value to X, choice (2) a value to Y.

Only if these two types of competence were low, and the result side of the equation was therefore insignificant, could the British depose the chief without heartburnings. As the quotation at the top of page 161 reveals, there was otherwise a difficult dilemma, which had ethical overtones but ultimately came down to the question: would communication really be improved by the replacement of the chief? It was relatively easy to decide to get rid of the Small Bo chief, who lacked both technical and factual competence (since he violated the rules of the organizational structure in judging cases and in so doing sacrificed his competence in fact over his subjects). But it was very difficult to do something constructive in Jawi chiefdom - perhaps impossible, considering the nature of the charges against the chief - adoption of forceful measures to assist the chief in riding out the storm perhaps being as likely a solution as any. The ideology behind the Jawi agitation was too repugnant to British beliefs to permit any kowtowing to the interests which were said to be tied up with the formulation of such charges against the chief.

Conclusions: The Equilibrium of the System

The problems encountered by the colonial authorities in carrying forward the policy of reform under the doctrine of indirect rule can be summarized briefly. One basic question was that of finding the financial resources to support the communicative effort which was contemplated. On the native side, this difficulty stemmed in part from a lack of interest, in part from a genuine poverty of resources. The latter

problem the British attempted to solve by amalgamation of chiefdoms
into larger units which could support more elaborate administrative
organizations to act as receptors of cues. The former seemed to be
related to lack of technical competence on the part of Tribal Author-
ity members, and to difficulties of communication among the members of
a Tribal Authority. The administration of chiefdoms fell by default
to the chiefs, assisted only by personal councillors, factional sup-
porters and chiefdom officials.

The technical competence these displayed in administration was
in general poor, and worse still, there developed at times a problem
of the competence in fact of the chiefdom administration - especially
the chief. He and his officials were out of communication with the
Tribal Authority, particularly where matters of a "modern" character
were concerned. Abuses of various sorts were therefore more possible,
and occurred in profusion, partly because the only other source of cues
controlling behavior in the chiefdom administration was the remote col-
onial administrator. Furthermore, this absence of communication raised
the specter of a threat to the legitimacy of the chief's and other of-
ficials' positions in the social structure, upon which the policy of
reform relied so heavily. In one instance given here, the Small Bo
chiefdom, where the young men rioted, this theory that absence of com-
munication (lack of representation) would lead to unrest seemed to have
worked out in practice. There were similar instances of trouble in
other Mende chiefdoms.

The predictions comprised in the theory of indirect rule and in
the policy of reform thus broke down in several directions. This fact,

and even more particularly world events, made a change in policy a rather urgent matter toward the end of World War II. The experience of the British in other dependencies and on the world stage played an especially important part in the decision to create a new state of equilibrium, a new policy. The next chapter will therefore open with a discussion of the effect of the new context on local administration in Sierra Leone and then proceed to what was done in Mendeland to accommodate the African political system to both external and internal pressures.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLICY SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATIVE CONTROL

The External Balance

The progress of events outside Sierra Leone in the 1930's and the first half of the 1940's profoundly affected the external balance of the local political systems of the territory. Three different elements of this balance can be distinguished: Britain in the world situation, the system of relationships among Britain and her various dependencies and trends in British opinion and politics.

Perhaps the most important lesson of World War II for the British was the revelation of just how vulnerable Great Britain, the Commonwealth and the Empire had become, and how easily the resources available for defense could be overstrained. One great imperative established in the exhausting and nerve-racking struggle was not to allow the account sheet of resources and demands to fall out of balance again. The strain might come from outside the Empire and Commonwealth, and due precautions had to be taken here by various diplomatic means; but demands upon scarce resources might come from within the Empire also, and here, too, preparation had to be made to keep the possible sum total of demands within bounds.

British possessions had long been knit together in a system of naval and military establishments. Trouble in East Africa or China called for troops of the Indian army as well as from the home islands.

A Hut Tax war in Sierra Leone drew West Indian and Gold Coast units;
in World War II campaigns in Africa and Burma were fought by polyglot
armies from many parts of the Empire. But for this system, the hand-
writing was on the wall, for the Indian army was the heart of it, and
Indian independence deprived the British of the use of this force.
Furthermore, events in Palestine, India, Burma and elsewhere had amply
demonstrated the great expense and effort necessary to keep in line
determined dissidents from the ideology of Empire.

Power considerations alone, then, dictated a change in the gen-
eral policy toward the colonies and dependencies. It was perhaps bet-
ter, by appropriate political adjustments, to forestall the building
up of situations where great expense and the use of the military would
be necessary to keep order. These considerations were reinforced,
moreover, by the change in British political opinion which culminated
in the landslide victory in 1945 of the Labour Party over the Conserva-
tives and was of course a part of the general swing in world opinion
which brought into power a great many "leftist" governments. It was
thus popular as well as expedient that there should be a movement
toward a policy of devolution of power to the various dependencies.

For all of these reasons, "Self-Government within the Common-
wealth" became the slogan in colonial affairs during the war, and the
administration of Sierra Leone, like others in the dependencies, found
itself constrained to emphasize African preparation for ultimate self-
government. By reason of this changed stress, a new policy, called
here "representative control", came into being. Whereas the policy of
reform had made economic and social progress the main objective, the
new policy emphasized political change - changes, that is, not only in

the kinds of things the political system existed to do, but also in who decided and to a certain extent where it was decided something should be done.

The British administrative complement in Sierra Leone were in effect directed, by the change in home government policy on colonial matters, to look to the time when they might no longer be competent to maintain order in the territory, and to begin preparations which would make an orderly withdrawal before rising pressures possible. The dominant policy of the home government, as expressed in the call for self-government within the Commonwealth, provided an ideological basis for their behavior during this period of preparation for turnover of the reins of government to Africans, and simultaneous orderly withdrawal. A commitment to self-government was a commitment to democracy, given British political beliefs and attitudes, and therefore the ideal of democracy could serve as a major justification and guide for measures promoted by the colonial administration.

Self-government of course referred to the entire territory as a political unit. But the ideal of democracy as interpreted by the British administrators made a place for local political systems in the organizational structure of government. In this respect the policy of representative control did not differ from its predecessor. In both, what is known as "modern liberal democracy" found expression. This

> . . . Rests upon a philosophy of universally valid means and ends. Its fundamental assumption is the worth and dignity and creative capacity of the individual. . . . Ideally considered, means and ends are joined in the concept of freedom . . . freedom of self-government, so that no one may be compelled against his will.[1]

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[1] Carl Becker, Modern Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 27.

The fundamental assumption here is that "categorical imperative", the concept of freedom, and the possibility of choice which is its corollary, referred to earlier as underlying the Cameronian doctrine. Such an ideology of democracy can be found equally in Cameron's insistence on channels from the top down to the "humblest peasant", in the feeling that the more local the government the better, or the related statement that "the political progress of the (colonial) territories is dependent on the development of responsibility in local government . . . without sound local government, a democratic political system at the center is not possible."[1]

The question of precisely how to effect "freedom of self-government" at the level of the African political system was not urgent business under the policy of reform, for the doctrine of indirect rule was essentially one of conserving the freedom which did allegedly exist. It did become urgent when self-government for the territory was set as a goal to be achieved in some finite future. It was necessary that the control of local political systems exercised - in a very undemocratic way - by the colonial administrators should be transferred to the African population or to elements representative of it before self-government was granted, if democratic ideology was to be served. When the question was posed by the change of home government policy, the answer given was, naturally enough, a proposal that English local government be adopted as a model; for both in its internal operation and in its relation to the central government it is believed to express in organizational structure the democratic ideology. With respect to the

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[1]Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947, Cmd. 7169 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1947), par. 150.

central government, of course, self-government involves the adoption of parliamentary institutions along British lines, thus completing the model of a governmental structure which will be the epitome of democratic practice.

Adoption of the English local government model not only supplied an idea of the relationship which should obtain between African political systems and the governments which would replace the colonial regime. It also delineated the difference between the policy of reform and the policy of representative control. This is very precisely stated in the comment:

> The Local Government theory has defined precisely in what sense the objective of moulding the traditional institutions toward the standards and forms of "civilized government" is to be understood. . . . Now, the essential test of the composition of a native authority is not whether it is a traditional authority, but whether it is representative and acceptable to the people.[1]

This ideological directive and such a model of organizational structure appropriate to the policy system of representative control were what the colonial administrators brought with them. Inquiry can now turn to the accommodation which was made to these ideas in the existing conditions in Sierra Leone - in other words, to their impact upon the internal balance of the African political system. It need not be stressed that the new policy did not imply the abandonment in toto of the policy of reform, but only greater emphasis on the political aspect of that policy. Increased attention in this direction was

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[1]R. E. Robinson, "Why 'Indirect Rule' Has Been Replaced by 'Local Government' in the Nomenclature of British Native Administration", _Journal of African Administration_, July, 1950, pp. 14-15.

indeed only relative, for the effort to stimulate social and economic change went on at an even faster pace than before.

Local Units of Administration and Representative Control

The first step was creation of District Councils in 1945.[1] These comprised two members from each chiefdom in the district, one the Paramount Chief, the other elected by the Tribal Authority, although not necessarily from that body. Under the presidency of the District Commissioner, and subject to call by him, the District Councils had the duties of advising the Governor on matters he might put before them, making recommendations to the administration on their own initiative, suggesting sources of revenue if either advice or recommendations involved expenditure, and also making rules in the field of native law and custom.

By 1950, under the impetus of plans to increase the agricultural and other production of the territory as the "only sure foundation for improvement of social services",[2] the place of the District Councils in the organizational structure was changed. They were given the job of running the economic development programs for their districts. In this connection, authority was given for them to delegate responsibility to committees of the councils. Furthermore, under a new constitution for the territory, each council was made an electoral college for the selection of a member of the Legislative Council.[3] Provision for membership

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[1]Incorporated in the Laws of the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone in force on 1st January, 1946 (5 vols; London: Roworth, 1946), as Part II of Cap. 185.

[2]Childs, op. cit., par. 7.

[3]When ministers were appointed from the non-official membership of the Legislative Council in 1953, a political party drawn mainly from members chosen in this manner took over the ministries.

of the councils were changed to take account of differences in the size of chiefdoms, each chiefdom now sending its chief and two members for the first two thousand taxpayers and an additional member for each thousand taxpayers over two thousand. As before, the representatives other than the chief were selected by the Tribal Authority, but not necessarily from it. Further changes have been made from time to time; the District Commissioner was replaced in 1954 by an African president, and in early 1956 it was proposed that the members selected by Tribal Authorities should instead be popularly elected, on the basis of one member for each thousand taxpayers in the chiefdom. Under this official proposal, there would be a ward system, all men over twenty-one being eligible as electors, as well as women who paid taxes, were literate or owned buildings.

The economic development activities of the councils did not imply any power to tax. These activities were financed originally by government grants, contributions from the chiefdoms to support work taken over from the chiefdoms by the councils and contributions from public organizations and funds.[2] Later the government grants were dropped or curtailed, and the councils then were given authority to "precept"[3] on the chiefdoms to replace this revenue.

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[1]See bill printed in the Sierra Leone Royal Gazette Supplement, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 14, March 1, 1956, entitled "An Ordinance to Amend the District Councils Ordinance, 1950".

[2]See Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on Sierra Leone for the Year 1952 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1953), pp. 22-23, listing the following main items of revenue for the councils:

Grants in Aid - L 5,000 per council . . . . L 67,904
Chiefdom Contributions 38,591
Produce Marketing Board (interested in palm products) . . 78,956
        Total: over 90 per cent of entire revenue.

[3]A precept is simply a demand for a certain contribution from chiefdom revenues.

In thus elaborating on the organizational structure, it is clear, the initial interest of the British lay in the prospect of obtaining better communication with the African leaders, for administrative purposes. The point was made that:

> District Commissioners and other government officers wishing to present and explain aspects of government policy or to consult the people's opinion, had to do so piecemeal (before District Councils were instituted). . . . It was thus difficult to obtain a coordinated view of what the people were thinking, and from the opposite point of view, extremely difficult to convey to them the wider scope and implications of government policy.[1]

Furthermore, the District Council provided common ground for communication among the Africans themselves - a thing which was in large measure lacking in the social structure as it existed. It was hoped, even in 1947, that the members would develop, through communication with one another, common interests of sufficient strength that the council would be suitable to serve as a "connecting link" between the chiefdoms and representative bodies at higher levels, such as the Protectorate Assembly and the Legislative Council. The problem envisaged here, obviously, was the one ultimately posed by the objective of territorial self-government and its corollary of democratic local government: how to replace that component in the organizational structure composed of British colonial servants with some other arrangement which would be both as effective in connecting the tribal social structure with the territorial administration and governmental institutions and yet constituted, as the colonial servant segment of the organizational struc-

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[1]Great Britain, Colonial Office, _Report on Sierra Leone for the year 1947_ (London: H. M. Stationery Office), pp. 67 ff., Appendix on District Councils.

ture was not, in accordance with democratic ideals.

Connected with this objective, of course, was the question of the competence in fact of the members and of the District Council as a whole. The organizational rules of procedure sought to obtain this through devices of representation which recognized the existing competence of the chief by making him automatically a chiefdom representative on the councils, and furthermore took into account existing channels of communication in the social structure. Appointment by the Tribal Authority of the second or additional members was thought, initially, the best way of assuring competence in fact of those members, since popular election would "not be in accordance with traditional ideas".[1] In addition, it was sought to broaden the competence in fact of such members by (1) excluding the chief from the deliberations of the Tribal Authority preliminary to choosing them and (2) making the representative chosen a member of the Tribal Authority, if not already such. The first move would, in theory, eliminate the possibility of interference by the chief with the flow of communication within the Tribal Authority which might lead to a true consensus. The second gave the man selected the maximum facilities for communication with his constituents and thus presumably to nurse along his competence in fact to act as their representative.

In a sense, the interests of the colonial administration which impelled the organization of District Councils were the same as those stimulating the drive for the reform and amalgamation of chiefdoms. This can be seen in the kind of responsibilities granted the councils.

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[1]Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on Sierra Leone, 1947, p. 68.

The most significant, those for economic development work, grew out of the need for more and better controlled financial resources and more technically competent staff than the usual chiefdom could provide, to receive and elaborate upon the kind of cues given under the policy of reform. Furthermore, it was argued in favor of decentralization of such responsibilities that "omission to invoke the interest and assistance of the people prejudices success by inducing a feeling of detachment". In Africa, "Government planners, and indeed Government services, are alone incapable of doing more than touch the fringes of the problem. The people must actively cooperate in the work of development if results are to be commensurate with the cost, or the need."[1] This is very much the line of thought behind the policy of reform, with its emphasis upon eliciting the interest of the traditional authorities and their advisers in "modern" administration.

As the revenue figures for District Councils in 1952 show, the colonial authorities felt enough the need of eliciting African interest in development that they subsidized the councils by up to three-fourths of their expenditures. For the rest, they encouraged the pooling on a district basis of chiefdom funds budgeted for certain types of work.

The results of this expensive investment have been called "remarkable". Within two years of the assumption of responsibility for economic development matters, the councils were working well enough that the system of precepts was proposed, the idea being that an increase in council revenue in this fashion would make possible transfer

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[1]Childs, op. cit., par. 10.

to them of central government services, such as agriculture, education and some of the others listed earlier.[1] The problem of communication within the council, imposed by the size of districts and the necessarily infrequent meetings, was overcome by use of standing committees (usually one, the Finance and General Purposes Committee). These in general displayed increasing zeal and technical competence in discharging council duties. They worked in conjunction with District Council staffs which totalled over 130 by the end of 1952.[2]

However, this development apparently had its own consequences for communication. While it provided channels through which exchange of communication stimulated by interest on the part of the Africans could flow, increasing the factual competence of the councils, it tended to close off equally vital channels of communication. Probably the majority of council members were illiterate (In Mendeland one council in 1953 had 35 literates in English out of a total membership of 45, but another had only 10 literates out of 50 members.), and even some members of standing committees labored under the handicap. This fact and the associated concentration of literates on the standing committees "widened the gap between the informed few and the rest of the members of the District Councils". Furthermore, the mass of the people were said to "have little awareness of the services the District Councils provide or of the duties they perform".[3] It was fear for the

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[1]Sierra Leone, _Report on the Administration of the Provinces,_ _1952,_ par. 98.

[2]Sierra Leone, _Report on the Administration of the Provinces,_ 195?, par. 91.

[3]Sierra Leone, _Report on the Administration of the Provinces,_ _1953,_ par. 115, 117.

consequences in terms of the councils' competence in fact, flowing from these conditions, which led to a warning against a tendency of chiefdom administrations to shift responsibility to the councils. The councils, it was argued, "by their nature as statutory bodies are unable to command the family and tribal sanctions on which the social structure of the country is built and upon which its continuing stability depends."[1]

It would seem that the consequences were felt when the central government withdrew its subsidy from the councils, and they were turned to the device of the precept to finance their activities. This move forced the level of the Local Tax (combined Chiefdom and House Taxes) to thirty-five shillings from the 1945 average of five to ten shillings. As mentioned earlier, there were riots, with attacks on chiefs and other officials, in protest over these rates. The main complaint of residents of one such unsettled area was said to be that "they had no idea about the way the heavy taxes . . . are being utilized . . . because there is not the slightest vein of proof of any benefit since the introduction of the District Council system in the area."[2]

The response of course was the recent proposal to elect members of the councils on a ward basis - an obvious attempt to improve communication between council and population, and hence establish more firmly the competence in fact of the council members.

In the chiefdoms there was also a process of accommodation to British ideas of local government. The steps taken have not been enshrined in ordinances, but nevertheless the administrative officers have

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[1]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces, 1953, par. 106.

[2]Sierra Leone Daily Mail, January 11, 1956, p. 6.

been busy supplying cues encouraging and approving changes in the struc-
ture of chiefdom administration in certain directions. One move, de-
signed to meet the criticism of "large and unwieldy" Tribal Authorities,
was to associate with the chief and his officials in the day to day
administrative operations a small standing committee drawn from the
Tribal Authority and more or less formally organized for the discharge
of business, unlike the personal advisers and hangers-on of the chief.
This measure in recent years proved to be of great value in raising
technical competence, for "where such committees have been established,
supervision of native administration works and revenue collection have
improved."[1] Of course, by establishing an organizational requirement
of frequent communication with others, they also established some reg-
ulation of the chief's activity, hence setting closer limits on his
competence in fact.

To take care of the problem of the competence in fact _vis-a-vis_
the population of the chiefdom administration and Tribal Authority as
a whole, reforms in the composition of the Tribal Authorities were also
introduced in the early 1950's. The so-called "young men" of the chief-
doms - criteria for distinguishing these from other men are not clear -
have been encouraged to elect their own representative to the Tribal
Authority, the colonial administration hoping by this means to reduce
"the spirit of restlessness and rebellion which has been an unfortunate
feature in some chiefdoms during the past five years".[2] In the chief-

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[1]Sierra Leone, _Report on the Administration of the Provinces_,
1953, par. 107.

[2]Sierra Leone, _Report on the Administration of the Provinces_,
1952, par. 75. The system actually works, at least in one chiefdom.
The _Sierra Leone Daily Mail_ for January 17, 1956, (p. 4) carries a

doms, too, there were the beginnings of an effort to broaden the electorate for selection of a chief, by making it permissible for the Tribal Authority to be constituted for such occasions on the basis of one member for each twenty taxpayers, rather than on the traditional lines.

Analysis: The Aims of Policy

In these measures there is evident an effort to overcome the difficulties encountered in the policy system of reform. The problem of mobilizing resources to support the educative effort is attacked through the District Council. This permits the hiring of staff (including some Europeans), thus assuring greater technical competence and capacity for reception of cues from the colonial service officers. At the same time, the device of the standing committee permits the recruitment of the technically most competent members of the councils into the positions most significant for the active pursuit of objectives, thus coping to some extent with those problems of comprehension and hence interest and communication which were mentioned earlier. This is true both of District Councils and of chiefdoms, although the effect in the latter is intended to be more in the realm of competence in fact. In both cases, too, competence in fact of the African authorities is at least in theory strengthened by extending the base of representation.

In this, an increasing conformity with the theory of English local government can be noted. The essentials of this theory are: (1) sufficient financial resources to be autonomous to a considerable

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photograph of a meeting of the "young men" of Tikonko chiefdom, at which, it was reported, eight of nine sections or sub-chiefdoms moved to depose the representative of the young men on the ground that he had failed to work for them and to keep them informed.

extent from the central government, which means simply that the local government is not obliged to bow to the superior competence of the central government and hence to the cues which it communicates regarding some governmental activity desired by the local population; (2) a sharp division between staff and council, between those persons who are supposed to be primarily technically competent and those who should first of all be competent in fact and hence be better placed to regulate the flow of cues to the staff which will lead to some things' being accomplished at the expense of other things - in other words, so situated as to be able to deal with the "political questions" which arise; (3) an organizational structure which not only makes this division, but also makes the regulation of cues effective by isolating small groups of council members in committees concerned with certain aspects of staff activity; (4) corresponding to this system of communication with the staff, a system of communication with the general public, through devices for selecting members of the council, which gives some assurance that members will indeed have the necessary competence in fact.

These points outline the ultimate aims of the policy of representative control in terms of organizational structure. The description necessarily implies considerably more than the policy itself stands for, since there is more to government than representation alone. Two aspects of communication are the essence of the policy of representative control and of the contribution of the policy to the operations of a structure resembling English local government. These are access and identification. The whole elaborate structure of conciliar government is intended to give access, for the purposes held among the population at large, to the point at which these purposes are integrated through

the initiation of some course of action or policy in the name of the whole social unit. Access is accomplished by representatives, who can claim such a title partially by virtue of the operation of that peculiar phenomenon which is called identification. It operates because some feature - what the representative is, what he has done or what he gives the impression he will do - is known or is communicated widely. For those whose representative the individual truly is, invocation of this feature will serve as a cue to action or inaction, as might be appropriate, which will affirm his competence in fact.

CHAPTER VII

COLONIAL POLICY AND AFRICAN BEHAVIOR

African Behavior in the Analysis

In the analysis just completed, the "policy systems" used as examples have been taken as comprising both European administrative and technical personnel on the spot and the elements in the African population who seem to stand in some relation to them which is significant for the course of their work - in other words, have some effect on the courses of action called policy. But because the behavior and ideas of the alien participants in the political system have been so important in the evolution of the system, the choice was made to focus initially upon this most active element and what it has sought to accomplish. Like any other system of human activity, the political system in the last analysis consists in the behaviors of individuals and cannot very well be discussed intelligently without some notion of what human ends or purposes are served (the functions of the system). This is especially true of the political system, where purposes and objectives are to a larger degree than usual consciously formulated as courses of action.

The starting point was therefore the British administration and the organizational structure which it had attempted to put in being as a system of activity. The positions, functions and rules of procedure which comprise the organizational structure are in fact policy, in a

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somewhat narrow sense of the term, since they provide the operating

mechanism through which the underlying purposes and objectives are to

be effected. It might better be said that they are the mechanism

through which it is hoped or expected that the underlying purposes and

objectives will be effected. Organizational structure as an aspect of

policy is an attempt at prediction of the self-fulfilling type; it not

only indicates what should happen, but provides means to make it happen.

This approach to the analysis of the African political system

has its difficulties, however. The first and most general problem is

that of the validity of prediction; it may be taken as axiomatic that

it will always fail in some measure, because the human material is re-

calcitrant and to a certain extent unpredictable even in the presence

of an effort to make the results conform to the predictions implied in

policy. Concentration on British behavior in the African political

system will therefore result in overemphasis on the organizational

structure, the policy it represents and in general the "hortative" or

normative aspects of the system. Part of the question why things hap-

pen as they do will be answered, but part will not, to the extent that

policy and the efforts to fulfill it are stressed to the neglect of the

reasons lying in African behavior.

A second and allied problem is that within the scope of the in-

quiry falls a vast range of African behavior. This is not true of the

behavior of colonial officials, particularly since the scope of the

scheme has been restricted to British Africa only; it is quite certain

that there will be strong family resemblances in policies throughout

British Africa. But on the African side there is no such reasonable

assurance of a resemblance among tribal systems, so that, for example,

the explanations of why things happened as they did in Mendeland would apply throughout the general area of inquiry represented by all tribes in British Africa.

The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that it will be necessary to seek ways of taking African behavior into account. Thus far, this has been actually attempted for only one tribal system, and the results of this effort can be assumed to apply generally only to the extent that the concepts of the scheme derived will certainly find counterparts in African behavior in any system whatsoever. But, even assuming this basic identity, the theoretical implications of the concepts must be developed to permit useful comparative work with the variety of tribal systems in interaction with British policy. The next two chapters will be directed to this end, although admittedly the treatment given cannot, within the limits of the paper, be definitive.

The Crucial Position of the "Man Between"

In the previous chapters, an attempt has been made to establish that communication between European and African elements in the political system will be necessary if the forms of activity laid down or implied in the organizational structure are to become effective as behavior in the African political system. It is to the question of conditions for effective communication that the inquiry must turn, and it seems fair to say that here the most significant concept is that of competence. If there is assumed a high standard of technical competence in the colonial servants involved in the system, and the possession of means to secure themselves the necessary competence in fact among the

Africans they deal with,[1] then the examination of colonial tutelage and guidance can turn to modes of African behavior and the factors determining such modes. If communication is necessary, and there is no question of the European element's having something to communicate and being competent to do it, then the major point of interest must be the receptivity of Africans to cues.

What this seems to boil down to is the competence of the African "man between" to act or to refuse to act in response to cues - to comply or not to comply with the prescriptions of the organizational structure. If his receptivity, considered as a function of his ability to secure the acquiescence of others (competence in fact) as well as of his individual willingness, comprehension and knowledge (technical competence) is good, then he has competence which accords with the definition of his legitimate competence, and there will be effective communication with the whole tribal group.

The very term by which the "man between" is characterized arises from the fact that he participates in two main kinds of structure. Both bind him, and he cannot go very far with some deviant line of behavior without drawing upon himself material or psychological sanctions from whichever structure is adversely affected. This will be particularly true of the habitual relationships organized within the social structure. It is difficult to abandon the patterns of behavior of social structure in response to pressures from another structure of more limited scope, because those patterns provide an effective means whereby the time and

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[1]This assumption was explicitly accepted at an earlier point. However, in the study of a specific African political system, competence of the individual colonial civil servants involved would of course be a point to be examined.

energy available to a human being are stretched to acquire the material and emotional sustenance he needs for general well-being. Since change means both losses of things significant to the individual and a tremendous effort of will and intelligence to reorganize life, social structure tends to hold its shape. As one observer remarks of this phenomenon, "Basically, most people want to be let alone."[1] In other words, people will be inclined on the whole to look with reserve upon cues which require some strong effort and sacrifice on their part.

When examining the interplay of organizational and social structure as is done when the problems of the "man between" are discussed, therefore, it is to be assumed that the characteristics of the one, transmitted to the African official as cues, may find a better or a poorer reception, depending on how well they can be fitted into the existing pattern of life of the official and of the population with which he is supposed to work. This assumption brings inquiry around again to the problem of typology. Since social structure can be so important in regulating responses to cues, it becomes part of the problem to devise ways of typing them so that it is possible to compare African political systems for differentials in receptivity to cues. From the scientific viewpoint, it is little more useful to lump all African societies together as "primitive" or "savage", because of a certain characteristic inability to spring to "civilization" on cue, than it is to classify trees as such simply because they all grow to a certain minimum size. Characteristic features have laboriously to be picked out in terms of their significance for response of the sys-

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[1]Alexander Leighton, The Governing of Men (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 335.

tem, so that explanation of response becomes possible by reference to differences and similarities of characteristics of structures.

The sound method for going about this would seem to be that already propounded: to take organizational structure in the various stages of policy as a succession of constant factors in all African political systems in British Africa - the basis for the action being that "family resemblance" spoken of earlier. After determining characteristic features of organizational structure for each stage, it would remain to compare the responses in various African political systems to similar stages of colonial policy, trying to determine which characteristics of the social structure, by their presence or absence, help to explain the response. In order that hypotheses might be offered, of course, the characteristics in terms of which they might be stated would have to be general enough to fit at least a number of African political systems, so that the necessary testing of reliability through examination of multiple examples would be possible.

It is the purpose here to elaborate on the conceptual scheme, as described in the section on typology in Chapter I, in such a way that types or categories of such characteristics are developed for use in this fashion. In this chapter, a typology of characteristics for organizational structure is the aim.

Some Characteristics of Organizational Structure

A start in establishing a set of significant characteristics of structure can be made by looking at the matter of social ranking, which in its political aspects is a problem of who defers to whom when the question, "What is to be done?" is asked and answered, of the reliabil-

ity or "depth" of this deference and of the areas of activity for which it is given. This question of deference in decision-making has aptly been called the "first problem of politics", for insofar as there are rules of procedure of this kind, reflecting social ranking, then political decisions are to at least some extent prejudged. The holders of positions in the structure who, under the rules usually applied in the particular structure, are deferred to in certain respects and in a certain measure, by definition exercise control over their fellows to the extent that deference is given. The authority so obtained affords them the ability to shrug off miscellaneous suggestions and demands thrown up to them. At the same time they can within the limits imposed by the rules of procedure insist upon certain responses from those who are supposed to defer to them. Every suggestion of a friend requires at least the appearance of consideration if friendship is to be preserved, but this is not the case if the interaction takes place between an employee and employer.

This "first problem" - who controls whom - can be understood in terms of the concepts of hierarchy and polyarchy. Hierarchy exists to the extent to which there are ranked and graded positions in the social structure, the holders of which perform certain functions under rules of procedure subjecting them to control from some, while at the same time permitting them to exact deference from others. The geometric analogy commonly used to illustrate hierarchy is the pyramid; the whole system of control and deference comes to focus on a single point - the chief, the king, the board of directors or other governing council. Polyarchy exists to the extent to which the rules of procedure of the structure do not require relations of unilateral control and deference

among holders of positions. Responses to cues cannot be demanded, but rather must be elicited, which implies an exchange of cues and to a certain extent a process of bargaining or mutual participation in the making of decisions, in which deference and control operate in both directions.

It is a commonplace that the absolute, unilateral control which would logically be the epitome of hierarchy as defined is not a consistent feature of actual structures. There is, in other words, an element of polyarchy even in relationships between very unequal social ranks. This has led students of organizational structure to define authority as the right to the "last word". The boss is the boss because, although others are permitted to make suggestions to him and even argue points of policy with him, it is recognized that the rules of procedure put him in a position to enunciate a course of action to which others will have to conform regardless of their own opinions. The ultimate right to deference, corresponding to legitimate competence in one of its aspects, is therefore the hallmark of hierarchy. What is required, if hierarchical relationships are to exist, is that the rules of procedure of the structure should make some positions inferior to others by calling upon a subordinate to yield to a superior, who will enunciate the decision which sticks and may even be in a position to decide who if anyone will participate with him in formulating the decision.

Even with such a qualification in the definition of hierarchy, however, there very often remains a large element of polyarchy even in the most hierarchical of structures, the organizational. This is so apparently because human beings are dependent upon one another for the

satisfaction of needs and purposes. Ultimately, an individual's ability - his technical competence - to perform some act which functions to satisfy a need or purpose of his fellows will give him a make-weight, or competence in fact. The commonest example of the phenomenon is found in the conflict between line and staff, or scalar and functional principles of organization. If "experts" of one sort or another are brought in to advise and assist in operations carried on for the most part within the lines of control and deference of a typically hierarchical structure, difficulties may ensue. It has been noted that "This kind of division of responsibility aids in the use of competent knowledge, but it tends to conflict with the hierarchy of command. An inevitable specialization of interests takes place which tends to obscure the dominant goal of the whole organization."[1] A rather striking example of the tendency in that most hierarchical of organizations, the army, stimulated Sir Ian Hamilton, in his novel of World War I, The First Hundred Thousand, to have an officer complain rather good humoredly that he had largely lost control over his platoon because many of his men had become specialists in some phase or other of the technology of modern warfare.

It would appear that in such instances the element of uncertainty that appears reflects a certain decrease of hierarchy. The unequivocal right to deference and to the last word is to a degree thrown into doubt. If this interference with hierarchically oriented rules of procedure is a common occurrence even where they are strongly and consciously emphasized, even greater must be the problem where the emphasis is not so strong.

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[1] S. A. Greer, Social Organization ("Short Studies in Sociology"; Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 62.

It follows from what has been said that all structures lie somewhere along a continuum between hierarchy and polyarchy. A great deal of deference may be demanded, and reciprocal relationships which would tend to offset this emphasis on hierarchy be discouraged, as in the army; or the emphasis may be quite the opposite, as in an international organization like the United Nations. The consequences for humankind may differ widely, according to the balance achieved between unilateral and reciprocal control as evidenced by the directions in which deference is given. But both polyarchical and hierarchical tendencies will be present, and the fundamental point to be made here is that some sort of balance between the two will always be struck in a structure.

Hierarchy-polyarchy having been outlined as the main problem of structure, at least in its political aspects, the inquiry can turn again to Africa. The relationship of the discussion to these problems of analysis can be simply stated: in their concern with an organizational structure through which to carry out the various objectives of their policy, the British tended to emphasize the hierarchical element by using hierarchical social structures wherever they could be found, and developing them where they were lacking. This stress on hierarchy was part and parcel of the initial phase of British policy. To exercise control over and to communicate with large numbers of people with the smallest feasible expense in money and manpower required the employment wherever possible of Africans who were already in a position to exact deference or who gave promise of being competent to do so. As noted in discussion of the Mende, this was also a matter of expediency under the policy of supervision, being cheaper than employment of expensive European manpower, for one thing. But under the policy

of reform, it became a matter of deliberate policy to create a hier-
archy, the cues communicated to the Africans calling for the develop-
ment of a rather more elaborate organizational structure, in the form
of the "native administration". This would comprise a number of tech-
nical personnel ranged and ranked under the chief (in Mendeland) or
headman (in tribes where African officials had had to be created), in
a typically hierarchical arrangement of deference and control.

The use or creation and the subsequent elaboration of hierar-
chical features in the organizational structure have wide implications
for the investigation of the relation of social structure to the recep-
tivity of tribal societies to cues from colonial authorities. The im-
mediate problem is, by developing some of these implications, to state
a set of characteristics of the organizational structure against which
to place the reactions of various African tribal systems, for purposes
of comparison. To do this, the organizational structure will be con-
sidered as a bureaucracy - an aggregate of individuals whose activities
are ordered and positions ranked so as to facilitate accomplishment of
certain formally stated purposes.

Carl J. Friedrich has reported finding in study of the history
of administrative organization in government in the United States,
Prussia, England and France that "Six elements or aspects recur in a
developing bureaucracy in demonstrable institutionalization: central-
ization of control or supervision (hierarchical aspects), differentia-
tion of functions, qualification for office, objectivity, precision
and continuity, and secrecy (discretion)."[1] The first of these, of
course, we have just noted as a prominent feature of British policy

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[1]Carl J. Friedrich, "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of
Bureaucracy", Reader in Bureaucracy, Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray,
Barbara Hockey, Hanan C. Selvin (eds.), (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
1952), pp. 27-33, at p. 29. See also C. J. Friedrich, Constitutional
Government and Democracy, (rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950) Chap. II.

in Africa.

The recurrence of this pattern over a number of examples suggests a functional relationship among these various aspects. On this evidence, it may be assumed that the emphasis on the hierarchical principle in colonial administrative policy will be associated with a stress on the other aspects also. Thus, the organizational structure set up by the British would feature not only the use of the hierarchical principle, but also a tendency to sets of activities and rules of procedure in accordance with the dictates of the other aspects as well. The assumption might be stimulated, too, by the fact that these generalized aspects of bureaucracy represent trends in British practice and hence presumably influence the thought and conduct of British colonial administration as they set about to create and develop organizational structures at the level of the African political system.

What do these various, interrelated aspects of bureaucracy imply for the competence which colonial administrations seek to build in African participants in the organizational structure? To begin to answer this question requires an interpretation, especially, of the last four of the six aspects of bureaucracy listed by Friedrich - qualification for office, objectivity, precision and continuity and discretion - in terms of individual behavior. For assistance in doing this, one can turn to the "pattern variables" of Parsons[1] and to the "analytic aspects of relationship structures" of Levy,[2] which derive from

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[1] Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shills, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 76-91.

[2] M. J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 238 ff.

Parsons. Both are attempts to state concisely the fundamental ways in which individuals may orient themselves in social relationships. Parsons states these as dichotomous choices, Levy as extreme points on a continuum of choices. Here they are viewed in the latter light, because these modes of orientation are considered, to use Friedrich's words, as "developmental trends", in terms of which tribal systems lie rather toward one end of a scale, while the organizational structures which form a portion of the African political system lie toward the other.

Qualification for office refers to selection of holders of positions on the basis of merit and, generally, technical competence in a strict sense of the term. The fundamental choice here lies between selection on the basis of ascription or on the basis of achievement; whether selection occurs because of what a person is or because of what he is able to do. The latter choice can be said to operate to the extent that individuals are not barred from a position in the organizational structure because of their placement in the social structure and the criteria for selection concern competence to perform the functions of the position in accordance with the pertinent rules of procedure.[1]

Objectivity refers in a less specific way than qualification for office to the technical competence of the individual. It is not so much a matter of some trained qualification, as of emotional attitude toward the work; the choice lies between treating the duties of the position as a series of formally stated problems in which personal

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[1] Ibid., page 255.

feeling is not highly relevant but the rules of procedure are, and treating them in such a manner as to allow personal predilections and relationships with others to affect the course of action taken. In Parsons' terms, it is a choice between "affectivity" and "affective neutrality"; in Levy's, between "avoidance" and "intimacy". Whatever the terminology used, it is clear, the reference is the same. The attitude described is that of the official who says he sympathizes, but can't assist because the rules prevent him from doing so, or, on the basis of his training, experience or knowledge of the rules of procedure, pursues certain ways of doing things despite appeals, threats or bribes put forward by those interested in doing them another way. This aspect of behavior may be connected with qualification for office; as Friedrich points out, objectivity "is closely related to expertise . . . no one can be a good craftsman . . . who does not acquire the capacity to think in terms of objective needs, in terms, that is, of what the particular job at hand requires."[1]

This leads into the discussion of discretion,[2] a term which refers to the choice which lies open to the individual as to the standards which should guide his behavior. Should he act with reference to the pattern of relationships imposed upon him by the organizational structure, and therefore shared with all others in the structure, or with reference to personal motives or relations (perhaps falling

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[1] Friedrich, _Constitutional Government and Democracy_ (rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), p. 52.

[2] This term is preferred to secrecy because it implies what that term does not, a functional basis for circumspection. If the relationships in the organizational structure are not to be thrown into confusion, there must be discretion.

outside the structure) unique to him or to a select coterie (clique) among the participants in the work of the structure? The first choice is a universalistic one, the second particularistic, since in one the individual regulates his conduct by reference to the criteria supplied by the universe of the organizational structure, while in the other, criteria more personal to him and less relevant to the structure are used. The same choice may be stated as responsible (from the organization's viewpoint) or individualistic. However put, it is plain that the first choice is more discreet than the second. It will be noted that this definition implies the previously discussed aspects of bureaucracy. Lack of discretion, individualism or particularism must involve either a failure to be objective or lack of qualification for office resulting in a failure to comprehend properly the objectives of the organization or the individual's relationship to them.

Precision and consistency[1] as aspects of bureaucratic behavior refer to the amount of self-control which holders of positions are called upon to exercise. This is clear from Friedrich's derivation of the category from the growth of files and precedent as bases for action. Anyone who has ever attempted to organize or use files, or who has acted on the legal principle of stare decisis will recognize that self-control is a very important element in the activity.

Both files and reliance on precedent are essentially means of organizing life in an economical fashion, so that time, energy and scarce resources can be used as efficiently as possible, and as such

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[1]Following Friedrich, consistency is substituted for continuity, as better expressing the meaning.

are only two means among many. Generically, they and the precision and consistency to which they give rise fall into a more general category. For any individual, there is a choice between diffusing his attention and energy over a wide range of functions and relationships, and restricting these by whatever means may be devised to reinforce self-control. Some restrictions are of course necessary - one cannot, like the legendary horseman, "ride off in all directions" - but there is a choice open. This can be stated as lying along a continuum between specificity and diffuseness. Specificity means a careful definition and delimitation of functions and consequently of the rules of procedure governing the positions in a structure. Precision and consistency are behaviors lying toward the specificity end; they imply that the holder of a position will be expected to exercise close control (perhaps in conformity with cues stored in files, regulations or records of previous instances of the situation currently facing him) in the functions he undertakes and the relationships into which he enters.

Specificity in stating what a holder of a position is to do and how he is to do it clearly bears a relation to the aspects of bureaucratic behavior already reviewed. As Friedrich puts it, precision and consistency are the result of rules for the organization of human cooperation. Violation of the rules will throw the organization into confusion. "It is something like the difference between driving an oxcart and an express train. The oxcart driver can stop to chat with a friend, the engineer of the express train cannot."[1] That is, the

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[1]Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 54.

engineer has a specific function closely related to the functions performed by many other people; he therefore is required to maintain a universalistic orientation when he is performing his functions. He has to keep his emotions in check while operating the train (cannot pause to be friendly), which implies avoidance or affective neutrality. And of course the engineer must be qualified for the job; like the modern Mende clerk, he must have both higher technical ability than his primitive predecessor and appropriately greater comprehension and concern for the consequences of his actions for the organization, since such consequences will be greater.

Specificity also bears a relationship to differentiation of function. Differentiation means the division of work formerly done by one person among two or more persons, or the appending of new positions onto an existing structure. In either case, it is obvious, coordination and hence closer definition of the various functions and the rules of procedure distinguishing and connecting them will be required. For this reason, it would appear, greater specificity will be required.

From differentiation of function one can move to close the circle to hierarchy again, for centralization of control and supervision (the hierarchical aspect) and differentiation of function are in a sense related; the centralization of control and supervision is itself a kind of differentiation of a particular function, viz., the function of control and coordination. Central supervision "is necessary only when a differentiation has previously existed".[1] It is probably jus-

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[1]Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 45.

tifiable to conclude that, in areas where hierarchy in the tribal social structure was almost absent, the creation of a hierarchy for administrative control became necessary when the British took it upon themselves to see to it that public order was maintained - a differentiation of a function previously performed, to different standards, by local or kinship units, which also had many other functions.

It is appropriate to speak of the development of bureaucracy, defined in terms of these six aspects, as "rationalization" of behavior. This is not to say that bureaucratic behavior is utterly and perfectly rational, or that organizational structures do not vary in their rationality - defined here as the use of the most appropriate means to attain desired ends. But it can be asserted with a good deal of force that, as historical evidence shows, the development of bureaucracy in government and other fields of endeavor has vastly augmented ability to obtain desired objectives with a given expenditure of effort. It only need be considered whether twentieth century business and other enterprises could be conducted with, say, fifteenth century organizational structures and the habits of work which went with them.

It is with a sense of this tendency toward "rationalization" that Friedrich speaks of the aspects of bureaucracy which he outlines as representing a developmental trend. It would seem that general awareness of this historical trend and of the peculiar quality which emphasis upon organization has given western societies is one major basis for the distinction commonly made between primitive and modern societies. The former are traditional, the latter rational. As noted earlier, some Europeans were so struck by the evident differences that

they denied these peoples any reasoning powers at all.

This is of course nonsense. But if the capacity to augment gross social product by means of depth of organization in time and range in space is taken as the criterion of rationality, there can be no doubt that all African societies were primitive or traditional in comparison with the European societies with which they came into sudden and often violent contact in the nineteenth century. This is an important conclusion, since the aspects of bureaucracy just reviewed actually seem to have the nature of rules of procedure for that rational behavior. Native societies therefore could be expected to display them much less prominently as forms of behavior, as they display a smaller capacity for organization. That is, hierarchy, which has been defined here in terms of ranks and levels of control and deference (number of levels in the pyramid) and degree to which control and deference are unilateral, would be less developed and would probably be accompanied by a lesser degree of differentiation of function. The tendency would be to accept ascription rather than achievement as the criterion for office, and the individual would be constrained from compartmentalizing his relationships mentally, as the criteria of avoidance, specificity and universality or responsibility would tend to force him to do. All three of these operate to prevent non-organizational aspects of life from interfering with organizational aspects.

Bureaucracy and Social Communication

It has already been assumed that the British use of hierarchy in their African territories involves the aspects of bureaucracy discussed above. If this is the case, then the more the various aspects

are stressed, the greater will be the tendency for the African official to become isolated from his social base. No other conclusion can be reached, if one considers how every aspect of bureaucracy operates to separate the area of activity of the organizational structure from areas of activity outside of it. The principle of hierarchy itself works in this way, since it essentially consists in the right to the last word and to choose the conditions under which consultation takes place with "the public". Since the African official must give deference to his European supervisors, this limits the amount of leeway he has in what his last word will be (in other words, how much bargaining can take place with other Africans with whom he is dealing), and compels him to restrict consultation. To the extent that other Africans do not comprehend the system of administration, of course, the official can abuse these excuses and assume a domineering attitude. The differentiation of functions, or, more properly in this instance, the augmentation of functions, may contribute to this, because the African tribesman may not understand the limitations the rules of procedure of the organizational structure are supposed to place on the official, with respect to the new functions. Even if he does, of course, he may refuse to the official the cooperation necessary to perform the function. The two tendencies have quite opposite consequences for the official's competence in fact, but in either case the isolating tendency of differentiation of function will be a root cause.

More important, from the standpoint of individual behavior of officials, is the isolating or compartmentalizing feature of the other aspects of bureaucracy. Achievement rather than ascription as the

basis of qualification for a position substitutes individual capaci-
ties for what are likely to be qualities closely bound up with social
relationships such as kinship, friendship or simply membership. Uni-
versalism, affective neutrality and specificity tend to focus the of-
ficial view on matters which officially come to hand, on formal rela-
tionships falling within the definition provided by legitimate competence.
Relationships not directly pertinent to and functional for the organ-
izational objectives as realized through the activities of holders of
particular positions definitely take second priority in the ideal bur-
eaucratic situation. Efficiency - getting the job done adequately
with the smallest expenditure of time, energy and other resources - is
the prime consideration. This implies rationality, because appropri-
ate means must be chosen to achieve utmost efficiency. But the job or
function and the standards of adequacy by which efficiency is measured
are set by the policy objectives; the official down the line of com-
mand or supervision has little part to play in this larger field for
rationality. He will be cut off from his social base, therefore, to
the extent that through the operation of the hierarchical and other
aspects of bureaucracy he adjusts his behavior to the organization -
deferring to others and in turn exercising control in terms of purposes
which are not those of his associates outside the organization, or nec-
essarily of friends inside it.

The true bureaucrat and the truly bureaucratic organization hold
the rest of the world at arm's length. This is so universal a trait
that it has made "bureaucrat" an epithet in many circles, and has given
rise to a literature stressing the tendency almost to the point of gross

exaggeration.[1] There is said to be an "iron law of oligarchy"; i.e.,
hierarchy is hypothesized as a self-generating phenomenon once a begin-
ning is made. The "pathology" of bureaucracy, which includes such
things as a tendency to substitute means for ends, is emphasized. This
literature indicates the extent to which the isolation of the member of
a modern bureaucracy may actually take place, although the insistence
on it seems somewhat strident.

Organizational Structure and African Competence

With this background, it is feasible to pursue the discussion
in terms of a model of technical competence - competence in fact rela-
tionships which it is to be hoped will provide a route of attack upon
many of the problems of explanation and prediction encountered in Afri-
can political systems. If both technical competence and competence in
fact are thought of as continua, it being possible to place any partic-
ular performance along a line between the points of no or low compe-
tence and high competence, then all of the possible relationships
between the two aspects of competence can be shown on a diagram, as
follows:

Technical Competence

A   (High)   (Low)   B

C   C'   D'   D
    (Small scope for initiative)   (Large scope for initiative)
              Competence in Fact

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[1]The most prominent examples are Roberto Michels, Political
Parties, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949); Philip Selznick,

The extremes in relationships between technical and factual competence are thus four in number: A - C, A - D, B - C, and B - D. The markings C' and D' indicate other possible relationships of great importance, which will be discussed in the following pages, in conjunction with detailed examination of this diagram and of the different kinds of empirical relationships to which the extremes approximate or bear characteristic resemblances.

The logically possible situations within the scope of this diagram may be divided into two kinds: those tending toward states of technical and factual competence, and the relationships between them, which the British colonial administrators wished to see come about, and those situations other than the desired ones, the latter representing problems of receptivity with which the administrators would have to cope. They will be discussed in this order.

In the discussion of the Mende, four stages of policy were distinguished. These aimed, with different degrees of emphasis, at two general kinds of goals. The first was to get certain things done. The first two stages of policy stressed this heavily, and even in the third stage it received the heavier stress. The incorporation of an existing hierarchy of positions into the organizational structure, or in other cases than the Mende, the creation of such a hierarchy and the subsequent elaboration of it, indicates this. The second kind of goal was to try to relate the general body of tribesmen to the activities of the African political system. The existence of such a relationship

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"An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy", American Sociological Review, February, 1943, and Robert K. Merton in some of the essays in his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949).

was pretty well taken for granted in the first two stages of policy, became an object of concern in the third, and its evolution only became of truly central interest in the fourth, the policy system of representation.

The first kind of goal may be called hierarchical, because here the concern was to develop an organizational or bureaucratic structure to do efficiently the things which colonial policy required to be accomplished. The second may be called polyarchical, since it was concerned with how the many accepted what was supposed to be done for or to them, rather than with getting what was supposed to be done actually accomplished. To revert to the concepts central to this chapter, the first kind of goal might be said to be primarily a matter of technical competence X, the second of competence in fact Y, and one or the other will be stressed according to the character of the result or goal Z which is desired.[1]

Turning to the diagram, one can say that the whole trend in working toward getting things done was to develop a relationship between technical and factual competence approximating to A - C, for this relationship combines the maximum of emphasis on technical competence with the minimum of emphasis on competence in fact. Some discussion will be in order to elucidate this statement.

It has been said that organizational structure implies a policy, a set of organizational objectives. Each position in a structure, to the extent that it is effectively organized, involves a function or set of activities contributing to the accomplishment of the organizational

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[1] This sentence refers of course to the formula stated on page 155.

objectives. The objectives thus determine the general nature of the function, but the rules of procedure of the structure, by virtue of their nature as a blueprint for carrying out the function in coordination with functions of other positions in the organization, fix its peculiar characteristics for that position. However, a distinction can be made among rules of procedure by reference to how particular their application may be. One kind of rule may be called the technical norm, which is more or less specific to the position and function - a secretary is supposed to meet certain standards of manual dexterity in typing and stenography, an agricultural specialist should know a good deal about farming techniques and problems, an "expediter" needs above all to know whom he should see about particular problems. Another kind are what might be called moral norms. They are not specific to a position, but are widely applicable - such as the rule that eight hours a day _should_ be put in on the job.

The aspects of bureaucracy discussed above constitute a sort of codification of certain such moral norms, taken at a highly general level. These aspects exist, it would appear, independent of any particular functions, positions or technical norms, as attributes of whole organizations which, by virtue of their possession of them, are called bureaucracies.

In the instances examined here, these aspects of bureaucracy or moral norms are transplanted to African soil. They become part of the technical competence sought in the African official. The individual who conforms to them closely will adquire a higher rating in technical competence. But since, as noted, emphasis on these aspects of bureau-

cracy tends to isolate and restrict the individual official, his scope for initiative will be decreased. To the extent that the norms are enforced upon and hold him close to the set of activities defined for his position, other courses of action will be blocked to him. Therefore, technical competence is emphasized in the relationship at the expense of competence in fact.

It would be going too far to say that a main objective of British policy has been to establish the relationship A - C, insofar as the administrative functions of the African political system are concerned. The relationship is an extreme variation, approximated, perhaps, only by the squad of recruits on the drill ground, who are called upon to conform to the bureaucratic norms at their most extreme, and whose only scope for initiative is to faint. A more precise statement would be to describe the relationship as A - C', thus taking into account the scope for initiative which would ordinarily lie within the legitimate competence of the holder of a position, as part of the function of the position. This leaves room for deviation from the theoretical ideal of the bureaucratic structure in the direction of too little competence in fact (the case of the "man between" who must rely entirely on higher authority, the clerk so enamored of the rules that he fails or refuses to take action which in terms of competence in fact is open to him).

Just as the relationship A - C approximates most closely of the four extremes in the diagram to the theoretically ideal structure for getting things done, so does the relationship A - D approximate most nearly of the four to the ideal which the British aimed at in trying

to relate the tribesman to the African political system. In the context, emphasis in seeking this kind of goal is on competence in fact, on the problem of assuring that courses of action will not be blocked by the action or inaction of the public which they involve. Since this is so, the relationship A - D is the only one of the four which could be chosen as a situation at which to aim in connection with such a goal. It is the only one which maximizes competence in fact and technical competence, which any authority will also want at the same time.

While remembering the relativity of the term noted several pages back, one can call this relationship polyarchical because of its concern for public reaction. The competence in fact of officials is stressed, and such stress necessarily involves the question of means of eliciting deference. Therefore, some relations of mutual deference and control will result. The moral questions involved are not of the same order as those in the relationship A - C or C', where the concern is more with some defined, organizational objective, and the bureaucratic norms provide the moral atmosphere for the activity. This relationship can be called hierarchical because of this condition, in which the objective and the moral or bureaucratic norms together contribute to the development of clear lines of control and deference in the structure. Utilizing these, those in authority, having the moral right to the last word, can regulate the range of duties and criteria of performance of subordinates. It is this control, combined with knowledge on the part of the general public concerned with the structure, which gives the relationship A - C' that low competence in fact which is one

of its defining characteristics.

A - C and A - D are in fact complementary to each other, and the distinction between them is familiar, as that made between executive and representative, or administrative and political functions and positions. The logic of the distinction is clear: the executive or administrative type relationship between technical and factual competence should reflect unilateral control, circumspection and isolation from social objectives other than the organizational one, while the representative or political relationship should reflect reciprocal control and a wider field for debate regarding purposes. At this point it might be noted that with the relationship A - D as with the previous one, it would be going too far to say that British policy has taken relatively unlimited competence in fact as the ideal. Such a broad scope for initiative implies almost no reciprocal control at all; Plato's "philosopher king" would be a close approximation. But the ideal of democracy calls for a relationship more like A - D', a formulation which indicates reciprocal controls on officials, and hence some definite limits to competence in fact.

The distinction between executive and representative as terms for characterizing positions in a structure lies in the difference in the weighting of technical and factual competence in the two kinds of relationship.[1] The positions of chief and clerk may be used to illustrate

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[1]This difference essentially reflects the classical distinction between politics and administration: one is akin to deciding, the other to doing. See F. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York, Mac-Millan, 1900), whose entire book is based on this distinction. To do something requires technical competence, but it presupposes the competence in fact to do it, and when the obtaining of assurance of the latter is separated as activity from performance of the task requiring

this point. The chief's position in the social structure was incorporated into the organizational structure mainly because of the competence in fact he was presumed to enjoy with regard to his fellow tribesmen. To be effective, from the viewpoint of the colonial administration, therefore, the current holder of the position must not only possess a modicum of technical competence, but even more important, the competence in fact anticipated when the organizational structure was established. The clerk, on the other hand, holds a position created to get certain things done in the administration of the chiefdom. His is not the chief's job of integration of purposes, or the physical representation of a settled course of action, but of execution of purposes. Therefore, the same competence in fact is not required of the clerk. The weight of emphasis in judgment of his performance will fall more on technical than on factual competence.[1]

technical competence, then the executive and representative, or political and administrative types of positions can be distinguished from one another by the respective weights placed on the two aspects of competence.

[1]It seems to be very common, however, for greater weight to be placed on technical competence, regardless of the position involved. Judgment of the chief as a political figure is skewed by the fact of incorporation of his position into the organizational structure; the legitimacy of his position is thus made absolute in the eyes of the colonial official. This seems to be the explanation of the frequently noted tendency of colonial officials to deprecate "political" activity and to insist upon the primacy of "administrative" considerations - technically competent performance - in African political systems. They want the cues which they supply to be responded to, for it is an organizational necessity that the legitimated rules of procedure be followed in carrying out the functions for which the organization was created in the current form. And as time goes on and more functions are imposed upon the holders of positions in the local political system under the policy of reform, the more important does it become for effective work in a complex situation that "disturbing factors" arising in the social structure of which the African official is a part should not interfere with reception of cues and conformity with the organizational rules

The inquiry can now turn to the kinds of relationships between factual and technical competence which the British did not desire. The relationship B - C represents the completely unsatisfactory performance mentioned in earlier discussion of the "man between". Very low technical or personal competence to perform a task is combined with low competence in fact; the lack of both recommendations would make performance unsatisfactory whether the position was one in which technical competence was stressed, or in which competence in fact was the prime consideration.

The last of the four extremes of relationship, B - D, holds perhaps the most interesting opportunities for analysis. The relationship of low technical competence and high competence in fact must always be viewed from the standpoint provided by the analysis of policy as a state of moving equilibrium. A change in policy is a change in the state of equilibrium of the system, a recognition of such a change or a combination of both in what is essentially a prediction of what will occur in the future. As pointed out earlier, a feature of policy predictions is their character as self-fulfilling prophecies, as those who set the policy attempt to have it carried out. Certain actions

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of procedure.

This point seems to have a bearing on the comment by Lord Hailey that indirect rule aimed rather at economic and social reforms than at political change. Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories (5 Parts; London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1950-1953), Part IV, p. 6. Change and reform were to be accomplished within the existing framework of "native institutions". It was thus pretty well assumed that there would be no great problems of competence in fact, that procedures for settling questions about what was to be done - insofar as they would be needed on the local level to facilitate administration of the reforms - would develop within the existing political structure. Such an assumption would of course much strengthen a British tendency to resist attempts to raise the question of competence in fact of the chief.

intended to bring about certain results are called for, and the particular standards by which technical competence is rated are projections of these expectations.

All that is required to change the ratings for technical competence, therefore, are changes in policy which move the system to a new state of equilibrium. The use of some illustrations will clarify this point. One feature of British colonial policy which is profoundly annoying to some African intelligentsia is the insistence that civil servants should not participate in politics. This insistence is of course part and parcel of the moral norms called here the aspects of bureaucracy. An African official violating the code of bureaucratic norms is *ipso facto* not technically competent to the extent that he does so, and the more so if he recruits a following whose concerns cause him to neglect his work, or worse, to use his position to advance these outside interests. But a change of policy, perhaps revising the organizational structure so that the African official finds a place on a local government council, will provide a new definition of technical competence. Abruptly, if the policy-makers are lucky, the relationship B - D may become something closely resembling A - D.

The same analysis may be applied to agitators operating outside the organizational structure, although, strictly speaking, no question of technical competence would arise because none was defined for them. Such agitators, if policy is redefined in response to the strain which they place upon the old equilibrium through their high competence in fact, may conceivably show a high technical competence in the readjusted political system, thus contributing to the success of policy by the

same personal capacities which formerly upset the equilibrium of the system.

Illustrations of movement in the other direction may be drawn from the Mende material. For example, the Mende chiefs leading the Hut Tax rebellion were decidedly technically incompetent, although possessed of high competence in fact. The same may be said of the treasury clerk who embezzled funds, but in this case the competence in fact - the ability to proceed without being blocked by others - is as untoward from the viewpoint of the organizational structure as lack of technical competence, whereas it was not in the case of the Mende chief.

Conclusion

This chapter constitutes a beginning in the attack on the problem of rounding out the conceptual scheme which has been derived from an examination of the administrative history of the Mende under colonial rule. The objectives of this broadening out process are two, one growing to a considerable extent out of the other. First, concentration on administrative history is concentration on policy or organizational structure, and therefore constitutes undue emphasis on the behavior of the colonial administrator and the behavior he desired from the African. The behavior of the African, as influenced by a variety of factors including colonial policy, must be taken fully into account as well. The technique used here is to proceed from the foundations provided by the conceptual scheme as a system of interrelated elements, utilizing competence (of the African participant in the political system) as the central concept. To this concept the other concepts in the scheme should ideally be more and more closely related

in the course of research, as additional causal relations are determined. Second, and dependent on the orientation to African behavior, because only the change to this orientation will bring the student face to face with the fact of extreme variety in African social structures, the conceptual scheme must be adapted to utilization for comparative work among African political systems.

Only a beginning could be made in this chapter toward achievement of either objective, for fruitful comparative work depends upon awareness of the significant points to be taken into account in making comparisons in any particular instance. Modern biology does not classify whales with sharks, on the ground that the habitat of both is the water, but this is because members of the profession are aware of other significant points of comparison which, when used, give leads to much more basic understanding of both species. Unfortunately, this consideration carries right back to colonial policy and the behavior desired from the African, for comparison of the reactions or receptivity of various tribal systems to European control would have to have reference to what the colonial authorities aimed to accomplish.[1] What was needed were significant points or characteristics of the organizational structure, as the embodiment of colonial policy. The bulk of the chapter, therefore, was devoted to developing a typology for organizational structure.

It was undertaken to derive this typology or set of significant

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[1]Because, from the political scientist's viewpoint, at least, these aims are the common denominator of the African political systems being compared. They are the magnet that draws the attention of those interested in the study of politics, and it is differential achievement in terms of them which leads to the quest for causal relations to explain the differences in results.

characteristics in terms of hierarchy and polyarchy, which were asserted to be the two major tendencies in British colonial policy. Hierarchy was then used as a pointer to five other aspects of bureaucratic organization. Hierarchy, achievement, avoidance, specificity and universalism constitute the typology of organizational structure developed here. Differentiation of functions is excluded as a historical phenomenon rather than something directly observable from individual behavior. Since, on the basis of the hierarchy - polyarchy distinction, two major types of positions in the organizational structure had been distinguished - the administrative and the representative - it was possible to leave the matter in this state. The administrative role in the context of British colonial rule stresses the five selected aspects of bureaucracy; the representative role does not.

Having determined some characteristics of the organizational structure which were significant and which provided some bases for comparative work by virtue of their generality, the inquiry moved a step further in the twelve pages prior to this section to relate the characteristics to the competence of the "man between". In conjunction with a diagram, it was shown what kind of characteristics the British sought to utilize or develop in African officials, and how technical and factual competence featuring these characteristics would stand both in relation to undesired competences and to each other. Making this connection between characteristics and competences desired and not desired of course permits a shift to the objective of taking into account the behavior of the African official as the receiver of cues and his success or failure in transmitting them to the African

population effectively. It opens the way to attempts to determine why actual competences do or do not measure up to the standards set by the prescriptions of the organizational structure, and thus to explain the comparative receptivity to cues of various African political systems.

This presentation determines the problem to be attacked in the next chapter: the examination of questions of analysis and characterization which arise in connection with study and comparative work on the evolution of competences from the pre-contact situation. If second only to the behavior of the colonial officials is the receptivity to cues from those officials and others, the receptivity being measured by the competence of the "man between", then the central problem of analysis must be to try to explain and predict the incidence of such competence. This involves examination of the evolution of technical competence, of competence in fact and of the resulting permutations of the relationships between the two, the possibilities of which are indicated by the diagram.

Accordingly, it is necessary to ask about the effect, upon these competences and their relationships, of alterations in the internal and external balances of the political system. This seems logically to entail inquiry concerning (1) the impact upon African tribal leaders, or members of a tribe raised to office by the British, of the behavior and activities of the colonial officials, who are of course by definition part of the African political system and its internal balance, and (2) the effects of what has happened to African society and economy - the external balance, the context, of the African political system - subsequent to contact with the West. The next chapter opens with a series of questions directed toward just these points.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COMPETENCE OF THE "MAN BETWEEN"

Evolution of Competence

The examination of the evolution of the technical and factual competence of the "man between" may be organized about a series of four questions. The *first question* is: What has been the effect of colonial rule upon his competence in fact? This question is applicable not only to the impact of the initial phases of colonial policy, but to the progressive and cumulative changes set in motion through instigation of succeeding stages of policy.

Whatever the consequences of colonial policy may be in terms of competence in fact, underlying them must be reasons relating to the way in which, other things being equal, the position and the activities of the "man between" have been modified by the prescriptions of the organizational structure. For this reason, "conflict of roles" is a favorite topic with anthropologists. The *second question* in the series therefore flows from the first: How are observed changes in competence in fact related to changes in sets of activities and hence to definitions of technical competence imposed by the colonial regime? To what extent and why do the prescriptions of the organizational structure, as enforced by the colonial administration, restrict or release the African official with reference to his scope for initiative, his ability to act without being blocked by other Africans in the social unit or

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tribe? Conversely, how are difficulties in obtaining technically competent performance related to problems of maintaining competence in fact? This question of course presumes a choice by the African official to stand well with his people at the expense of his relations with the colonial officials over him.

There was a qualification with regard to the second question. In fact, other things are not equal; technical competence is not to be discussed solely in terms of the pre-contact social structure, the organizational structure and the incompatibilities between the two which may bring about "conflict of roles". Men are adaptable creatures, not utterly bound by the ties of their relationships with others, have different equipment for dealing with problems of role conflict and above all have a relatively high capacity for learning. Life does not stand still, as structural models might make it seem. From these considerations flows a third question of the series. What is the effect on technical competence and hence competence in fact of factors other than structure? Personality, character, experience and training, perhaps provided by the colonial administration, are outstanding factors to be considered under this heading. Of course, the analysis must again take into account the progressive and cumulative changes in the activities and rules of procedure which are introduced by the colonial power from time to time, since these have an important bearing on technical competence.

Out of this question arises the fourth question in the series: If the African official is assumed to be adaptable, then the African man on the street must likewise be presumed to be so. If technical

competence is not to be treated solely in terms of organizational and pre-contact social structure, neither is competence in fact. The deference which competence in fact implies may be given the official on entirely altered bases and within limits quite different from those defined in pre-contact social structure. The question is, therefore: What is the effect on competence in fact of changes in the circumstances, outlook or education of the African population, or of aggregates of individuals within that population?

These questions appear to afford a logically complete framework for further discussion of the evolution of competences. The theory is that the "man between" will, because of his stance with a foot in both camps, be likely to find himself faced with incompatible demands from the structures with which he is involved. The result may be that considerations connected with his role in the social structure will inhibit his response to cues emanating from the organizational structure. Or it may be that cues from the organizational structure will so demand his consideration that they will interfere with his activity in the social structure. If this latter condition arises, it is likely to affect his competence in fact. However, the occurrence of interference is not a certainty nor even a probability in every case, for he may be clever, strong or knowledgeable enough to avoid the pitfalls. By the same token, he may not have the qualities required to carry off this difficult balancing act. Lastly, alterations of competence in fact may arise not only from the impact of organizational prescriptions upon social structure, but also from changes in social structure itself, to which the African official does not adapt himself adequately. These

few sentences canvass the possibilities covered in the four questions put in the introductory paragraphs above.

The questions of this series divide fairly evenly into two groups. The first two have to do with the internal balance of the system, the impact upon African officials of the colonial regime. This is essentially a matter of the contact of the two types of structure and the problems for the African caught between them, but since there is presumably still room for personal initiative in the political system, the third question also comes into the examination of the internal balance.

It is logical to begin examination of the evolution of competence with these two questions, since they carry the inquiry back to the beginning of the African political system as this was established by contact between African and European systems of order. Accordingly, in the next sections only these questions (with the mentioned lapover into the third) and the internal balance of the political system will be considered, leaving the other two and the adaptation of the system to changes in the context of political activity until the final section of this chapter.

Types of Social Structure

To provide basic materials for considering the evolution of the competence of the African official, the next few pages will be devoted to short descriptive accounts of the political aspects of the pre-contact social structure of several African tribes. This material will then be used as background in the subsequent discussion of problems of analysis.

The tribes which are to be discussed are selected because they represent a good spread of types of social structures. The present standard typology of tribal social structures in their political aspects was developed in a volume called <u>African Political Systems</u>[1]:

> Firstly, there are those very small societies . . . in which even the largest political unit embraces a group of people all of whom are united to one another by ties of kinship, so that political relations are coterminous with kinship relations and the political structure and kinship organization are completely fused. Secondly, there are societies in which a lineage structure (descent group) is the framework of the political system, there being a precise coordination between the two, so that they are consistent with each other, though each remains distinct and autonomous in its own sphere. Thirdly, there are societies in which an administrative organization is the framework of the political structure.

Emendations have been made by other students since this was published, a notably useful one being that of Paula Brown,[2] who made the point that the existence of associations, such as the secret societies among the Mende, was an important basis for classification. Short descriptions of a few selected African political structures will illustrate very roughly the various types classified in this manner; however, the first type defined above will be ignored here because it is not important on the African scene.

The Nuer of the Sudan served as a prototype of the second type of system. Here, the typical unit was the small local group of cattle herders and their dependents, each group being identified with

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[1]E. E. Evans-Pritchard and M. Fortes (eds.), <u>African Political Systems</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 6-7.

[2]Paula Brown, "Patterns of Authority in West Africa", <u>Africa</u>, October, 1951, pp. 261-275.

a dominant clan segment, members of which formed the nucleus of the group. Links with other local groups consisted mainly in the kin relationships of this dominant segment, sub-tribes within the whole Nuer ethnic group being identified and set apart through the fact that their component groups were formed about nuclei holding membership in the same clan. By a process of coordination of initiation ceremonies, an age grade system was also shared by numbers of local groups, their youths being initiated into manhood together. Generally, individuals regulated their relations outside their own local group through kinship and age set ties. But the local groups were autonomous to such a degree that this was very nearly the only regulation which took place. The nearest semblance to common political leadership were the specialists from certain clans who had a recognized right to give sanctuary and mediate disputes, or to provide ritual sanction for age set ceremonies. There were no chiefs, no clan heads, and not even the age set was organized.

The Nandi of Kenya are of the second type, for association in the form of age grades plays an important role. The basic unit among the Nandi was the "parish", governed by a council of elders drawn from the inhabitants of the localtiy. A number of these parishes comprised the regimental area, which was a territorial subdivision of the tribal area. Most activities of a political nature were carried on by the parish councils for their localities, descent groups, for example, being widely scattered among localities and therefore tending to seek redress for injuries to kinsmen by going to the parish council of the offender for judgment against him. The regimental areas had councils,

drawn in part from the constituent parish councils, in part from the various age grades into which all of the men of the tribe were organized. The regimental councils concerned themselves mainly with war, rituals and timing of planting, and the regulation of the age grade system, severally for their own regiments and jointly for the tribe. In fact, all of these responsibilities were sometimes coordinated for the tribe by representatives of the regimental councils meeting with the chief "medicine man", who performed mainly ritual and magical duties in these consultations. But there was mainly coordination, not control, at this level; the warrior age sets organized under their chosen leaders in the regimental areas frequently waged war on other tribes separately.

With the Mende political system there is some difficulty in classification, because of the existence of strong associations in the form of the secret societies, but it seems fairly clear that the Mende should be classified as of the third type, because of the existence of an "administrative structure". In this the apparent usage of the editors of African Political Systems is followed: such a structure can be said to exist if there is a hierarchy, as in the Mende system of chiefs, sub- and town-chiefs, speakers and "krubas", or head war-boys, of position-holders conducting as their most important business what is quite recognizably political activity.

The Yao of Nyasaland are an extreme case of the third type. There the basic unit was a group of related women, their husbands and descendants, all in charge of a male from the matrilineal line. New units were created by the splitting off of segments under the leader-

ship of younger males of the matrilineal line. Since the male heads of basic units were "immortal", a sister's son succeeding and being assimilated to the name and generation of his predecessor, the process seems to have created a hierarchy of descent group segments ranged in order of the generation of their founders and therefore of heads of the basic units. The Yao political structure consisted of the chief, a group of councillors heading both junior related and unrelated kinship segments, as well as personal advisers. The councillors often controlled even more junior groups headed by males of their matrilineal line. There was thus an administrative structure, but the kinship segment played a very important role in it. There appear to have been no associations or organized system of age grades among the Yao, however.

At the other extreme of the third type, of course, are such "native states" as Buganda, where there was a "king", supported by a large court including such important officials as ten governors of districts, a "prime minister", queen mother and queen sister. The governors had authority over numerous deputies and sub-deputies in charge of parts of the kingdom, and the numerous courtiers frequently had large estates and their own retinues. It was said that "there is hardly a man in Uganda who does not hold an office of some kind".[1] There was thus a very complex hierarchy, and although kinship was a criterion for appointment and the clans were organized to some extent, the administrative structure was the predominant feature which struck all observers.

These thumbnail sketches all utilize certain points of reference

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[1]Quoted without citation in George P. Murdock, Our Primitive Contemporaries (New York: MacMillan, 1934), p. 528.

to organize the presentation of the descriptive material, dividing the structure of the society into various categories accordingly. The basic patterns of such structuring seem to be four.[1] They may be called the administrative, locality, age grade or association, and kinship substructures. In the examples cited, they appear in various combinations. Among the Nuer, common habitation of a locality was of greatest significance in the life of the tribesmen, while kinship furnished a certain minimal basis in ordering relationships among local groups. Age grading was of relatively minor importance, while administrative structure was non-existent. The Nandi system utilized both locality and age grade, the former being the exclusive principle in the parish and appearing in combination with the age grade in the regimental area. Kinship seems to have counted for little, while the administrative structure was minimal, for although at least three levels of decision-making can be distinguished, it was on the locality level that most political questions were dealt with. Among the Mende, kinship was important, because descent group membership was a major criterion of who should hold office; but administrative structure was superimposed upon it, so kinship counted for far less than the whole. But locality and the accompanying phenomenon of association, while subordinated to administrative structure, definitely modified it to a considerable extent. The fact that the chief did not select his sub- or town chiefs, if the situation was a settled one, and apparently did not exercise direct control over

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[1] In the case of the Nandi, it could be maintained that there was a fifth distinct structure, the ideological, which was of significance in the political system. The chief "medicine man" commanded a certain deference on this basis, and therefore had a part to play in political activity.

the Poro, supports this viewpoint.

The kinship structure was extremely important among the Yao, of course, because to it were so closely joined the locality and administrative structures. However, the latter existed to a varying extent, depending on the prowess of the chief as a slaver and trader, apart from or beyond the kinship hierarchy. There was no age grade substructure, although young men were put through initiation rites.

Bureaucracy, Communication and Kinship

The important thing about these sub-structures is how they were related in any particular tribal structure to the aspects of activity or the element of integration called the political system. For this reason, the last paragraphs were devoted to a brief review of the relative significance of these structures in several of the tribal political systems. What is meant by significance is this: that activity within the limits of any particular sub-structure accounts for a greater or lesser proportion of the total activity in the society which is concerned with deciding what is to be done, as well as by whom, how and when.

Just as these sub-structures of activity will almost certainly account for parts of the total political process, so will they also account to varying extents for the other elements of integration which appear as aspects of behavior. Some of the names assigned sub-structures, in particular the kinship and the ideological sub-structures, are explicit indications of this sort, pointing to significance for analytical systems other than the political.

It has been suggested, with reference to the Mende, that the

administrative and kinship structures were of particular significance in that phase of the tribal political system relating to the selection of the chief. This discussion of the relationship of administrative and kinship structures can be extended, in order to tie together certain points made in this and the preceding chapter.

The substructure of administration is predominantly political, since this is the "element of integration" appearing most prominently as an aspect of the concrete acts of the participants. The kinship structure may be called fundamentally biological, since its basic activities relate to the conditions for maintaining the personnel of the society; but the close alignment of kinship with locality and association in Mende society means that several other of the elements of integration are important and with kinship structure provide a key to understanding Mende social structure as a whole.

When an individual participates in a predominantly political and a predominantly biological structure at the same time, the political aspects of his concrete acts must be to a certain extent intertwined with the biological aspects. Obviously, the extent to which one aspect bears a relation to the other may vary widely from society to society. Among the Mende, the association was close for at least two reasons: the choice of holders of positions in the administrative structure was largely on the basis of kinship, and about the blood tie or biological nexus there was organized a widespread net of activity involving very significantly several elements of integration as modes of that activity. The position in the administrative structure was in a sense an extension of the kinship structure, and therefore the flow

of needs and purposes, for whose fulfillment the administrative struc-
ture existed, was channeled through and given character in great part
by the kinship structure.

Along with the predominantly political aspect of activity in the
administrative structure, then, there was a (fundamentally) biological
aspect; no clear dividing line apparently existed between the two as-
pects as they manifested themselves in concrete acts. The rules of
procedure governing activity in the administrative structure did not
limit communication with relatives and dependents to certain times,
places and occasions, or to kinds of cues strictly appropriate to ac-
tivities of the administrative structure, when the holder of a position
in that structure was ostensibly engaged in activities of a political
nature.

This interpenetration of kinship with other kinds of structures
is familiar, and can be observed widely in Africa and elsewhere. The
kinsman fortunate in business is expected to provide for needy relations,
the politically powerful man to throw his influence behind kin desiring
some boon or other. Nepotism reigns in the official's retinue; favor-
able judgments are demanded of the relative presiding over court sessions.

To take another example, however, kinship structure was of vir-
tually no importance to such administrative structure as existed among
the Nandi. Officials apparently were not chosen with an eye to their
blood ties, and the range of needs and purposes fulfilled through ac-
tivity oriented to the kinship tie was small in comparison to the Mende.
For example, the locality structure controlled the land and the meting
out of justice, and neither this structure nor the age grade structure

was aligned with that of kinship, kin being scattered.

This contrast of social structures must give one pause. The British brought hierarchy and the other bureaucratic norms to both; as noted in the preceding chapter, the implication of this is a cutting of communication with the social unit, so that on the job the exchange of cues is limited to the sphere of the set of activities prescribed in the organizational structure. The difference between the two social structures suggests the hypothesis that, other things being equal, the Nandi officials might generally conform more closely to the norms than the Mende. The latter might be almost compelled to mingle activities in the kinship structure with those of the administrative structure, as formerly. The Nandi official on the other hand, starts fresh, neither owing his position to kinship ties nor being involved in a large, tightly woven kinship structure through which are communicated cues relating to fulfillment of a large variety of ends. Whatever his competence in fact, then, it might be easier for him to achieve the desired level of technical competence (insofar as the "moral" or bureaucratic norms are concerned) than it would be for his Mende counterpart.

Here is suggested, then, a characteristic of social structure which might explain differentials in receptivity to cues among African political systems - in this case, cues relating to observance of the bureaucratic norms. It is by some such method as this that a fuller knowledge of the bearing of the pre-contact social structure on what goes on in African political systems must be developed. For this reason, it is worthwhile to examine some problems which arise in deriving hypotheses in this way, and no better procedure exists for doing this

than examining generalizations which have been made in the past about African political systems.

Social Structure and Analysis of Competences

The British everywhere in Africa tended to adopt a distinctly hierarchical form of organizational structure. Where a suitable African hierarchy seemed to exist, the positions in it were assimilated into the organizational structure. Where one was lacking, poorly defined or unsuitable for reasons such as manifest hostility of the holders of positions in it, a hierarchy was evolved. Thus, among the Mende, the hierarchy was adapted to the needs of administration without fundamental change, and much the same thing happened with the Ganda. To cope with the Nandi, however, it became necessary, after some futile efforts to administer through the apparent leadership in the regimental councils, to appoint "headmen" over various "locations", which approximated somewhat the regimental areas. These men carried out the instructions of the colonial administrator and in so doing utilized the services of the parish elders in such matters as tax collection, road-making and the hearing of cases. As for the Yao, the fact that the propensities of the chiefs for slave-raiding had forced the British to fight a war to put them down apparently caused the administration to by-pass the old leaders. Reliance was placed on appointees, who were indeed headmen of local settlements but not necessarily men of moment in pre-contact times, to carry out the will of the administration.

The question under consideration here is how such manipulations affected the behavior of the "man between" in his relations with his fellow Africans, and thus, presumably, the bases upon which deference

was elicited and the competence in fact achieved as a consequence of such deference. The editors of <u>African Political Systems</u> ventured the following generalization on this point:

> In the societies (in which an administrative sub-structure had existed) the paramount ruler is prohibited, by the constraint of the colonial government, from using the organized force at his command on his own responsibility. This has everywhere resulted in diminishing his authority and generally in increasing the power and independence of his subordinates. . . . If he capitulates entirely, he may become a mere puppet of the colonial government. He loses the support of his people because the pattern of reciprocal rights and duties which bound him to them is destroyed. Alternatively, he may be able to safeguard his former status, to some extent, by openly or covertly leading the opposition which his people inevitably feel toward alien rule. . . .
>
> In the societies (of the segmentary type, lacking administrative structure), European rule has had the opposite effect. The colonial government cannot administer through aggregates of individuals composing political segments, but has to employ administrative agents. For this purpose, it makes use of any persons who can be assimilated to the stereotyped notion of an African chief. These agents for the first time have the backing of force behind their authority, now, moreover, extending into spheres for which there is no precedent. This tends to lead to the whole system of mutually balancing segments collapsing and a bureaucratic European system taking its place. An organization more like that of a centralized state comes into being.[1]

The language used in this statement - references to sanctions, rights and duties - implies that the African societies under consideration were structured systems of action. An examination of the various studies upon which the generalization is based would reveal data solidly backing up this supposition that they were composed of elements closely interrelated and interdependent with one another in a pattern of activity.

It may be asked what originally generated such a hypothesis.

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[1]Evans-Pritchard, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 15.

The ultimate answer must be that the particular African society was identified and observed to be persisting over time as a recognizable entity. Then (1) the fact of persistence was interpreted as meaning that the society was in a state of equilibrium, which (2) stimulated the search for elements in the society "documenting" or constituting an explanation of that state through their character and the pattern of their interrelationships.

The fact of persistence and the structure of interdependent elements which explain it underlie the generalization just quoted. They may be regarded as together forming a postulate of equilibrium, which states that the condition of the elements and of their interrelationships in a society at the time of contact with Europeans was such that a tendency toward change in one element was counteracted by other elements so that the situation existing prior to the first movement tended to persist – that is, the society continued to persist in its environment. The generalization of course utilizes this postulate. for the main theme is the place of the element of force as a basis for control of deviant behavior and hence for the state of equilibrium of the tribal society.

The fundamental assumption is that gratification and deprivation are the basic factors motivating human social behavior. There are needs and purposes which can only be fulfilled through relationships with others. Motivated by the impulse to gratify these, men participate in complex social arrangements. In the going social structure, there is assumed to be a certain fulfillment of needs and purposes accomplished through its persisting pattern, for one generalized condi-

tion for a state of equilibrium is that there must exist a minimum net balance - a balance greater than that achievable through other arrangements - of gratification in relationships in order that they may persist. As Homans puts the argument:

> Control is the process by which, if a man departs from his present degree of obedience to a norm, his behavior is brought back toward that degree . . . . Control can be effective only when that degree of obedience is the one that produces the greatest amount of satisfaction of the man's sentiments possible under the existing state of the system, so that any departure whatever from that degree brings a decrease in satisfaction, a net punishment.[1]

Any change in degree of adherence to rules of procedure by some participant in a structure presumably alters the balance of gratification and thereby sets in motion some reaction by other participants in the structure. They will attempt to deprive the violator of support they give for the fulfillment of his needs, thus supposedly reducing his balance of gratification in retaliation, and likewise tend to reward good performance by the opposite procedure. This means that a loss or a gain of gratification will result in a corresponding loss or gain of deference. The converse of course is that a minimum net balance of gratification is the foundation of the deference - control relationship. Thus, a change in what may be expected of the "man between" or, on the other side of the coin, in what a population is obliged to concede him, may change this net balance, and hence change competence in fact. Or again, the "man between" may be able even to gain competence in fact by appropriate manipulation of reward and punishment.

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[1]George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 298.

What this generalization says is that such changes in competence in fact have been brought about by the action of the colonial administration in augmenting or limiting the capacity of the "man between" to reward or to punish. It is a classic statement of "conflict of role", in which the African leader is described as being prodded or enjoined, under the new rules of procedure imposed by the colonial regime, to behavior which threatens or actually does upset the state of equilibrium by forcing him to cease to conform to the rules of the social structure. This alters the balance of gratification and thus changes his ability to exercise control. If, for example, the chief in the African tribe commanded a certain force, equilibrium would exist if he were able to inflict on any who dared to refuse deference to him punishment which would bring about deprivation relative to the gratification actually obtainable by giving deference. Then, on the basis of this postulate of equilibrium, it would be possible to predict, as the quoted statement does, that a reduction in the force available to him might prevent punishment of deviation and subsequent return to obedience as the more gratifying course. The result would in this case be loss of competence in fact.

It may be pertinently asked how apt, useful or even correct the generalization may be in its present form. If it is tested against the data on the Mende, it will be found that there was not the loss of competence in fact predicted for tribes possessing an administrative substructure. Alldridge thought in fact there was a net gain, despite various restrictions on the use of force. But the case of the slaves is instructive with regard to the effect of these restrictions. With

the opening of physical communications and the measures of pacification introduced by the British, they might have been expected to withdraw the deference they paid to their masters and either run away or buy their freedom. The vast majority did neither, but continued to accept their lot. The reason appears to have been the lack of alternative means of livelihood; their masters claimed the land, the economy was an agricultural one, and this meant accepting the position which was accorded them. The social structure thus remained as it had been despite the presumed dissolving effect of prohibitions on force.

The matter of elections of chiefs among the Mende is another case where the hypothesis seems to fall short. It was indicated earlier that several descent groups usually had a claim to the chieftaincy. One apparent result of colonial rule has been that candidates have become much more numerous, now that restraints are placed on the use of force. The chiefdom politics involved in this new situation supply the administration with some severe problems of competence in fact, as some of the data cited in Chapter V indicate.

This development seems at first glance to confirm the generalization - until it is noted that apparently it is the exception rather than the rule that problems of this sort become severe. The motivations toward expeditious and mildly contested selection may have been reduced by the restraints placed on the use of force, but a remedy has been available. The colonial officials have consistently demanded that the Tribal Authority make the choice without advice from above, either unanimously or by a heavy majority.[1] So insistent are they on the latter

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[1] In a debate in the Protectorate Assembly the government spokesman insisted upon a majority of 80 per cent as standard, against the

point that the Tribal Authority may be convened over and over again
until a satisfactory degree of consensus is achieved. One chiefdom re-
cently went for eleven years without a chief pending sufficient agree-
ment on one candidate.[1]

Two examples have been cited to show that, at least for the Men-
de, the restrictions on force imposed by a colonial power did not result
in reduced competence in fact. The generalization is to that extent
disproved, and it might be asked why it was incorrect in this instance.
The answer seems to lie in the orientation to the tribal society as a
persisting entity, in the postulate of equilibrium, and in the mode of
analysis which arises out of it.

This postulate is entirely valid only so long as the environment
of the relationship, the situation in which the society is persisting
as a functioning whole, remains the same. In the elections of Mende
chiefs, restraints on force produced deviation in the form of more can-
didatures. But the situation differed in other respects also - the in-
sistence of the administration on an agreed choice before it would
recognize a chief. One part of the difficulty in applying the general-
ization, with its postulate of equilibrium to the new situation of col-
onial rule is thus precisely that there is a whole new situation of
action. If X changes, then Y will also change; this is the simple sit-
uation for prediction assumed in the quoted item, X being force, in

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60 per cent backed by the African members, apparently more deeply im-
bued with Democracy. Sierra Leone, Protectorate Assembly: Proceedings
of Fifth Meeting at Bo, the Third, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh May, 1949
(Freetown: Government Printer, 1949), pp. 55-61.

[1]Sierra Leone, Report on the Administration of the Provinces,
1953, par. 112.

that case. But the more complex the changes, the more problematical will be application of the postulate of equilibrium. The hypothesis will have to be qualified; if X changes, Y will change predictably, provided prior or concurrent changes have not affected the relationship as it was determined to be previously.

It is this very situation which the authors of the generalization encountered in formulating their proposition. While attributing changes in competence largely to augmentation of or restrictions on force, they had to introduce a proviso qualifying their assertions, noting that the chief may safeguard his position by espousing the opposition which his people feel toward the colonial regime.

It may be, and as time passes it will be more likely, therefore, that under colonial rule and the new conditions it brings a number of changes will have occurred, so that change in Y will no longer be explicable on the basis of the function of a formerly operative factor X as a condition for the maintenance of equilibrium. This is of course true in the case of the election of Mende chiefs, where the prediction that restrictions on force would strengthen devisive tendencies, while partially borne out by the evidence, was falsified by increased emphasis on getting a consensus.

When results of change begin to vary from those expected on the basis of a knowledge of the relationships and elements in the social structure and their contribution to the persistence of the pre-contact society, then the problem of the anthropologist analyzing a tribal political structure under the impact of colonial rule becomes much like that faced in this paper. Starting from a situation which no longer

exists[1] (the state of equilibrium of the pre-contact society), he tries to establish causal connections between actual events and that pre-existing equilibrium, just as the problem here is to explain the gap between the moving equilibrium envisaged in policy-making, and actual events. Social structure and the postulate of equilibrium can no longer be relied upon when roots of behavior in the balance of gratification become confused through processes of change, so that it is impossible to say with assurance that an individual or a group will react to change in a specific way.

At this point a survey of what study of social structure reveals is in order. There are, first, motivations associated with social structure. They are of three characters: those stemming from factors such as force and the means of livelihood, as in the case of the Mende slaves; those arising out of beliefs, an example being acceptance by the slaves of their masters' claim to the land, a claim founded in part on beliefs in ancestors and their spirits; and those stemming directly from the fact of structure and the rules of procedure. The group feeling which the chief might exploit to safeguard his position in a colonial situation is an example. Another is the continued acceptance by the Mende of the chieftaincy and the practice of filling the post by resort to candidacy of men representing kinship structures, even when standard procedures for filling it expeditiously and with assurance that public order would be preserved were sadly lacking.

In addition to these types of motivating factors, there is a

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[1]Or in any event cannot be proved to exist, since the tribal society cannot be returned to the pre-contact environment to find out whether or not it could survive despite changes in structure.

network of communication associated with a structure, for the rules of procedure regulating activities imply interrelationships through which cues are passed. Furthermore, there must be technical competence to carry on activities, and such technical competence implies competence in fact to the extent that the consequences of these activities for others cause those others to defer to the performer. In a social structure, then, there are involved all of the other concepts of the scheme developed here, with the exception of organizational structure. Competence and communication have been mentioned specifically, and involved with the three characters of motivation are, respectively, interest, the values specifically associated with the rules of procedure of a structure, and ideology.

An anthropologist will - ideally - know the nature of all of these elements and of their relationships. Knowing this, he need only refer to the observed manifestations of motivations in the structured situation to predict the consequences of changes wrought by colonial rule. But when these various elements begin to change extensively from the pre-contact situation, then it is necessary to "build back" to the pre-existing structure, making no assumptions about the bearing of particular phenomena on gratification and control.

The analysis of the evolution of the competence of the "man between" can go forward, in such an event, in terms of the conceptual scheme rather than of a hypothesis depending upon the postulate of equilibrium and the accompanying theory of structure. For example, it proved impossible to deal with elections of Mende chiefs through the hypothesis offered by the authors of <u>African Political Systems</u>. Restric-

tions on force perhaps explain the increase in numbers of candidates, but they do not explain the usual outcome of elections.

It is necessary to talk in terms of the conceptual scheme to do this. The process of election involved various contending interests arising out of the material and other advantages of the chief's office. The candidates presumably were weighed partially on the basis of technical competence, and on top of this there was intensive communication. All of these phenomena were without doubt evident in the pre-contact structure also; the Tribal Authority provided for in legislation was merely an adaptation of previous practice. The difference lay in the insistence of the colonial administration that the Tribal Authority keep busy communicating about nominees until consensus was reached. Out of this insistence and the resulting processes of communication, the available data indicate, came competence in fact for the chosen individual.

In this analysis social structure is not eliminated, for as pointed out, it is the context in which the struggle went on and as such a source of motivation. Everyone agreed to the rules of procedure which called for a chief to rule over a chiefdom, doing certain things in certain ways, and furthermore to those rules which united descent groups and permitted them to put forward candidates. It seems probable that in any given place and situation, much the larger proportion of total activity can be accounted for simply by reference to social structure as motivation. Alexander Leighton[1] cites T. E. Lawrence

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[1] Alexander Leighton, The Governing of Men, (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1945) pp. 334-335.

as commenting that 90 per cent of the Arab population did not lift a
finger against the Turks in World War I, but it was upon their stolid-
ity and unchangeableness that the new Arab states would have to rest;
and of course it was in those terms that most of the motivation in the
situation would have to be accounted for. It seems just as reasonable
to say the same thing of most individuals: although they may be in
rebellion in some part of their activity, their motivations driving
them away from some patterns of behavior, yet much of their conduct
will be conformist. The various schools of abstractionist painters,
for example, have refused to follow certain old patterns, but they con-
tinue to use rectangular frames and hang their work on the walls of
galleries.

Environment and Political Activity

In the preceding sections, attention was concentrated upon the
problems of explaining the evolution of the competence of the African
official, insofar as competence may be affected by alterations in the
internal balance of the system. In this portion of the chapter, the
inquiry will proceed to the effect of alterations in the external bal-
ance of the political system. The concept of the external balance im-
plies, it will be recalled, a context of human needs and purposes which
call for integration into some pattern through the activity of the poli-
tical system. Changes in these needs and purposes will constitute al-
terations in the external balance of the system, for as new elements
entering the situation, they will necessitate an adjustment of the
system to take them into account. In the process of doing this and
thus establishing a new external balance, the internal balance of the

system, the interrelationships of the elements of the conceptual scheme, is changed because it is only through such changes in interrelationships that the new external balance can be struck.

The two questions in terms of which the examination of the effect of alterations in the external balance is undertaken do not take into account all changes in the context of the political system, but only those which may have their effect through the African official by changing him or the people about him. Changes in the external balance which have their effect on the political system through British officials have already been partially dealt with in fashioning the typology of policy in earlier chapters.

The questions both ask about the _effect_ of change in the context of the political system. This is of course a matter for empirical investigation; but there are numerous agents of change, which will have various effects on the political system. A first step in obtaining comparability among African political systems with reference to the differential effect upon them of changes in the context will necessarily be to develop a typology of agents of change.

To take this step, reference might be made to what happened in Mendeland after British rule began. After 1890 Mendeland was pacified, "opened up", a railway and some roads were built, traders extended their operations throughout the area and these "modern" systems of commerce and communication were supplemented to an ever increasing extent by missionary and governmental enterprise in the field of education. This account suggests several types of agents of change. Three may be singled out - economic development, education and population movement.

Since education in Africa and Mendeland especially has been so tied up with missionary work, the category of religion (made general, to take into account Islam as well as Christianity) might well be added. However, the three agents of change listed are enough to illustrate a method of getting at answers to the two questions under consideration.

If an agent of change is discerned to be operating in the context of a political system, it may well be possible, as a new step in increasing the feasibility of comparison, to obtain some measurements of the agent by which to characterize it as a type of agent of change. When this is done, the way is opened to infer quantities of new factors as a fresh context of needs and purposes to which the political system must adjust. A territorial political unit characterized by extensive changes in all three categories listed here might be expected to show a permutation of relationships among the elements of the conceptual scheme, and an alteration in overall performance, quite different from that of a political unit only slightly changed in all three.

Even to have established types which can be related in this fashion to the political system is a step forward in comparative work. But to go only this far really constitutes correlation of changes in political system and context, not explanation of how the changes in context operated to alter the political system. If the types of change are to be interpreted fully in their relations to the political system, then there should be some fairly consistent notions about how the statistical or other data classifiable under the heading of a particular agent of change bear as _input_ upon the political system.

This assertion can be explained as follows: it is assumed that changes in the context, as they affect the competence of the "man between", may take effect directly or indirectly. A change in technical or factual competence may be immediately traceable to changes in the context, or other elements in the system may be so affected by these changes that an adjustment in technical or factual competence will be required in the process of reestablishing a balance among the interrelated elements. Whether direct or indirect in effect on competence, however, changes in the context will operate on the political system by putting into one element or another something which was not there before.[1]

By way of example only, a few such relationships between agents of change and elements of the political system, stated as concepts in the scheme developed here, may be suggested. The ramifications and implications of the analysis of changes in context of the political system are obviously great, and within the limits of a few pages it cannot be hoped to go very far with them.

Economic Development: The basic idea behind emphasis on this category of data is that such development implies functional differentiation - the coming into existence of economic activities which are to a greater or lesser degree distinct from the old. Activity implies purpose, and as activity changes through economic development, so will purpose. There are obvious implications for the political system.

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[1]Of course, changes in the context may also take something out, and this possibility must be considered also. For example, the westernized young chief who the Provincial Commissioner reported did not know native custom (See page 118) in this sense had lost technical competence through concentration on acquiring a "modern" education rather than a "traditional" one.

Various new functional categories in the economic sphere may come onto the political scene as interest groups, seeking satisfactions of certain felt needs. Economic development therefore stands in direct ratio with interest as that concept is defined here. It may be suggested that a high degree of economic development will result in a new incidence of interest as an element in the political process.

Economic development is also related to the concepts of compe-tence and communication. The second relationship is more direct than the first, for the division of labor involved in functional differentiation compels people to rely more on one another for satisfactions of their various needs and desires. They will require contact, and contact may pose the problem of communication with a view to some integration of discordant purposes. The greater the degree of economic development, the greater will be the demands made upon the capacity for and ingenuity in communication in the system.

Since economic development increases divergence of purposes at the same time it increases interdependence, the tasks of achieving the necessary coordination call for new technical competence in the form of understanding of new situations created and measures to alleviate difficulties created. Furthermore, the coming into existence of new interests will affect competence in fact, since the African official will be asked to recognize these interests in his activity and perhaps to lower the priority of other and older interests correspondingly. This is the problem of representation, of access and identification.

Education: To discuss at any length the relationship of education to the conceptual scheme would be to belabor the obvious.

Education relates directly to at least two of the concepts, competence and ideology. The concept of communication is left to one side, as it seems to be taken care of by the idea that among the things taught at school is competence to communicate - communications patterns and skills are "built into" the student so that he will be more capable of performing well at whatever he is supposed to do. This does not eliminate the concept, for there is more to communication than the part individuals are trained to play in the process, but it does eliminate it from consideration here. Technical competence achieved by education may relate to particular skills: an ability to type eighty words per minute or keep double-entry ledgers. But frequently the criteria of performance which define technical competence will be both more vague and more general, because there is a penumbra of knowledge and attitudes about the particular skill which is acquired in the course of education. Thus an ability to communicate, involving education in the English language, might be the main criterion for a British administrator in employing a new Mende clerk; but at the same time he hired this skill, the administrator would presumably hope to get a clerk who had also acquired a general education that would equip him to use his skills with an eye to the bureaucratic norms and other structural prescriptions. The presumption is that the higher the level and standard of education and the broader its range, the greater its effect on the individual, and hence its general influence on competence.

Consideration of breadth and depth of education in relation to competence carries over to the concept of ideology. When education ranges beyond mere technological training, it is apparently necessary

that beliefs should in some degree be inculcated as a part of the process. They constitute reasons which the student may employ to put what he is being taught in place as part of his cosmos, and accordingly to guide his activity more intelligently. The beliefs and thought which are so inculcated become part of the individual's stock, which under the definition used here can be called ideology when used to guide his activity in the political system.

If this is so, then it seems obvious that education might have its main influence on the political system by supplying great numbers of people with similar stocks of belief. Thus the extent to which education is developed in a territory becomes a significant criterion for typifying the particular unit because of its relation to competence in fact. There may be a circular process involved here, in which belief in education itself becomes a species of ideology. There is great pressure for education, and those who have it may tend to be looked to as leaders, they in turn may he lp to develop and inculcate a coherent system of beliefs, until the movement becomes politically significant.

Population Movement: There are certain circumstances under which population movement may prove a good standard by which to characterize a territorial political unit. Not just any movement of population will do; the mere shifting of villages or the breaking up of larger settlements upon cessation of tribal wars are not the kind of thing envisaged here. But population movements which result in the establishment of close contact with alien influences by numerous individuals are a different matter. First, they quite possibly may be an aspect of functional differentiation which escapes notice if sole reliance is placed

on the relatively crude yardstick of economic development. The African
group in question may simply remain poor and relatively unproductive in
a somewhat different fashion which is nevertheless important because
there is uprooting. Second, there is an element of training present in
the situation, for contact must almost inevitably be accompanied by
communication and learning. New ideas or interests, and new abilities,
may be picked up and imported onto the local scene as part of the bag-
gage of returning natives. But there is a third facet of population
movement which seems to provide the best justification for its use as
a device for typification.

Population movement, in the sense used here, is in part a pro-
cess which creates a need for more intensive social communication with
elements alien to the persons who have moved. In an arresting presen-
tation, Karl Deutsch attempts tentatively to establish the hypothesis
that national conflict (read group conflict) is a function of the rela-
tionship between the "rate of mobilization" for social contact and the
"rate of assimilation" - the pace at which the need thus created for
social communication is met.[1] If assimilation is defined as the disso-
lution of technical barriers such as language differences, and of moral
evaluations which constrain communication, one can arrive at an idea of
the usefulness of population movement as a typing device. Given a cer-
tain lack of assimilation, it may be suggested, an increase in popula-
tion movement will result in an increase in group sentiment. This may
come to bear on the political system in the home area of the people

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[1]Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York,
John Wiley, 1953), pp. 97-126.

concerned as ideology, or it may have less direct consequences by stimulating an interest in education or ways of earning a better living.

However, population movement may in part be occasioned by a desire for social communication rather than itself create a need for it. In his study of the Polish peasant in America, W. I. Thomas had something like this in mind when he postulated as a motive for migration the "desire for new experience". In the individual, the desire for new social communication is manifested by such things as social climbing, or, more formally, the "imitation of overt behavior"[1] There are many well-known instances of its operation as a mechanism for communication; for example, in parts of Latin America change in social class may involve nothing more than a change in clothing to conform with the standards of the class. One need go no further than Mendeland to find similar phenomena. There is a general desire to attain European standards, which in practice means imitation of the "Creoles" of Freetown,[2] beginning with dress and proceeding to such things as adoption of English or "Krio" as the major language of use and acquisition of an English surname.

If a great many people "pass" in this manner, a new group or social class will come into existence in the African society, as Little reports in the article just referred to. It would possess interests and ideology different from those previously existing and therefore might well have an effect on the political system.

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[1]E. Sapir, "Communication", excerpt from article in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences reprinted in Berelson and Janowitz (eds.) Reader in Public Opinion and Communication (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1953), pp. 160-164.

[2]K. L. Little, "Social Change and Social Class in the Sierra Leone Protectorate", American Journal of Sociology, July, 1948, pp. 10-21.

CHAPTER IX

THE SCHEME AND ITS FUTURE

In the statement with which this paper began, it was said that the purpose was to search out a route of approach to the analysis of territorially defined local governmental units in the colonial areas of Africa. These were regarded as constituted by the joint participation of Africans and colonial service personnel and other Europeans, and were termed "African political systems". It was suggested that what was needed for this purpose was a conceptual scheme, a framework for thought and observation which would provide a sorely needed guide to the student in collecting data and relating items of fact to one another in logically consistent and significant ways. The primary intention was thus not to carry out research and analysis of substantive materials, but to prepare for it by laying out a pattern through which to orient such research efforts.

The preceding chapters contain the results of this effort, and this final chapter is appended to evaluate these results and to suggest, necessarily in general terms, how they may be capitalized upon and extended in actual research. First, however, a resume of the theoretical foundations of the scheme, the scheme of concepts itself and the ways in which the two fit together to make a usable framework for study of the African political system will be offered as a convenient reference in the discussion.

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A Resume' of the Argument

A system may be defined as "the interaction of a plurality of individual actors oriented to a situation". Participation in a system, therefore, is simply activity in conjunction with other individuals with reference to an objective or problem. The objective or problem is always the starting point in the system of action, and participation follows in the form of some behavior connected with the situation thus created.

It follows from this that there can be as many systems of human action as there are situations which draw two or more individuals into relationships. The political system is a particular type, on a high level of abstraction, and can best be understood by reference to the things which must be done in human society if that society is to come into being and to persist. The basic material of society is aggregates of individuals, each one with his own needs and purposes, and each individual manifesting at least some will to achieve satisfaction of these. Theoretically, the result might be a chaos. To explain why there is in fact ordered conduct in social relationships, it is necessary to suggest certain mechanisms or elements - political, economic or religious, for example - whose function is to integrate activity into patterns of generally compatible behavior. A political situation thus comes about when, despite the operations of other "elements of integration", there remain needs and purposes which require control or reconciliation if stable social relationships are to exist. The activity oriented to such a situation constitutes the political system of action, participation implying some intention of somehow controlling

the divergent needs or purposes.

In point of fact, the situation to which activity of participants in a political system will be oriented will be a policy or proposals for a policy, which will be a course of action for coping with questions raised regarding what should be done or be made to happen by or on behalf of at least some members of a social unit. The African political system, like all others, will be a complex of activity turning on a policy or proposal of policy. Its main outlines are sketched by the situation of contact between European and African, with which of course is associated a colonial policy expressing the purpose of the colonial power to exercise control in certain ways over the African. Political activity in this system will be all behavior relating to the execution of this course of action.

However, from the notion of policy as the situation about which the political system forms it follows that as the focus of policy shifts from issue to issue, the political system will also change. It is therefore also possible to consider the African political system as the system of action which shapes itself about any particular policy within this general framework of colonial policy. To distinguish these important variations within the abiding system of action oriented to the situation of colonial rule, they may be called "policy systems" rather than political systems.

Interaction in a system implies interdependence among the elements of behavior or the individuals oriented to the situation, so that a change in one element will lead to changes in others. There are two possible results from such interdependence. Either the changes will

assume a pattern in which the tendency of one element to change will be
effectively balanced by counter-tendencies in other elements, with the
result that activity will not alter the situation to which it is orien-
ted, or tendencies to change will not be effectively counterbalanced,
with the result that the situation and the system of action will both
be altered. The first condition will be a state of equilibrium, the
second one of disequilibrium.

As the situation to which activity is oriented, a policy will of
course be subject to either of these consequences. A policy will have
eventuated in a state of equilibrium if the direction of action to which
it points remains effective, or in disequilibrium if the direction of
action undergoes mutation or is dropped entirely out of sight.

A policy is a plan of action, and it must be assumed that one
which is seriously intended to be workable will be designed with a view
to its probable success. A state of equilibrium among the elements of
behavior bearing on the policy will be the aim, and the prediction of
such a state which a soberly formulated policy will represent will be
both the resultant of observed impact of such elements upon one another,
and a forecast of future experience. In the case of the African polit-
ical system, furthermore, a policy will be an attempt to anticipate or
predict a state of moving equilibrium, in which the activity of those
making the policy as well as the activity of other participants will
enter into the calculation of the balance of the elements in the sys-
tem. The predicted or aimed at level of official activity in the
system will therefore help provide a standard, through comparison of
the differences between the plan and the actuality, against which to

measure the success of a policy.

The various "policy systems" (of which four main ones are singled out on the basis of the historical record of British colonial rule in Africa - those of public order, "supervision", economic and social and political reform, and representative control) will therefore record loss of moving equilibrium and a simultaneous attempt to reestablish a new moving equilibrium on the basis of a changed alignment of elements in the political system, including the behavior of colonial officials. Such loss and reestablishment may stem from one of two sources, for the state of equilibrium has two aspects, the internal and external balances. The first has to do with interdependence of the elements of the system; an internal balance exists if the elements counteract tendencies toward change in one another, thus maintaining a state of equilibrium. An external balance exists if the system of elements takes account of the context of needs and purposes of the political system existing in the social unit in which it operates. The two go together as opposite sides of the same coin, for the system cannot persist unless the elements do exhibit such a stable balance of relationships and at the same time create conditions meeting the requirements of survival in an environment.

Loss of equilibrium in a policy system may thus arise simply from inaccurate prediction of the state of the elements and their interrelationships in the internal balance, or come about through failure to take into account the context of needs and purposes contributing to the activity entering into such relationships and comprising the environment or situation of the system. Despite the plan or prediction,

the activity will take into account these needs and purposes. Or loss of equilibrium may arise from a change in the context of the policy system subsequent to the formulation of policy, resulting in changes in the internal balance to take them into account.

There has been much mention of the elements of behavior in the political system in the theoretical discussion above. It is the function of a conceptual scheme to reduce to a few clearly definable phenomena these elements of behavior, so that the mind can begin to grasp the political system "whole", and to set about sorting out the complex relationships in the system into ordered patterns. Five concepts, some with one or more subdivisions or appendages, are offered with this purpose in mind.

Structure was defined as "a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity of action or operation". It is constituted by the reciprocally influential behaviors of holders of positions who are expected to perform certain sets of activities in accordance with rules of procedure. The leverage of such rules, in securing compliance and hence reciprocal influence, is provided by the rewards and sanctions in the hands of the various participants. Two sub-categories are important in analysis of the African political system: organizational structure, which refers to the consciously planned and imposed patterns of activity sponsored by the colonial power, and social structure, the patterns of activity found in African tribal societies.

Communication was defined as the transfer of meaning by symbols or actions, the transmittal of stimuli, which become cues through the attachment of meaning by the sender, through some physical means.

Competence was defined as a condition of relative ability to perform a given task or carry out a given purpose. There are three sub-categories. Legitimate competence is an aspect of structure, resting on the legitimation of certain activities by an individual because he holds a position and is required and permitted by the relevant rules of procedure to perform them. This legitimation can be important to capacity to perform simply because the rules of procedure call for others not to block the holder in the conduct of activities attached to the position. Allied with this call upon the participants in the structure to permit this activity is, of course, the call upon the individual to perform his tasks to the level legalized by the rules of procedure. Competence in fact refers to the actual ability, as opposed to the prescribed capacity imposed by structure and legitimate competence, to pursue a course of action without regard to the response or lack thereof by others which might conceivably block that course. Technical competence refers to individual or personal characteristics bearing on the ability to perform a task or carry out a purpose.

The last two concepts are coordinate aspects of motivation. Interest is definable in a general way in terms of need or desire; ideology, of belief.

These concepts are complexly interrelated. For example, communication was obviously necessary between European and African participants in their respective structures after contact was established. In incorporating Africans into the organizational structure of colonial rule, the colonial administrators conferred certain legitimate competences upon them, but neither the technical competence nor competence

in fact to carry out the activities thus legitimated could thus auto-matically be established. Technical competence to perform might require a certain minimum of interest; furthermore, even personal interest might be made ineffective in securing desired performance because of disinter-est or even opposition by other Africans blocking a course of action. On the other hand, personal interest and energy might be all too effec-tive, in the absence of the interest of others which could block unau-thorized activity. Communication is also needed in such an instance to provide suitable conditions for control to operate, for the uninformed but interested cannot act appropriately. In part, the pre-existing channels of communication of the social structure might be adapted to the needs of the organizational structure in this respect.

The definition of these concepts prepares the way for their as-sociation with the types of "policy systems" and with the notion of moving equilibrium set forth above. Each of the policy systems can be traced, in its genesis and mutation to a succeeding policy, to de-ficiencies, actual or anticipated, in the internal balance of a system, and to alterations, again actual or anticipated, in the context of a system, upsetting the external balance. Such changes can be analyzed in terms of the concepts set forth above.

Thus, the change from a policy of supervision to one of reform was dictated in part by the failure of the former policy system to gen-erate or incorporate the technical competence to cope with "modern" problems, except among a small minority of Africans whose ability to proceed with a course of action (competence in fact) was all too like-ly to be quite narrow because of failure of other Africans to grasp

new problems with the same intelligence and fervor, or rather broad, for much the same reason. These problems with respect to the internal balance of the policy system of supervision combined with an upsurge of ideology in the form of the doctrine of indirect rule, which emphasized preparation of the Africans for democratic control of aspects of the political system as the economic and social and political environment of African life changed. The doctrine altered the external balance of the system by affecting the ideas of some of those (the British participants) who were active in it. Because these ideas influenced their behavior and the behavior they encouraged in the Africans, there was a corresponding change in the internal balance of the system. When this change took place, the old equilibrium was lost and a new established, in the shape of the policy of reform.

This example illustrates the way the concepts are combined with the notion of equilibrium and of policy as an envisaged state of moving equilibrium which can be affected either by internal failure or external change. From the British standpoint, organizational structure is the most important of these concepts in carrying forward the analysis. It is, in a narrow sense, policy and a prediction of a moving equilibrium (for structure is by definition a state of equilibrium, since the reciprocal influences in the system of action restrain change in the various elements). As such, it implies elements of behavior defined by the other concepts, giving them all a place in the structure.

Therefore, with reference to the internal balance, the existing condition of the system in relation to that planned for it can be understood by comparing the actual relationships of the elements of behavior

identified with the other concepts to the relationships as envisaged in the organizational structure. Furthermore, with reference to the external balance, changes in organizational structure can be understood in terms of changes in the elements of behavior identified with the other concepts; for example, the changes in the ideological component of the African political system through the official adoption of the doctrine of indirect rule had a very profound effect upon the organizational structure of the policy system of reform.

The organizational structure is thus a standard to which to refer the activity of the political system in order to understand the consequences of actual operations of the system for its future. For example, under the policy system of supervision, organizational structure set certain limits of legitimate competence within which African officials might operate, but they frequently did not have the technical competence to undertake activity up to those limits. In addition, there was little assurance that they would not be forestalled in legitimate activity by the opposition or lack of response of fellow Africans, or on the other hand find it easy to operate far beyond those limits. Either case was of course a problem of competence in fact. The organizational structure is a standard for the student because it is the standard for the colonial official. Failure of the elements of the system to conform to the course of action thus laid out will lead to a change in official behavior and consequently in the state of the elements of the system. A change in his behavior stemming from attitudes brought by him to the political system will lead to a corresponding change in the organizational structure, sponsored by the official.

The heart of colonial policy and the consequent activity of the colonial official is communication with the African, seeking certain responses or receptivity to cues. As the primary target of these cues, situated as he is in the channel of communication leading to the mass of the African population, the African official is the crucial figure in the African political system. It is in terms of his technical competence (personal capacity and willingness to comply with cues), and his competence in fact (ability to act on cues without being blocked by other Africans) that the response of the whole society can be understood. His performance, when his competence is fully accounted for by reference to the various causal factors bearing on it, will explain the contribution made through the activity of Africans to the making or breaking of the state of moving equilibrium envisaged in a policy.

The standards for that performance will of course be set by the organizational structure, and may differ from position to position, according to what is expected in the way of technical competence, competence in fact and in the relations between the two. For example, the position with "political" duties de-emphasizes technical competence and stresses competence in fact, while an "administrative" position stresses technical competence within a narrow sphere of activity, outside of which the holder of the position should ideally be blocked from acting by others.

There are several approaches to analysis of the African official's performance. One is concerned with purely personal factors, such as character, mental makeup and physical condition. A very important one will relate to the pre-contact social structure, in which the official

or his predecessors in office originally occupied positions and performed activities, and from which his competence will have evolved. Since the social structure is a habitual or at least accustomed pattern of activity, it may be used, like organizational structure, as a standard to which to refer elements of the political system such as the competence of the African official in order to understand better the part his performance plays in relation to the rest of the political system. However, habit and the rules of procedure which accompany it are not immutable, but may be changed, destroyed or altered in the values placed upon them, by variations in component elements of the activity in the pre-contact social structure. Therefore, reference to descriptions of this social structure need to be made with much caution.

The source of such variation in elements of the social structure lies either in the fact of colonial rule and the imposition of new patterns of political activity through the organizational structure, or in social and economic change in African society. Both offer approaches to analysis of the competence of the African official. The first can be used to show how accustomed procedures in the social structure have been altered, giving rise to sentiments affecting his competence in fact and to changes in the methods of securing deference which are open to him, or, more indirectly, creating new rules of procedure. The second source of variations, represented here by such categories as economic development and education, will alter the context of the political system and hence what is brought to it as activity falling within the definition of one concept or another of the scheme.

Evaluation: The Utility of the Scheme

The evaluation of the results of this study should be related, at least initially, to the problem which stimulated the paper. This, it was noted in Chapter I,[1] was the substantial failure to bring within a single focus European and African political activity in the local administrative district in African colonies. It was proposed to devise a conceptual scheme which would accomplish the purpose by creating a framework for thought about, and observation of, this "African political system".

On the whole, the conceptual scheme offered here seems adequate as a guide to study of political activity in the African administrative district as a single system of action. Reference to the requirements of a conceptual scheme listed in Chapter I[2] will show in just what ways this adequacy obtains. The categories of phenomena defined by the concepts of the scheme are general enough in their incidence that the scheme can be said to cover at least a great deal of the political activity in the local African administrative unit. These concepts are also operational, in that an observer would have relatively little difficulty singling out phenomena which would fit the definitions. Perhaps more important, the conceptual scheme is systematic, for it was shown, particularly in Chapters IV, V and VI, how phenomena fitting into the various concepts bore causal relationships to each other. The activity of European and African participants here is brought into a single focus through the idea of a common orientation to a policy and

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[1]Pages 1-7.   [2]Pages 12-15.

of this "policy system" as a process of interaction among the elements
defined in the conceptual scheme.

The conceptual scheme thus seems to meet the minimum require-
ment as a framework or model upon which inquiry and observation can be
based - that it be at least a provisional way of making more coherent
and orderly the ideas about political activity in the African colonial
administrative district. This impression of adequacy as a guide for
study is strengthened by what is perhaps the most notable feature of
the resume' just given. There is a very strong emphasis upon what to
look for - the phenomena defined by the concepts - and how to relate
these phenomena to the historical narrative of colonial policy and ad-
ministration, to ethnographic accounts and to social and economic cir-
cumstances in African communities. This would appear to provide a
sound foundation upon which to stand in beginning work in the field or
with collected materials about local administrative units. To be sure,
there are also weaknesses and shortcomings, and the scheme does not do
more than hint at research tactics. However, before turning to these
problems some further evaluation of the utility of the scheme is in
order.

The above discussion has considered the scheme in application
only to a single African political system. However, the point was
made more than once that comparative analysis based upon the scheme
should be possible, at least among local units of administration in
British Africa. That "family resemblance" of policies - and the close
resemblances among the administrators carrying them out - provide the
condition of basic identity which is necessary for comparison. One

suggestion made was that characteristics held in common by all organizational structures might be examined in relation to characteristics of various social structures to attempt to determine what types of the latter fitted best with British policies. It was even hypothesized that officials in the Nandi tribe of Kenya, for example, might be less prone to nepotistic practices than Mende officials, because of a lesser emphasis on kinship in the social structure.

Such suggestions regarding analysis of the differential results of similar policies may be extended. For example, when the Mende are compared with tribes with somewhat similar social structure in the Gold Coast, their relative backwardness with respect to the goals of the policy of reform, and the absence of much pressure for the change of emphasis involved in the policy of representative control, may be explicable by reference to the environment of the political system. Economically, the Mende area was much the same in 1935 as in 1905, and did not develop mining enterprises or truly commercial agriculture on any significant scale until the 1930's and 1940's. So far as the figures show, education and population movement did not grow rapidly until after World War II, in contrast to the Gold Coast. Similarly, among the Nandi relatively advanced policies of reform and representative control did not produce much result until in the post-war years, when an economic upsurge began.[1]

Such facts as these suggest that there is room for work on particular concepts of the scheme, in conjunction with statistical and other data on change in the African society under examination. In

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[1]Geoffrey S. Snell, Nandi Customary Law (London: MacMillan and Co., 1954).

Chapter VIII, for example, mention was made of Karl Deutsch's speculations about the relation of communication and population movement. Deutsch offers the hypothesis that nationalism will develop if contact is not accompanied by communication to the point of assimilation of one group into another - the tests of communication being such things as adoption by one group of the language or general culture of another. Similar tests might be applied to Africa to measure the results of population movement in terms of communication. This would provide a basis for examination of a hypothesis, for example, that the competence in fact of a tribal official will not be affected if the contact resulting from population movement does not result in changes in communication patterns.

The discussion may now turn to evaluating the usefulness of the scheme beyond the British scene of Africa. When the designing of this scheme was undertaken, non-British areas and policies were deliberately excluded in order to simplify matters. However, there is no reason to suppose that the scheme would not be applicable likewise to French or Belgian colonies in Africa. The situation in all of its essentials is the same, and it would require only a reasonably detailed knowledge of French colonial policy, similar to that developed for British colonies, about which to organize the analysis, using the conceptual scheme and the method sketched in this paper.

In fact, there appears to be no theoretical reason why the scheme could not be applied even more widely. The concepts are general enough to have very broad application, and they are operational. To examine the possibilities and limitations of application a short theoretical

discussion is necessary here. The problem of scientific exploration, the establishment of causal relationships, is always that of treating a complex of interdependent elements with the subtlety which is required. That is why a straight-line cause and effect explanation is so frequently found lacking; not all of the distinctly relevant factors are taken into account, the omission leading to the fallacy of explanation in terms of a single controlling factor (or perhaps several) where in truth there are many elements somehow involved. The solution is so to design the inquiry that the factors which are focused upon are interpreted by establishing their consequences for the larger situation in which they are involved. In the laboratory this is accomplished by establishing controls which "hold constant" all but the factors whose relationships are under examination.

When this cannot be done, the idea of the system and the situation to which it has reference must be invoked. Everything defined as within the system is a causal factor, and everything outside of it is, for a given phase of the system, held constant. Then, in order to keep the factors within the system in proper perspective, they are interpreted with reference to their consequences for each other and thus for the situation of the system as a whole. Either they will operate to fulfill the functional requirements defined by the situation, or they will not.

A policy is the situation for which the factors in the political system have consequences, since it is to this situation that activity is oriented, as noted in Chapter II. Therefore, in order to use the conceptual scheme in analyzing various political processes, there must

be the possibility of establishing that there is such a situation and of defining it, so that the general method set forth here can be employed. It is rather doubtful, for example, whether the scheme would be very useful in a "home rule" situation, in which as far as higher authority was concerned, the local unit of government had carte blanche in many matters.

In addition, of course, the data should be relatively amenable to analysis in terms of concepts like social structure, which was adopted in this paper because it was peculiarly suited to the way inquiry and knowledge regarding African affairs has been organized.

One question which has not been touched upon is the feasibility of comparative analysis, in terms of the conceptual scheme, of differing systems of colonial administration. This would seem to be quite possible on one of two bases. Either elements of organizational structure, representing policy in that narrow sense spoken of in an earlier chapter, must be the same and the comparison be made with this as a starting point, or other elements found in the political systems being compared must be the same. This latter condition would in principle allow comparison of the causes for differentials in effectiveness of two policies which are not the same.

Suggestions for Further Development

It has been said that the scheme is adequate as a guide to study of African political systems. However, there is one apparent weakness; while it takes account of the personal factor in the concept of technical competence, it cannot be claimed that any full consideration has been given to the place of individual psychology in the scheme. That

this is important in the study of such things as competence is obvious,[1] and the question of how to incorporate it in the scheme is a matter which needs treatment beyond that given in this paper.

There is also one respect in which it cannot be said that the scheme has been demonstrated to fulfill the requirements of a conceptual scheme. It has not yet been shown to be highly fruitful of explanations of empirically observable phenomena. At very least the requirement of fruitfulness demands a system of testable hypotheses, and at most a system of "laws" or principles which can be used to predict the outcome of observed processes. Reflection on the content of this paper will reveal how far short of the minimum it falls.

The resume' expounds a method for sorting out data, including the provision of categories or concepts, but it says little about the interrelationships of phenomena defined by the concepts. It is true that in a general review there is a problem of space, but appeal to this reasoning merely highlights the failure to arrive at any concise formulations of propositions about relationships among the phenomena falling within the definitions of the various concepts.

The best generalizations about these relationships that could be produced within the limits of this paper were quite vague and general indeed. It was suggested in the preceding chapter, for example, that certain changes in the African economy might establish new interests, effect changes in competence in fact by raising these new issues and thus affect the communications network. Likewise, it was pointed out that social structure which made kinship relatively insignificant might permit more technical competence in the form of compliance with

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[1] Alvin Gouldner, Studies of Leadership (New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 1-39, discusses leadership in terms of the personal and the situational factors. It is essentially true that in this scheme only the situational factors have been considered in the relationship of the technical competence of the African official to his competence in fact, a relationship which is actually one of leadership.

bureaucratic norms, with their condemnation of nepotistic practices, than a social structure which did not. The adverse effects of reducing the content of communication with one's relatives in this manner was brought forward as a possible basis for such a (hypothetical) relationship. Furthermore, there have been many suggestions of this kind: that reliability and effectiveness of communication depend upon the elements of social structure incorporated into the organizational structure and its communicative system, upon the interests which impel communication and upon technical competence (both to comprehend the cue and to act upon it).

These examples could be multiplied, but there is little point in culling the paper for additional propositions of like caliber. However, even though little or no progress has been made in this paper toward precise statements of how the concepts will be related in particular circumstances, it is clear that there is some sort of systematic relationship among them, as pointed out earlier. The elucidation of these relationships in the form of testable and tested hypotheses is a problem for further research.

The area of inadequacy relating to the requirement of fruitfulness does not justify dismissal of the conceptual scheme as a useless exercise, considering that it meets requirements in other respects. The problem is why the scheme is inadequate in this important respect, and this may be dealt with by reference to the nature of hypothesis. The mental process rests on a notion of the relationship of things perceived as facts, and the more clearly the relevant facts are noted, the more firmly can a testable hypothesis be formulated and put on trial.

Facts must be marshalled, therefore, at all stages in the process of developing explanatory propositions, not only in the testing stage. Some facts, referring mainly to the Mende, were used here, but they constituted a bare minimum necessary for the exposition of the conceptual scheme. The lack of factual bases for hypotheses is at least part of the reason for their absence, and the crying need now, for developing the explanatory power of the scheme, is more facts.

The paths which research should now take in accumulating the data necessary are clearly implied in the line of argument set forth in the resume'. The ultimate point of reference is always policy, as the situation toward which political activity is oriented. What is required is information which accounts for the policy and its effectiveness or lack thereof. All of this information can be sorted out in terms of the conceptual scheme.

Since policy, as an element in the political system, takes the form of organizational structure, this is the first sort of data to be sought through research. A thorough knowledge of the positions, sets of activities, rules of procedure and the motivations planned upon to insure adherence to those rules will be needed, right down to the level of the taxpayer and the voter, if there is a franchise. Because organizational structure is a mere shell, a planned and imposed rather than evolved pattern of activity, however, the question of the conformity of participants in the political system to the plan immediately arises. The participants of course divide into the main categories of European official and African.

Data regarding the European official and his conduct is therefore

the second kind of information to be sought. His technical competence will be a particularly important item. It will involve his comprehension of the background of the policy he is pursuing, in terms both of the internal and the external balance of the previous policy, traits of personality, grasp of how things should go under the current policy, and even state of health, since a sick man cannot carry on as well as a healthy one. Interest and ideology will be involved; a man waiting out his pension, or out of sorts with the policy he is supposed to enforce, will not be so effective as one imbued with fervor for his work, presumably. The state of his communications with fellow officials and Africans, in terms of channels, kinds of cues, their frequency and timing, and the means employed to back up cues to obtain compliance will need to be known. All of these factors will enter into the actual functioning, as opposed to the ideal condition, of the organizational structure, altering perhaps the planned network of communication, the cues passing through it, the definitions of legitimate competence for certain holders of positions (since the official is the arbiter of those definitions) and changing other motivations which shore up the structure.

The third kind of information to be sought, that concerning the behavior of the African official, has already very largely been dealt with.[1] A few remarks might be added. The anthropologist provides the initial block of data, in the form of descriptions of social structure and ideology in the pre-colonial period. The rest has to be sought in the field. As in the case of the European official, the first emphasis in inquiry should be upon technical competence, because this represents

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[1]Page 261.

performance taken in relation to organizational structure and hence contains the seed of future fulfillment or failure of the policy behind the structure. The technical competence of a non-official may afford matter for research, if the activity affects the operation of the organizational structure and thus falls within the ken of the European official to the extent that his activity as an element in the system must be thrown into the balance- to maintain equilibrium. However, the data on technical competence may be found most readily through study of units in the organizational structure, such as councils, courts and offices.

The fourth kind of data will be those changes in the part of the context of the political system belonging to the "African world". They will fall into such categories as economic development, religious innovations, education and population movement. Such factors are quite obviously important for political change in many parts of Africa and the world, but even so, few correlations precise enough for prediction seem to have been established.

This point carries the discussion from fact to typology. A hypothesized connection or correlation can only be demonstrated over a number of instances if the circumstances surrounding the looked-for consequences are the same. It is too much to expect that in a situation as complicated as that of the African political system very many correlations of "one to one" such as, say, between education and political demands, could be demonstrated to occur predictably. There are too many facts involved in political change; the circumstances influencing a result are too complex and variable for such a simple corre-

lation to be possible on a consistent basis. The kinds of facts which may be significant need to be sorted out.

The conceptual scheme is an effort of this kind, but when the elements subject to variation are reduced to such a very few, establishment of a degree of predictability may be equally difficult for the very reason that the highly generalized approach smooths over the variations which are significant in such a complex real life relationship. The concepts, however, are primary ones, in what might even be called a primary typology, and they are subject to the elaboration necessary to take into account significant variations. Apparent lack of "fruitfulness" may be due to the incomplete utilization of the possibilities of such elaboration, rather than failure of these primary concepts to open the way to explanation. This possibility needs to be explored.

Therefore, it will at some point be necessary for research to move from the level of collection of data and sorting of facts into the "boxes" provided by the concepts put forward in the scheme here, to the establishment and employment of types within the primary categories, for the purpose of setting up hypotheses which will be empirically testable. The bureaucratic norms of the organizational structure were offered in the body of the paper as an example of the technique; other significant types of phenomena might be categories of interest, kinds of communication networks, types of cues and of social structures, as suggested in Chapter VIII. The student working in a particular administrative unit will, in trying to explain the causal relationships among the items of fact which he observes, tend to develop such typologies as the variations among circumstances are dealt with. Beyond

this, comparative work among political units will tend to follow the same lines of development. These research procedures, the collection of fact, the development of "dimensions" or types of phenomena in the course of formulating explanations, all within the terms of a conceptual scheme such as that developed here, need encouragement if the research opportunities inherent in the field of primitive societies under the influence of quite similar political controls and guidance and economic and social stimulants are to be used to full advantage.

This needs to be said, because it has been possible here only to begin the huge task of unravelling the problems of analysis of the African political system - of assembling the watches, to use the analogy one final time. Some parts are sorted out on the table. Some notions of their interrelationships in the whole scheme of things suggest themselves, but in the main, they are too generally stated, too full of possibilities of variation, to be testable hypotheses. What is needed is more knowledge of these relationships in the context of the situations in which they occur before prediction can even be thought of. It is to be hoped, however, that this conceptual scheme will prove adequate as a framework for fruitful study along the lines set forth above.

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